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Abstract 
The main objective of the present study is to identify the extent of corporate 
internet reporting practices in an emerging economy through the extent of 
disclosing mandatory and voluntary information on the internet. It also 
addresses the determinants of such reporting practices. It uses sample from 
Bangladesh, an emerging capital market with few disclosure studies regarding 
corporate internet reporting.  
To measure the extent of mandatory and voluntary disclosure two self 
constructed checklists were used. The results of the checklist are analysed in 
total and by different categories. By using a sample size of 234 companies, both 
bivariate and multivariate analysis is performed to identify the determinants of 
mandatory and voluntary disclosure on the internet. 
The result indicates that about 90.70% companies have websites and all of 
them disclose a small amount of corporate information. While the extent of 
mandatory reporting is 66.24%, the extent of voluntary reporting is 35.46%. The 
telecommunication sector discloses the highest amount of mandatory 
information and the banking sector discloses the highest amount of voluntary 
information on the internet. The tannery sector discloses the lowest amount of 
mandatory and voluntary information.  
The result also reveals that DXGLWILUP¶VLQWHUQDWLRQDOOLQNLQGHSHQGHQWGLUHFWRUV
in the board and dual leadership structure have significant positive association 
and profitability measured by ROE has significant negative association with the 
level of disclosing of mandatory and voluntary information by the Bangladeshi 
companies. Although firm size, multinational parent, and industry type have 
significant positive association with the level of disclosing voluntary information, 
they are non-significant in mandatory disclosure. In addition, board size, 
ownership structure and company age has non- significant association with the 
level of both mandatory and voluntary disclosure. 
By providing the current status of disclosing mandatory and voluntary 
information on the internet, this study contributes to reduce the existing gap in 
the literature relating to emerging economies and helps to identify the need for 
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Chapter: 1 
Introduction 
 
1.1 Introduction: 
Corporate reporting on the Internet is a new approach in emerging economy for 
outside decision makers to access relevant accounting information. To meet the 
information needs of users, companies in the developed countries started to 
disclose financial and non-financial information on the internet. Being the fastest 
mode of communication, the internet has the widest reach in the present world 
of globalised economies. It is a technology that has the potential to exhibit 
distinctive and attractive information features, which makes it a more efficient 
and cost effective than the traditional methods of print media (Garg and Divya 
2010). :LWK WKH KHOS RI WKLV QHZ WHFKQRORJ\ FRPSDQLHV¶ LQWHUQDO DV ZHOO DV
external communication networks are changing. The current competitive 
environment is requiring more useful accounting information and so investors, 
social agents, clients, suppliers and other interest groups are demanding more 
and more relevant, comparative accounting information. Currently companies 
are also concerned to disclose information beyond that which is mandatory to 
attract investors as well as to improve their image and reputation. In this 
context, the dissemination of accounting information on the internet is adding a 
new dimension to corporate reporting (Bonson and Tomas 2002). 
 
This chapter provides the foundation for the thesis. It discusses the background 
and motivation for the research in section 1.2, importance of corporate internet 
reporting in section 1.3, Justification for Selecting Bangladesh in section 1.4. 
Section1.5 provides the research questions and section 1.6 focuses on 
research aims and objectives. It also discusses contribution to knowledge in 
section 1.7. Finally the structure of the thesis is presented in section 1.8. 
 
1.2 Background and Motivation for the Research: 
Corporate reporting is an act of making financial statements transparent and 
public in line with statutory standards and guidelines which plays an important 
role in companies, because it reflects the efficiency and effectiveness of the 
management of the company and the work undertaken by the company 
(Sakarneh 2011). It should likewise be useful to the managers and directors 
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themselves in making decisions on behalf of the owners. Companies around the 
globe are making increased use of internet financial reporting (Khlifi 2007; 
Pervan 2006; Oyelere 2003; and CTM 2003) as they are now operating in a 
global market for capital, making the market more competitive. Operating in 
VXFK DQ HQYLURQPHQW KDV SUHVVXULVHG FRPSDQLHV LQWR KDYLQJ WKH µKLJKHVW
LQWHUQDWLRQDO VWDQGDUGV RI GLVFORVXUH¶ 0\QHUV  S  *URZLQJ
internationalisation of shareholder bases has meant that companies are seeking 
more effective and efficient means of communicating with their stakeholders 
(Brennan and Hourigan1999) and Internet can play a significant role in this 
communication process. 
 
This internet technology is a unique information disclosure tool that encourages 
flexible forms of presentation and allows immediate, broad and inexpensive 
communication to investors (Kelton and Yang 2008). The practice of 
disseminating business information in a digital format is spreading around the 
world (Bonson and Thomas 2006), and becoming a very important part of 
business information services (Liu 2000). As the Internet communication is 
multidirectional in nature and a very fast of transmission, companies can deliver 
unfiltered information to the public without a time lag (Sanchez et al. 2011). 
Thus, corporate internet reporting may be an effective tool for improving 
disclosure transparency (Kelton and Ya-wen 2008). 
 
According to the CIPE (2003) report,  recent scandals in a number of developed 
markets around the world have increased global concern about the issue of 
corporate governance in general and disclosure and transparency in particular. 
This raises questions about the possibility of future similar scandals in emerging 
capital markets. In response to these recent high profile accounting frauds, 
regulatory bodies (e.g., IASB, IFA) have attempted to improve disclosure 
transparency by encouraging companies to use the internet as a prime tool for 
information dissemination. Hodge et al. (2004) also support that technologies 
that allow alternative presentation formats for financial information may facilitate 
investor information gathering, improve disclosure transparency, and influence 
the investor decision process. Therefore, a firm may improve its disclosure 
transparency with both the content and presentation format of internet 
disclosures.  
- 16 - 
 
 
Prior research (e.g.,Kelton and Yang 2008, Gul and Leung 2004, Ajinkya et al. 
2005) has focused on corporate transparency and capital market development. 
The effective functioning of capital markets, however, significantly depends on 
the effective flow of information between the company and its stakeholders. 
Information disclosure is seen as a means to improve marketability of shares, to 
enhance corporate image, and to reduce the cost of capital (Meek et al. 1995). 
 
Given the increasing use of internet reporting, these constituents of financial 
reporting will need to develop new strategies to pro-actively respond to financial 
UHSRUWV LQFOXGLQJDXGLWRUV¶ UHSRUWVRQ WKH LQWHUQHW ,ISROLF\PDNHUVHQFRXUDJH
firms to adopt better disclosure technologies it should make markets more 
transparent (Debreceny et al. 2002). There has also been a less developed 
stream of regulation-related research that examines the issue of the needed 
changes in accounting regulations with respect to the changes that internet 
reporting brings about on the identity of contemporary business organisations 
and on the needs of their stakeholders (Andrikopoulos and Nikolaos 2007). 
 
Substantial accounting literature (e.g., Ball and Foster 1982; Belkaoui and Khal 
1978; Brennan and Hourigan1999; Gul and Leung 2004; Kelton and Yang 
2008) has emerged in the last thirty years that explains corporate financial 
reporting behaviour. As business reporting on the internet becomes more 
widespread, regulators and standard setters are beginning to question the 
acceptability and quality of internet-based business reporting. The development 
of standards for internet reporting is still at a discussion stage. Despite the 
absence of online reporting standards, the issue has been addressed in 
regulations concerning general reporting and disclosure issues (Marston and 
Annika 2004). The internet offers a potential delivery mechanism enabling the 
standards to operate on a global scale in a way not possible before. This is the 
reason why standard setting bodies across the world are concerned with the 
issue of the global reach of corporate reporting and of the jurisdictions of 
accounting regulations (Khan et al. 2008). 
 
Before the internet became a mass phenomenon, starting around the mid-
nineties, paper-based reports were the medium for corporate reporting. While 
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these reports are still used by stockholders, they may not consider them 
sufficiently detailed, accessible, timely or interactive (Allam et al. 2004). In 
contrast, the internet makes it easier for companies to distribute information to 
an extensive array of investors in a more opportune and convenient way. The 
internet also offers managers the prospect to contact all investors and to make 
available daily updates of relevant information. 
 
There are many surveys and empirical studies related to corporate financial 
reporting on the internet in different developed countries (e.g., Brennan and 
Hourigan 1999- Ireland; Ettredge et al. 2002 ± USA; Bonson and Thomas 2002 
- European Union country; Marston 2003 ± Japan; Marston and Annika 2004 ± 
Germany). In contrast, very little is known about the disclosure of financial 
information on the internet by companies in developing countries. As a result 
there is an increasing need to describe the current situation of financial 
reporting on the internet in the developing world. Klapper and Love (2004) and 
Durnev and Kim (2005) found that emerging countries are characterised by 
poorer corporate governance practices and inferior judicial systems than those 
of the developed countries. Furthermore, the increase in the market value that a 
company can obtain when it improves its corporate governance practices is 
much greater in emerging markets: this means, that corporate governance 
practices matter more in countries where legal protection is weak. Garay et al. 
(2013) argued that in the 21st century the use of the internet in corporate 
governance communication is of utmost importance. As a result, companies 
may enhance their market valuation by improving the quality and the amount of 
the voluntary information that they disclose (Patel et al. 2002). 
 
At present, financial disclosures on corporate web sites are mainly voluntary 
and unregulated in Bangladesh. Voluntary in the sense that until now there are 
no rules in the Company Act of 1994 and unregulated in the sense that there 
are no set of regulations that either require or forbid the disclosure of any 
specific data on web sites. However, there is a Directive Circular (which was 
issued by the order of the Securities and Exchange Commission 
SEC/CMRRCD/ 2009-193/09, on January 17, 2010) regarding the disclosure of 
quarterly financial statements in company websites. The Securities and 
Exchange Commission declared that it was directing all listed companies under 
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section 20A of the Securities and Exchange Ordinance, 1969 to also make 
available detailed quarterly financial statements on their websites and to include 
the following paragraph in bold letters at the end of the quarterly financial 
statements published in the newspapers: 
 
³7KHGHWDLOVRI WKHSXEOLVKHGTXDUWHUO\ILQDQFLDOVWDWHPHQWVFDQEHDYDLODEOH LQ
the web-site of the company. The address of the web-VLWHLV´. 
 
While some companies have established websites on the internet, there is little 
awareness of how the internet is used to disseminate financial information to 
the users. Research is needed to understand this new phenomenon of reporting 
so that effective and efficient standards can be put in place. It will also aid 
accountants and auditors in their decisions on the presentation of financial 
information on the internet. 
 
However, given the growing importance of the internet and its evident relevance 
to corporate reporting, it has become important to investigate the type of 
corporate reporting practices that have been adopted by Bangladeshi 
companies. In particular, lack of a comprehensive study of corporate reporting 
on the internet in Bangladesh, an important developing country, is the primary 
motivator for this study. So, the purpose of this study is to investigate the extent 
of overall mandatory and voluntary disclosure to identify the extent to which 
companies meets the information needs of the users. 
 
1.3 Importance of Corporate Internet Reporting: 
The business environment has witnessed changes over the years, mainly 
influenced by globalisation and technological innovation. The internet is erasing 
the barriers between countries. National economies are now interconnected and 
capital markets are evolving to meet capital formation needs worldwide. 
Technological advancements in telecommunications are helping in connecting 
dealers all over the world (Abd El Shahid 2003, p. 1). In recent years, there has 
been a substantial increase in trading activities at the Stock Exchanges 
worldwide. Companies worldwide are now vying to penetrate international 
capital markets. The disclosure of adequate and reliable information is 
necessary to penetrate these international markets. Those competing for funds 
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in the international capital arena have been found to comply with disclosing 
mandatory requirements and in addition disclose significantly more voluntary 
information that enables them to compete globally (Meek et al. 1995, p. 556). 
The government regulatory bodies and the accountancy profession in these 
nations suffer from structural weaknesses, which could encourage corporate 
fraud at the expense of those that have economic and proprietary interest in the 
business environment. 
 
Healy and Palepu (2001) argued that demand for financial reporting and 
disclosure arises from information asymmetry and agency conflicts between 
managers and outside investors. Information asymmetry exists when one party 
to business transactions may have information advantages over others. The 
problems of this information asymmetry in emerging financial market are most 
likely to hamper the development of financial capital markets (Gul and Han 
2002). The credibility of management disclosures is enhanced by regulators, 
standard setters, auditors and other capital market intermediaries. Corporate 
internet reporting is the notion of information asymmetry between management 
and ownership, espoused by Berle and Means (1932). According to this view, 
the level of information asymmetry is an important driver of investor uncertainty. 
Modern corporations have adopted various mechanisms, including voluntary 
disclosure, to mitigate the adverse effects of information asymmetry. 
 
Figure1.1 provides a schematic of the role of disclosure, and information and 
financial intermediaries in the working of capital markets. The left side of Figure 
1.1 presents the flow of capital from savers to firms. Capital can flow to 
business ideas in two ways. Firstly, it can flow directly from savers to 
businesses. Examples include private equity and angel financing. A second and 
more typical way for capital to flow from savers to businesses is through 
financial intermediaries, such as banks, venture capital funds, and insurance 
companies. The right side of the figure presents the flow of information from 
businesses to savers and intermediaries. Firms can communicate directly with 
investors through such media as financial reports and press releases. They also 
communicate with financial intermediaries or through information intermediaries, 
such as financial analysts (Healy and palepu 2001). 
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Fig. 1.1: Financial and information Flows in a Capital Market Economy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Myers and Majluf, 1984 as cited in Healy and Palepu 2001. 
 
A critical challenge for any economy is the optimal allocation of savings to 
investment opportunities. There are usually many new entrepreneurs and 
existing companies that would like to attract household savings, which are 
typically widely distributed, to fund their business ideas. While both savers and 
entrepreneurs would like to do business with each other, matching savings to 
business investment opportunities is complicated for at least two reasons. 
Firstly, entrepreneurs typically have better information than savers about the 
value of business investment opportunities and have incentives to overstate 
WKHLUYDOXH6DYHUV WKHUHIRUH IDFHDQ µµLQIRUPDWLRQSUREOHP¶¶ZKHQ WKH\PDNH
investments in business ventures. Secondly, once savers have invested in their 
business ventures, entrepreneurs have an incentive to expropriate their 
VDYLQJV FUHDWLQJ DQ µµDJHQF\ SUREOHP¶¶ ,QIRUPDWLRQ DQG LQFHQWLYH SUREOHPV
impede the efficient allocation of resources in a capital market economy. 
Although disclosure can reduce the adverse effects of information asymmetry, 
disclosure activities have costs. Traditional paper-based disclosure has 
important limitations and associated costs. With the increase in investor 
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geographic dispersion, the paper form has become increasingly expensive and 
limited in its capacity to reach the users of information. In contrast, internet 
disclosure can be cost effective, fast, flexible in format, and accessible to all 
types of users within and beyond national boundaries (Debreceny et al. 2002). 
 
According to Lymer and Anders (1997) internet offers a number of advantages 
to the reporting company: first, the internet offers a low cost access, to both 
users and producers, to corporate data by using an established network 
structure in which all can easily participate; second, it offers instant access to 
data at convenient times for users relative to paper versions; third, it provides a 
mass communication medium for corporate reports; fourth, it offers dynamic 
updating potential addressing timeliness implications, fifth, the internet has 
fewer constraints on presentation flexibility than traditional paper versions; sixth, 
it offers access to greater volumes of data than were previously possible; 
seventh, it provides flexibility in user models of the data provided; eighth, it 
facilitates hypermedia delivery of data using the inter-linking of information 
capabilities of the World Wide Web.  
 
Besides these micro level advantages, business reporting on the internet can 
be very beneficial to businesses at the macro level as well (Lymer et al. 1999). 
It provides the search facilities for individual company sites. Furthermore, it is 
environmentally friendly and multimedia functions such as video, audio, 
graphics and 3D simulations give user and provider a variety of communication 
choices. Finally, feedback can be given through e-mail, interactive feedback 
forms, discussion areas and conferencing (Adams and Geoffery 2004). The 
most essential characteristics of the internet are that information can be 
accessed at almost any time and from anywhere.  
 
The great increase in online reporting through web sites has not escaped the 
attention of researchers and many have carried out empirical studies of 
corporate reporting on the internet. Even though previously published studies 
have considered companies operating in both developed and developing 
countries, there is still a need for empirical studies on internet reporting 
practices due to the dynamic nature of internet reporting. Developments in 
internet-related technologies, regulatory recommendations and increasing 
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demand for information disclosure to stakeholders, change the amount and 
characteristics of online reporting. For example, Marston and Annika (2004) 
concluded in their comparative study for the years 2000 and 2003 that the 
amount of information disclosed on corporate web sites has significantly 
increased and that the mode and format of presentation has improved. 
 
Currently, financial statements on the internet are unregulated. The global 
accessibility of financial reports on the internet and the absence of a global 
regulator have possible implications for groups with interests in financial 
reporting, such as financial information preparers, users, auditors and 
regulators (Oyelere et al. 2003). Some companies disclose only partial financial 
statements using a low level of technology, while others disclose full sets of 
financial reports using all the sophistications of the Web including multimedia 
and analytical tools. Both the fast adoption of the internet and the heterogeneity 
of the content published online have created a need for regulation through a 
normalisation process in the national and international contexts. The objective 
of this process is to harmonise contents and formats to make the information 
online comparable. 
 
Corporate reports generally include information conforming with reporting and 
disclosure laws: this is considered as a mandatory requirement because laws 
require them to provide a minimum amount of information to facilitate evaluation 
of the securities. Every country, in general, has its own regulatory framework 
that governs disclosure in corporate reports within that country. Brownlee et al. 
(1990) argue that regulatory agencies should be more concerned with the full 
and fair disclosure of information than with the specific accounting methods 
used to measure or report economic transactions. Information that is disclosed 
beyond mandatory requirements are considered as voluntary information. The 
available literature has suggested many ways in which a firm or its management 
can benefit from improved disclosure (Lang and Lundholm 1993; Frankel et al. 
1995; Healy and Palepu 1999). Drawing on this framework, firms are expected 
to disclose voluntary information, when the perceived benefits exceed the direct 
and indirect costs of doing so (Ferguson et al. 2002). 
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The information contents of the disclosure are both qualitative and quantitative 
in nature. The qualitative information is textual information from managers to 
RZQHUV 'LUHFWRU¶V5HSRUWRZQHUV WR WKHJHQHUDOSXEOLF &KDLUPDQ¶V5HSRUW
VWDWHPHQW RI DFFRXQWLQJ SROLFLHV DQG DXGLWRU¶V UHSRUW IRU DVVXUDQFH 7KH
quantitative information reveals the financial position, performance, and 
changes in the cash flow, reflected in balance sheet, income statement, and 
cash flow statement respectively (Abubakar 2010). The demand for published 
corporate disclosure of companies has increased worldwide as users of the 
information become more attentive. But frequently disclosure does not serve the 
needs of the users because managers are likely to consider their own interests 
when exercising managerial judgment. In fact, this increases the disclosure gap 
or the difference between expected and actual disclosures. In other words, 
improved disclosure reduces the gap between management and the outside, 
enhances the value of stock in the capital market, increases liquidity, reduces 
cost and so on (Apostolos and Konstantinos 2009 and Karim 1996). 
 
It is essential for an emerging economy to raise capital is particularly acute as it 
needs to attract foreign investment into the country and to promote the 
confidence and understanding of stakeholders. For this reason, fairness, 
efficiency and transparency of financial information are considered the major 
objectives of those capital markets. Attention has therefore been directed 
towards disclosure of financial information, as a very important factor in 
encouraging people to invest. 
 
Since the internet is becoming established as part of the global information 
infrastructure, it is essential that organisations consider its impact on their 
business and develop strategies for using it. Internet-based technologies permit 
companies to utilize alternative information presentation formats, such as 
hypertext, multiple file formats (i.e., pdf, text-based), and multimedia: these may 
LPSURYHWKHZD\LQYHVWRUV¶DFFHVVDQGXQGHUVWDQGWKHLQIRUPDWLRQ$FFRUGLQJWR
+HDO\DQG3DOHSXSµµ7KHLQWHUQHWSURYLGHVPDQDJHPHQWZLWKWKH
opportunity to access all investors and to provide daily updates of important 
LQIRUPDWLRQ´7KXVDILUPFDQLPSURYHLWVGLVFORVXUHWUDQVSDUHQF\ through use 
of internet financial reporting (Kelton and Yang 2008). 
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In the modern global market, information and investment will shed their national 
identities for a global perspective. It was noted that electronic information 
delivery mechanisms have developed to the point where disclosures can be 
made effectively and efficiently in forms that are considerably more valuable to 
information consumers than that provided in print-based communication. It is 
SRVVLEOHWRPHHWXVHUV¶QHHGVLQDQLPDJLQDWLYHIDVKLRQDVWKHVHUHSRUWVDUHLQ
WRGD\¶V FRQWH[W WKH\DUHRQO\ LPSDUWLQJD IRUHWDVWHRI KRZEXVLQHVV UHSRUWLQJ
will be changed by the Web. It is widely felt that, if a company is not on the 
internet by the end of the century it will be out of business (Widdifield and 
Grover 1995). 
 
In order to succeed in this technologically-advanced business environment, it 
has become essential for corporations to display greater financial transparency 
to capital markets. Consequently, public companies are increasingly utilizing the 
internet to develop closer relations with their investors, analysts, and other 
VWDNHKROGHUV ,QDGGLWLRQHDV\DFFHVV WR WKH LQWHUQHW ³OHYHOV WKHSOD\LQJ ILHOG´
for all investors, thus fulfilling another requirement of good corporate 
governance: the equitable treatment of all shareholders (Mendes-da-Silva and 
Theodore 2004). More transparency helps investors understand management 
decisions, reduces information asymmetry, enhances confidence in the capital 
market and increases foreign direct investment (Bushman and Smith 2001). 
Turrent et al. (2012) found that the economic development of a country has 
significant positive association with the level of corporate transparency on the 
internet. Moreover, Hope et al. (2008) found that the economic development of 
a country has significant positive association with the level of information 
disclosed by the companies. 
 
On the basis of above discussion it can be concluded that corporate 
transparency can be determined by the information it discloses in its financial 
report. Accurate, relevant and reliable disclosures are seen as means of 
enhancing corporate image, reducing cost of capital, and improving 
marketability of shares. High-quality accounting information facilitates the 
acquisition of short and long term funds and also enables management to 
properly account for the resources put in their care. Thus, it acts as a significant 
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spur to the growth and development of money and capital markets, which are 
fundamental to the smooth running of any economy.  
 
La Porta et al. (1998) indicate that there are differences between emerging and 
developed countries due to environmental, cultural, socio economic and political 
factors that distinguish these countries. These factors indeed have been shown 
to influence significantly the accounting systems, standard settings, and hence 
the disclosure of the financial information. According to Ojah and Thabang 
(2012), three salient observations are evident: (i) the level of adopting internet 
financial reporting is much higher in developed economies than emerging 
economies, (ii) Developed economies commenced meaningful usage of internet 
financial reporting as early as1991/1992 while emerging economies 
commenced such usage in 1999/2000, (iii) On a country-by-country basis, the 
most early (and heavily) internet financial reporting users are Australia, Canada, 
Finland, France, Hong Kong, Japan, Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, UK 
and USA, almost all  developed economies; while only Brazil, Ecuador, Korea, 
Malaysia, Turkey and South Africa were early adopters from the 32 emerging 
economy group. There is some evidence of variability in the adoption of internet 
financial reporting across countries. 
 
Emerging nations have been under pressure to improve their quality of 
FRUSRUDWHILQDQFLDOUHSRUWLQJ$FFRUGLQJWR$OLHWDO³WKHJRYHUQPHQW
regulatory bodies and the accountancy profession of emerging nations suffer 
from structural weaknesses and often take a lenient attitude towards default of 
DFFRXQWLQJUHJXODWLRQV´ ,W LVRIWHQDOOHJHGKRZHYHU WKDW³OLVWHGFRPSDQLHVGR
not fully comply with the disclosure requirements stipulated by the regulatory 
ageQFLHV´ $NKWDUXGGLQ  Consequently private and institutional 
investors, local and foreign, are hesitant about investing in such emerging 
economies due to a lack of transparency. 
 
Hunter and Murphy (2009) argued that if the emerging stock markets are truly 
efficient as defined by Fama (1970), then firms that voluntarily develop websites 
send a costly signal to investors that future reporting will be timelier than in the 
past and, if that signal is deemed credible, the market should respond. They 
indicated that both local and global stock markets will reward those emerging 
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market stock companies that engage in electronic reporting over their non-
website competitors: these website firms are attempting to reduce information 
asymmetry between investors and themselves with the expectation of monetary 
rewards. Their study also demonstrates that in markets that suffer from low 
liquidity, firms that invest in internet technology are able to use the electronic 
medium to attract foreign investors, analysts, and creditors who might not have 
otherwise consider the emerging market securities within their portfolios. It is 
also of interest to policymakers because the internet and website firms show 
support at the micro-level for a national policy on privatization.  
 
So, internet financial reporting has been of great interest to regulators and 
accounting bodies. Several accounting bodies have published studies regarding 
internet financial reporting (e.g. IASC 1999; FASB 2000; IFAC 2002; ICAEW 
2004). However, this medium of reporting in general is currently unregulated 
and due to the worldwide nature of the internet, the application of traditional 
regulations and laws to internet financial reporting may not be appropriate. 
There are diverse motives for companies providing information on the internet. 
The Steering Committee of the Business Reporting Research Project (FASB, 
2000), provides some of these potential motives for companies to provide 
information on the internet: these include eliminating the substantial cost of 
printing and posting of annual reports and the accessibility of information to a 
much wider audience than more conventional means of communication permit. 
Moreover, they can provide up-to-date information through the regular 
maintenance of web sites and can reduce the time taken to distribute 
information. They can also communicate with previously unidentified consumers 
of information. In addition they can supplement traditional disclosure practices 
andcan increasing the amount and type of data disclosed. Most of all through 
the internet, small companies can improve access to the potential investors. 
 
Fisher et al. (2004) suggested that in the near future, it is likely that the internet 
will become the principal medium for the distribution of financial reports to 
users. The US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) supports the view 
that the use of technology such as the web enhances the efficiency of capital 
markets through the rapid dissemination of information to financial markets in a 
more cost efficient, widespread, and equitable manner than traditional paper-
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based methods (SEC 1995; FASB 2000). Further, it stated that as more 
investors have access to and use the internet; the Commission will consider 
encouraging the use of the internet as a prime dissemination tool (SEC 2001). 
 
The advent of this technology has led firms to reconsider their disclosure 
strategies since the web offers much more flexibility in the presentation and 
content of reporting. For example, many firms' web sites offer interactive 
facilities (e.g., questions and answers) or provide access to video presentations 
(e.g. management's presentations to analysts). Moreover, the Web allows a firm 
to disclose far more information than traditional means. Such a context implies 
that the stewardship relation between a firm's management and its stockholders 
becomes more direct, dynamic and, potentially interactive (Cormier et al. 2009). 
 
Ali Khan and Ismail (2012) identified three important findings emerged from 
their study: firstly, the respondents ranked that internet financial reporting 
implementation benefits the companies because they are able to promote 
company wider to the public, provide wider coverage, attract foreign investors, 
discharge accountability, attract local investors, promote transparency, and 
attract potential customers compared to the traditional form of annual reports. 
They also identified that the implementation of internet reporting benefits the 
users because it increases timeliness and efficiency in obtaining financial 
information, provides information for company inexpensively, provides 
accessibility to the users, makes investment decision process easier and faster, 
provides another medium of disclosure, and helps users in the decision making 
process. Secondly, the respondents ranked three most important factors that 
influence companies to adopt internet financial reporting: enhance corporate 
image, competitors in the industry, and company teller with the technology 
GHYHORSPHQW 7KLUGO\ UHVSRQGHQWV¶ FRQVLGHUHG that the most important 
advantage of internet financial reporting is global reach and mass 
communication. 
 
1.4 Justification for Selecting Bangladesh: 
This study has chosen Bangladeshi listed companies for a variety of reasons. 
Firstly, Bangladesh is a developing country at a transitional stage: major 
initiative regarding corporate internet reporting was taken in 2010. As a result, 
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research is needed to identify whether regulatory reform has any impact on the 
corporate internet reporting at the firm-specific level of developing countries like 
Bangladesh.  
 
Secondly, there is little research relating to corporate internet reporting 
practices and, in particular, no previous study has been undertaken in 
Bangladesh classifying the disclosure of mandatory and voluntary information 
on the internet.  
 
Thirdly, Bangladesh has drawn global attention in last few years as one of the 
fastest growing developing country with a rapidly developing capitalist economy 
813)  KRWWHVW HPHUJLQJ PDUNHWV 6WHYHQVRQ  ³)URQWLHU )LYH´
FRXQWULHV%ORRPEHUJ1HZVDVFLWHG$EGXOODKHWDO³1H[W(OHYHQ´
nations (BOI Handbook 2007). 
 
Fourthly, in February, 2010 the Bangladesh Securities and Exchange 
Commission introduced the directive circular regarding disclosure of corporate 
information on the internet. 
  
Fifthly, the poor levels of corporate disclosure have been identified as one of the 
factors that have not only contributed to the Asian financial crisis but are also a 
stumbling block in the regional economic recovery (Berardino 2001 as cited in 
Gul and Leung 2004). So, it is essential to have a diagnostic view of the 
disclosure practices in the emerging capital markets of Bangladesh. 
 
Finally, since the researcher is based in Bangladesh, it might be more relevant 
to conduct this research using a sample of firms from the same country as it  
WKH UHVHDUFKHU LV IDPLOLDU ZLWK  WKH FRXQWU\¶V UHOHYDQW OHJLVODWLRQ FXOWXre and 
reporting environment. 
 
1.5 Research Questions: 
i) To what extent do Bangladeshi companies disclose mandatory reporting 
requirements on the internet? 
ii) To what extent do the Bangladeshi companies disclose voluntary information 
on the internet? 
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iii) What are the factors that influence the disclosure of mandatory and voluntary              
corporate information on the internet? 
 
1.6 Research Aims and Objectives: 
I. The aim of this study is to identify the current status of corporate internet 
reporting practices in Bangladesh. 
II. To assess the extent of mandatory disclosures on the internet in 
compliance with the regulatory requirements of corporate reporting in 
Bangladesh.   
III. To determine the extent to which companies voluntarily disclose information 
to meet the information needs of users. 
IV. TR DVVHVV ZKHWKHU ILUP VL]H SURILWDELOLW\ DXGLW ILUP¶V LQWHUQDWLRQDO OLQN
industry type, multinational parent, liquidity, market category, independent 
director in the board, board size, role duality, leverage, ownership structure, 
and company age influence corporate reporting practices on the internet by 
Bangladeshi companies. 
V. To identify the sector wise disclosing level on the internet by the companies 
in Bangladesh. 
VI. To make recommendations for policy makers regarding corporate internet 
reporting. 
 
1.7 Contribution to Knowledge: 
According to Bagshaw (2000) the global accessibility of corporate financial 
reports and the absence of a global regulator necessitate the cooperation of 
national and international organisations to ensure that corporate financial 
information is of the highest quality. The need for control over internet reporting 
largely depends on the degree to which efficient solutions are currently being 
found in the market for financial information of this nature. Companies elect to 
develop and maintain corporate websites and choose to provide financial 
information on such websites. This study thus acknowledges the importance of 
improving the flow of information between the stakeholders and the companies: 
internet reporting helps to reduce information asymmetry which also helps to 
reduce the risk of global financial crises.  
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This study is intended to delve deeper into the issue of corporate financial 
reporting practices on the internet in order to develop some recommendations 
and present validated cause and effect relations between reporting system 
parameters and the final outcome of an organisation. The findings of the 
proposed study may be of much use to policy makers at the international and 
national level, help to enhance the effective use of internet technology and 
strengthen the relationship between the stakeholder and the companies. 
 
The research finding is essential as it assists in informing regulators about the 
characteristics of companies that are, and that are not, satisfying national and 
LQWHUQDWLRQDO LQYHVWRUV¶ GHPDQG IRU RQOLQH LQIRUPDWLRQ The users of financial 
reporting including investors need confidence of financial markets and 
information disclosure is a vital element to fulfil this confidence and in this case 
this empirical study would provide a communication bridge to the various 
stakeholders in society. It also assists current and potential stakeholders to 
know the drivers of corporate internet reporting in the particular area. 
Consequently, they may further investigate and verify such reporting practices. 
In practice, online reporting can be used as an effective tool for improving 
VWDNHKROGHUV¶RUXVHUVGHFLVLRQ-making process. 
 
Some of the previous studies (e.g., Bonson and Thomas 2002, 2006; Ezat and 
Ahmed 2009; Aly et al. 2010; Turel 2010) examined the extent of disclosing 
information on the website and consider the overall information; however, there 
are only a few studies (e.g., Ettredge et al. 2002; Xiao et al. 2004; Mendes-da-
silva and Theodore 2004) that classify the information as mandatory and 
voluntary. As an increasing number of companies all over the world are using 
the internet for financial disclosure, it is high time to think about an International 
Internet Accounting Standards (IIASs) for harmonisation of financial reporting 
practices (Nurunnabi and Monirul 2012). This study will give an overview of the 
current status of corporate internet reporting by examining the extent of 
mandatory and voluntary disclosure on the internet in an emerging economy: 
this will help to identify the need for national and international standards for this 
type of reporting.  
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To do this mandatory disclosures are classified into four categories: general 
LQIRUPDWLRQ GLUHFWRU¶V LQIRUPDWLRQ EDlance sheet information, and profit and 
loss information. Voluntary disclosures are also classified into nine categories: 
general information, strategic information, corporate governance information, 
financial information, corporate social responsibility information, corporate 
environmental information, corporate sustainability information, investor related 
information and information presentation format. It provides an understanding of 
the present state of delivery of business information in Bangladesh at one point 
in time: it should be remembered that the web page content is very dynamic. In 
addition to this, the study undertakes an explanatory effort in order to identify 
the factors that determine internet reporting practices for listed firms. 
 
The literature review suggests that this is the first study to investigate the 
current status of the disclosure of mandatory and voluntary information on the 
internet in a developing country, Bangladesh. The previous studies on internet 
reporting in Bangladesh have examined either a particular aspect of corporate 
reporting (such as corporate environmental reporting, Dutta and Bose 2008; 
Banerjee and Probal 2009; Sobhani et al. 2009) or how the internet is used for 
corporate reporting (Bhuiyan et al. 2007; Dutta and Bose 2007; Khan et al. 
2009).  There is only one study, Nurunnabi and Monirul (2012), which examines 
some of the determinants of internet reporting but the study GLGQ¶WH[DPLQH how 
much mandatory and voluntary information are disclosed on the internet by the 
Bangladeshi companies. 
 
This study will provide an updated examination of the corporate internet 
reporting by the Bangladeshi companies and help to provide a better 
understanding about the financial system of Bangladesh. Moreover, the process 
is not limited to the examination of the total disclosure, but includes, as well, the 
level of each category of disclosure (mandatory and voluntary) and its 
contribution to the total disclosure level. It also investigates the factors affecting 
the level of disclosure on the internet and identifies the significant and 
insignificant relationships between this level and the determinants of disclosure. 
In addition to this, this study tries to analyse the disclosure level of different 
industries helping to identify the most compliant and the least compliant group.  
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1.8 Structure of the Thesis: 
This section presents an overview of the structure of thesis. Chapter two gives 
an overview of Bangladesh and its legal environment of corporate reporting. It 
then provides the importance of internet reporting in Bangladesh and an 
overview of the FRXQWU\¶Vfinancial system. It also highlights the legal framework 
and regulatory environment of corporate reporting in Bangladesh. 
 
Chapter three critically reviews the relevant prior literature regarding corporate 
reporting on the internet to find out the present status and research gap in the 
literature. It divides the literature into mandatory reporting and voluntary 
reporting on the internet. It then reviews the relevant literature on corporate 
reporting on the internet in Bangladesh to outline the gap in the literature to 
which the present study contributes.  
 
Chapter four summarises the dominant theories that can be used to explain 
mandatory and voluntary disclosure practice. It also provides empirical 
evidences of the theories, concluding that there is no single theory that can fully 
explain the disclosure practices, as there is overlap among these theories. After 
that it outlines the theoretical framework that has been used in this study with its 
justification. Then it defines the independent variables and developed 
hypotheses that are tested in this study. 
 
Chapter five presents the research method and the procedures employed to 
carry out the empirical section. It starts with the research design which includes 
research philosophy and research approach for the current study. It also 
provides the details of the research design that are used to measure the extent 
of disclosure and the measurement process of the independent variables. It 
then describes the sample size and the details of research instruments of the 
study.  
 
Chapter six aims to answer the first two research questions: to what extent do 
Bangladeshi companies disclose mandatory and voluntary information on the 
internet. It starts with the descriptive analysis of the result of the checklist 
developed to measure the extent of disclosure. Each section describes the 
results in two parts- for mandatory and for voluntary reporting. Each mandatory 
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and voluntary section is also divided into two categories- for the combined 
sample and for the non-financial sample. It also provides the descriptive 
analysis for dependent variables. This chapter ends with the correlation analysis 
of both the combined and non-financial sample and their results. 
 
Chapter seven aims to answer the third research question- what are the 
determinants of corporate internet reporting practices in Bangladesh. By using 
bivariate and multiple regression analysis, the current study examines the 
relationship between total mandatory and voluntary disclosure as dependent 
YDULDEOHV DQG D QXPEHU RI LQGHSHQGHQW YDULDEOHV ILUP VL]H ILUP¶V SURILWDELOLW\
PHDVXUHGE\ERWK52(DQG52$DXGLW ILUP¶V LQWHUQDWLRQDO Oink, industry type, 
multinational parent, liquidity, leverage, market category, independent director 
in the board, board size, role duality, ownership structure, company age 
measured by both listing year and establishment year. It also analyses the 
regression diagnostic before choosing the appropriate regression techniques. 
This chapter ends with the discussion of result and implication thereof. 
 
Finally, a summary of the results and findings of the study are discussed in 
chapter eight. It also discusses the contribution to the knowledge. This chapter 
HQGV ZLWK RXWOLQLQJ WKH VWXG\¶V LPSOLFDWLRQV DQG OLPLWDWLRQV DQG VXJJHVWLQJ D
number of recommendations for further research.  
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Chapter: 2 
Corporate Financial Reporting in Bangladesh 
2.1 Introduction: 
The extent of disclosure is influenced by changes in the attitudes in society, 
economic factors and behavioral factors such as the particular corporate 
culture. Since the study considers Bangladesh ±as a case study, so it is 
important to understand the economy of Bangladesh and why internet reporting 
is necessary in that context. Moreover it is also very important to know the rules 
and regulations relating to corporate reporting before measuring the extent of 
corporate information disclosure by the companies. The corporate reporting 
environment and the rules and regulations related to corporate reporting in 
Bangladesh are discussed in the following sections. 
 
This chapter starts with the economy of Bangladesh and role of corporate 
internet reporting in section 2.2 and the importance of internet reporting in 
Bangladesh in section 2.3. An overview of the financial system is provided in 
section 2.4. Section 2.5 summarises the legal framework of corporate reporting. 
Finally section 2.6 presents the regulatory environment and followed by a 
conclusion in section 2.7. 
 
2.2 Bangladesh Economy and Role of Internet Reporting: 
An emerging market economy is defined as an economy with low to middle per 
capita income. Such countries constitute approximately 80% of the global 
SRSXODWLRQ DQG GRPLQDWH DERXW  RI WKH ZRUOG¶V HFRQRPLHV (PHUJLQJ
economies are characterised as transitional, which means that they are in the 
process of turning from a closed economy to an open market economy 
(Mohajan 2011). Most of the South Asian economies (e.g. India, Pakistan and 
Bangladesh) have made significant economic progress in the last two decades 
and are well on track to becoming major regional or even world economic 
SRZHUKRXVHV%DQJODGHVKRIILFLDOO\7KH3HRSOH¶V5HSXEOLF of Bangladesh, is a 
small South Asian country bordered by India on the east, west and north, by the 
Bay of Bengal on the south and a small border strip with Myanmar on the south-
east. It is strategically located between the emerging markets of South Asia and 
the fastest growing markets of Southeast Asia and the ASEAN (Association of 
South East Asian Nation) countries. Bangladesh is one of the pioneers in the 
- 35 - 
 
region for economic liberalisation. It has adopted the best policies of South Asia 
to attract Foreign Direct Investment (FDI).  
 
The economy of Bangladesh is a rapidly developing capitalist economy (UNPF 
2009). Its per capita income in 2012 was estimated to be US$2,800 (adjusted 
by purchasing power parity). According to the International Monetary Fund, 
Bangladesh ranked as the 37th largest economy in the world in 2013 in PPP 
terms and 36th largest in nominal terms with a gross domestic product of 
US$419 billion in PPP terms and US$173.8 billion in nominal terms (Financial 
express 2014). Based on the promising growth performance and future 
potential, Investor Chronicle, a UK based research organization on market and 
investment, listed Bangladesh as one of the hottest emerging markets along 
with Kazakhstan, Ukraine, Pakistan, Egypt, UAE and Nigeria (Stevenson 2008). 
-30RUJDQLQFOXGHG%DQJODGHVKLQWKHLU³)URQWLHU)LYH´JURXSRIFRXQWULHVDORQJ
with Kenya, Nigeria, Vietnam and Kazakhstan (Bloomberg News 2008 as cited 
Abdullah et al. 2011).  Goldman Sachs, a US-based investment banking and 
securities firm, puW%DQJODGHVK LQ LWV ³1H[W(OHYHQ´DJURXSRIQDWLRQVKDYLQJ
promising economic growth potential after BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and 
China) (BOI Handbook 2007). Next eleven consists of Bangladesh, Egypt, 
Indonesia, Iran, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, The Philippines, South Korea, 
Turkey, and Vietnam (Abdullah et al. 2011). 
 
The stock market capitalisation of the Dhaka Stock Exchange in Bangladesh 
crossed $10 billion in November 2007 and the $30 billion dollar mark in 2009, 
and USD 50 billion in August 2010. Bangladesh had one of the best performing 
stock markets in the world during the recent global recession, due to relatively 
low correlations with developed country stock markets. The bullish capital 
market turned bearish during 2010, with the exchange losing 1,800 points 
between December 2010 and January 2011. Millions of investors have been 
rendered bankrupt as a result of the market crash. The crash is believed to 
have been caused artificially, to benefit a handful of players at the expense of 
the big players (Indian Times 2011). 
 
Bangladesh, being a developing country with high potential, hardly spends a 
significant proportion of GDP on research and development. The country is 
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facing the problem of shortage of trained manpower in general and accounting 
personnel in particular. Growth in GDP to generate employment opportunity and 
investable surplus would depend much on managerial efficiency and the 
effectiveness of the corporate sector in Bangladesh. Bangladesh is thought to 
be one of the most corrupt countries in the world; the consequence of that 
corruption placed the country in the shameful position of being ranked the most 
corrupt country in the world for about 6 years. Against this backdrop, one 
solution could be through ensuring the digitisation process in every sector. 
Instead of manual dissemination, information and all types of reporting should 
be performed through the digital process so that people can gain information 
free of cost and without any kind of political influence or manipulation. This will 
drastically reduce the opportunity for corruption and ensure transparency in 
every sector. Both planning and monitoring need proper accounting information 
systems that are in line with international standards. 
 
An awareness of corporate financial reporting practices to meet the information 
needs of investors and a proper organisational framework to ensure 
transparency and accountability are yet to develop in Bangladesh. An efficient 
disclosure regime is a fundamental instrument for protecting investors and 
enhancing confidence in the capital markets (OECD 2004). The demands for 
openness and transparency have significantly increased during the last years. 
According to Gowthorpe and Flynn (1997) and Wildstrom (1997), the investor 
relation process could be improved and made more transparent and inclusive 
by means of internet reporting. Improvements in disclosure result in 
improvements in transparency, which is one of the most important aims of 
corporate governance reform worldwide (OECD 1999). It is worth noting the 
OECD (2004) Principles of Corporate Governance recommend that the use of 
the internet and other information technologies improves information 
dissemination, resulting in equal, timely and cost-efficient access to relevant 
information by investors.  
 
7UDQVSDUHQWGLVFORVXUHVSURYLGHPRUHLQIRUPDWLRQUHJDUGLQJDILUP¶VDFWLYLWLHV$
ILUP¶V ILQDQFLDO GLVFORVXUH WUDQVSDUHQF\ LV DVVRFLDWHG ZLWK LWV PHWKRG RI
information dissemination (Bushman et al. 2004). Innovations in information 
technology have enabled companies to improve disclosure transparency 
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through alternative methods of information dissemination, such as internet 
ILQDQFLDOUHSRUWLQJ$FFRUGLQJWR+HDO\DQG3DOHSXSµµ7KHLQWHUQHW
provides management with the opportunity to access all investors and to 
SURYLGH GDLO\ XSGDWHV RI LPSRUWDQW LQIRUPDWLRQ´ 7KXV D ILUP FDQ LPSURYH LWV
disclosure transparency through use of internet financial reporting. The lifeblood 
of markets is information and barriers to the flow of relevant information 
represent imperfections in the market. Increased and improved disclosure is 
likely to reduce agency costs as better information flows from the company to 
the shareholders, which in turn reduces information asymmetry (Solomon 
2007). To improve financial reporting, it is important to study not only the extent 
and the trend of disclosure practices, but also the factors explaining or 
influencing corporate financial reporting (Rizk 2006).  
 
2.3 Importance of Internet Reporting in Bangladesh: 
Bangladesh does not have depth in its equity market. The overall performance 
measures of its stock market show low trading volume, intermittent bumps, not 
many new offerings and unsteady valuations more on the declining side than 
otherwise (Hossain 2005). One vital aspect is that the capital market in 
Bangladesh does not react significantly to corporate performance in terms of 
higher stock valuation for accurate disclosure and poor stock price for failing to 
provide of accurate and full disclosure. There is little incentive in becoming a 
public company and listing on the stock exchange in Bangladesh. Companies 
with good reputations can get bank financing relatively easily than through 
share issue. There are very few bonds, fixed income or debt instruments in the 
capital market. This means there are no pressure groups for enforcing 
corporate governance principles (BEI 2003). 
 
The majority of the companies in Bangladesh prepare financial reports just to 
meet minimum legal requirements and hardly meet the information needs of 
different stakeholders. Moreover, motivation to disclose information and 
improve governance practices by companies is felt negatively. There is neither 
any value judgment nor any consequences for corporate governance practices. 
In Bangladesh, the corporate sector is at a cross roads as far as the legal 
structure and internal management, control and administration of corporations is 
concerned. The current system in Bangladesh does not provide sufficient legal, 
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institutional and economic motivation for stakeholders to encourage and enforce 
corporate governance practices; hence the failure in most of the constituents of 
corporate governance witness in Bangladesh (Islam et al. 2010). 
 
Bangladesh is a developing country where the use of the internet has evolved 
for the last decade at large. Initially the internet was used mainly for the purpose 
of sending and receiving emails but the use has diversified into areas such as 
dissemination of information and e-commerce. The practice of using the internet 
for disseminating corporate information is relatively new in Bangladesh. Since 
Bangladesh needs external capital to sustain the high growth rate and the 
biggest agency problem centers on asymmetric information and expropriation 
by majority shareholders, it is very important for firms to be transparent and 
make full disclosure of information. 
 
The review of published financial statements, conducted by World Bank 
consultants revealed compliance gaps. There is a consensus that a lack of 
transparency in audited financial statements discourages foreign investors. 
From discussions, leaders of the foreign banking community sent a strong 
message²³,I \RX ZDQW LQYHVWPHQW \RX QHHG WR SURGXFH GHFHQW VHWV RI
financial statements´ World Bank 2003). Representatives of the investment 
community generally agree that audited financial statements are rarely reliable 
and free from material misstatement. The investment analysts and various 
accounting and finance experts commented that actual accounting practices in 
Bangladesh need to improve in all areas covered by IAS. Most interviewees 
shared the opinion that improving the quality of financial reporting requires a 
robust regulatory regime and effective enforcement mechanisms for ensuring 
compliance with DFFRXQWLQJ DQG DXGLWLQJ VWDQGDUGV DQ DXGLWRUV¶ SURIHVVLRQDO
code of ethics is also needed.  
 
In terms of compliance with standards and appropriate technology 
implementation in corporate reporting, Bangladesh is yet to become fully 
developed and to offer a well-defined structure. Initially corporate information on 
the internet was mainly confined to non financial information such as product 
and marketing related issues. However, in recent years, financial information 
has become an integral part of the conteQWVRIWKHFRPSDQLHV¶ZHEVLWHV.KDQ
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et al. 2009). Now the question arises whether the existing practice is efficient 
enough to be characterised as a new kind, to support the needs of different 
groups of users. Generally, financial reporting is performed by the companies 
through annual reports publication. The elements of printed annual reports are 
nationally harmonised by Bangladesh Securities and Exchange Commission 
and The Institute of Chartered Accountants of Bangladesh (ICAB). However, 
the content of digital annual reports is not yet nationally standardised by the 
concerned bodies. Therefore, the contents of digital annual reports are not 
similar for all companies (Khan et al. 2009).  
 
The technology applied in Bangladesh by the companies for corporate internet 
reporting is neither adequate nor pragmatic. In developed countries, such as 
The United States, professional bodies release pronouncements regarding 
corporate internet reporting that contribute to the development of internet based 
financial reporting. Such practice is not a part of the activities of the 
Bangladeshi professional bodies namely The Institute of Chartered Accountants 
of Bangladesh (ICAB) and The Institute of Cost and Management Accountants 
of Bangladesh (ICMAB). Various auditing standards bodies of countries around 
the world have recognised the need for precise guidance to auditors on the 
implications of corporate internet reporting. They have made pronouncements 
that fell considerably short of a proper response to the challenges that arise 
from current internet reporting technologies (Debreceny et al. 1999). On the 
contrary, current corporate internet reporting practices have failed to draw the 
attention of the ICAB which is generally recognised as the local auditing 
standards body of the country.  
 
In addition to conventional responsibilities, ICAB ought to move forward to 
clearly determine the role of auditors in respect of reporting and attesting 
financial information on corporate websites. Since existing financial reporting 
rules apply equally to  financial reporting on the web: the wide range of variation 
observed in web based financial reporting in Bangladesh would probably draw 
one to conclude that some companies are violating the existing financial 
reporting regulations (Khan et al. 2009). The Transparency International Bureau 
stated that hiding information is a common phenomenon in Bangladesh and that 
companies are no exception. To be transparent and more accountable to 
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stakeholders, companies need to provide detailed information. It is quite 
shocking that the stock market crashes in 1996 and 2011 also revealed the 
same picture of the traditional culture not providing enough information to 
investors and insider information being the key to gain abnormal returns 
(Nurunnabi et al. 2012). Bangladesh is no exception to the fact that computer 
technology has changed the flow of information between firms that provide and 
consumers who demand information (Bhuiyan et al. 2007). 
 
Therefore, internet reporting is an emerging issue in Bangladesh and there is 
ample room for improvements in order to utilise the full potential of the internet. 
As more and more people in Bangladesh are connecting themselves to the 
information superhighway, companies are expected to change their internet 
reporting practices, in terms of content and disclosure. To the extent that more 
extensive use of the internet for information disclosure can improve the 
efficiency of the corporate disclosure regime, it is expected that more 
companies will improve their internet reporting practices. Even smaller 
companies that wish to expand further and attract investors (domestic and 
foreign) are expected to use the internet as an alternative channel to distribute 
information faster and cheaper.  
 
2.4 Financial System of Bangladesh: 
In Bangladesh, the financial system is comprised of: a) the formal sector, b) the 
semi-formal sector and c) the informal sector. These sectors have been 
classified in accordance with their degree of regulation. The formal 
sector includes all regulated institutions like banks, non-bank financial 
institutions(FIs), insurance companies, capital market intermediaries including 
brokerage houses, merchant banks; micro finance institutions (MFIs). The semi 
formal sector includes those institutions which are regulated otherwise but do 
not fall under the jurisdiction of the Central Bank, Insurance Authority, Securities 
and Exchange Commission or any other enacted financial regulator. This sector 
is mainly represented by specialized financial institutions like House Building 
Finance Corporation (HBFC), Palli Karma Sahayak Foundation (PKSF), 
Samabay Bank, Grameen Bank etc., Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs) 
and discrete government programmes. The informal sector includes private  
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Figure 2.1: Financial System of Bangladesh 
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intermediaries that are completely unregulated (Bangladesh Bank, 2014). The 
structure of the Bangladesh financial system is given in Figure 2.1. 
 
2.5 Legal Framework of Corporate Reporting in Bangladesh: 
Every country, in general, has its own regulatory framework governing 
disclosure in corporate reports within that country. Bangladesh is a former 
crown colony and almost every law has been inherited from the UK. Like other 
countries of this region, Bangladesh adopted the Companies Act 1913 of the 
then British India. This Act was in force in Bangladesh before the promulgation 
of the Companies Act of 1994, which is largely influenced by the British 
Companies Act. The legal framework surrounding corporate entities in 
Bangladesh includes The Companies Act 1994, The Bank Companies Act 1991 
(for banking institutions), The Listing Regulations of The Dhaka Stock 
Exchange, and The Securities and Exchange Rules 1987 (for all public limited 
companies), Bangladesh Bank Order 1972. 
 
Three regulatory bodies provide the legal framework for corporate reporting in 
Bangladesh: ICAB, Bangladesh Securities and Exchange Commission (BSEC) 
and the Register of Joint stock companies. There is, however, no one set of 
generally accepted standards within these three sources. Again, separate 
industries, like railways, electricity, insurance, and banks have their own distinct 
regulations that govern disclosures in their annual reports for example, the Bank 
Companies Act 1991 is applicable for banking companies and The Insurance 
Act 1938 is applicable for insurance companies.. As there are no separate rules 
and regulation regarding the content of internet reporting in Bangladesh, the 
rules applicable for printed annual report are also applicable for corporate 
internet reporting.  To develop the mandatory disclosure checklist the current 
study considered the common mandatory items, which are applicable for all 
listed companies in Bangladesh rather than particular sector based rules and 
regulations. 
 
There are two professional accounting institutions - ICAB and the ICMAB that 
guide the accounting profession in Bangladesh. The financial audit and cost 
audit are performed by members of ICAB and ICMAB respectively and both are 
under the control of Bangladesh Ministry of Commerce. These two institutes are 
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jointly managed by council members, who are elected internally, and by 
government representatives. This council is responsible for the development of 
the accounting profession in Bangladesh.  
 
In addition, the ICAB has been given the sole authority to develop and issue 
accounting and reporting standards and to monitor their application throughout 
the country. The ICAB, as a member of the International Accounting Standards 
%RDUG,$6% LVHQWUXVWHGZLWK WKH WDVNRIDGRSWLRQDQGHQIRUFHPHQWRI ,$6¶V
DQG,)56¶VVWDQGDUGVLQ%DQJODGHVK7KH7HFKQLFDODQG5HVHDUFK&RPPLWWHH
of the ICAB selects, reviews, and modifies the standards, where necessary, to 
confirm to local requirements. In 2014, ICAB adopted 28 IAS and 12 IFRS and 
rename it as BAS (Bangladesh Accounting Standards) and BFRS (Bangladesh 
Financial Reporting Standards) respectively (ICAB 2014). Regarding this, the 
Securities and Exchange Commission made a notification on 29th December, 
1997 mentioning that all listed companies are to abide by and follow the 
Accounting Standards adopted by ICAB and ICMAB as BAS from the year 2000 
(BSEC 1997). So these standards are mandatory for all listed companies in 
Bangladesh. The ICAB is, however, recommendatory in nature and has no 
legislative power to enforce compliance with the disclosure requirements of the 
accounting standards they issue (Hossain 2000). 
 
Besides this, The Company Act of 1994 and Securities and Exchange Rules of 
1987 are two important legislations for corporate disclosure. The Companies 
Act 1994 provides the basic requirements for disclosure and reporting, 
applicable to all companies incorporated in Bangladesh (GoB 1993). The Act 
requires companies to prepare financial statements in order to reflect a true and 
fair view of the state of affairs of the company. The Securities and Exchange 
rules of 1987 requires all listed companies to comply with accounting standards 
promulgated by the ICAB, in addition to its own disclosure provision (GoB 
1993). Disclosure provisions of the Securities and Exchange Rules are, in fact, 
restricted only to companies listed on the stock exchanges. 
 
The Companies Act of 1913 required limited public companies to submit an 
annual balance sheet containing a summary of their capital, liabilities, and 
assets: no specific formats were prescribed. Profit and loss accounts were 
- 44 - 
 
prepared without mentioning the nature of activities in detail. These two 
statements needed to be audited and presented at the annual general meeting 
for approval prior to publication. The fundamental weakness of the regulation is 
that it does not provide any guidelines regarding the contents or how the value 
of the respective items has been arrived at. 
 
The Companies Act 1994 made major alternations to financial reporting 
practices (Ahmed and Kabir 1995) and required both statements to be audited 
and reported before the annual general meeting. Under this law, fixed assets 
are to be shown at cost or valuation and the provisions for depreciation are the 
annual charges, which need to be disclosed separately. The required 
disclosures are classified and specified in far more detail and include reserves, 
WKHFKDQJHVWKDWRFFXUUHGGXULQJWKH\HDUGLUHFWRU¶s remuneration, commission, 
tax provision, and the flow of foreign currency. Section 185 of the Companies 
Act provides the mandatory items to be disclosed on the balance sheet and 
income statement and Section 186 provides a list of information items that must 
EHGLVFORVHGLQWKHGLUHFWRU¶VUHSRUW*R% 
 
The Securities and Exchange Commission was established in 1993 under the 
provisions of the Securities and Exchange Ordinance 1969. In 2012, the 
commission was renamed as Bangladesh Securities and Exchange 
Commission (BSEC) (GoB 2012). The BSEC governs the disclosure provision 
in company reports as a part of listing requirements. At the time of 
independence in 1971, Bangladesh inherited only one stock exchange, the 
Dhaka Stock Exchange (DSE). It was formed in 1954 and registered as a 
limited liability company. Another stock exchange, The Chittagong Stock 
Exchange (CSE), was set up in 1999 and functions in Chittagong. Both stock 
exchanges are regulated under the Securities and Exchange Rules 1987 and 
the Companies Act 1994. The SEC does not have any disclosure requirements 
of its own. It adopted the International Accounting Standards (IASs) and 
International Standards on Auditing (ISAs) in the preparation of financial 
statements and auditing procedures of listed companies.  
 
The BSEC in Bangladesh plays a central role in monitoring and enforcing 
mandatory disclosure compliance of listed companies. It has the authority to 
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impose penalties on companies for publishing misleading information or for not 
otherwise complying with general accounting and reporting requirements set out 
by the law. Listed companies are required to prepare financial statements in 
accordance with the approved IASs along with the disclosure provisions of the 
Companies Act. The penal provisions for non-compliance include: barring the 
auditor who conducted the non complying audit from acting as an auditor for a 
listed company for a period of up to five years; fining the auditor and the 
company officer up to one thousand taka for non-compliance with stipulated 
provisions under the Companies Act. But the BSEC employs a lenient approach 
to enforce compliance, which may lead to the withholding of mandatory 
disclosure information. To enforce existing rules, the BSEC has the power to 
suspend companies or remove their listing privileges if they do not comply with 
the listing requirements. The power to reward the reporting entity is also 
embedded in the enforcement process.  
 
2.6 Regulatory Environment in Bangladesh: 
Changes in the regulatory environment, specifically in a developing country, 
often fail to produce the desired policy outcomes. Countries across the world 
are now more inclined to adopt the more complete version of the international 
accounting standards than ever before. The regulatory environment in 
Bangladesh came under reform just after the first stock market debacle in 1996. 
Companies in Bangladesh have to disclose the information that is required by 
law. But the laws and processes are inadequate in terms of provisions and not 
strong in terms of enforcement. Again, over-regulation and inconsistence make 
WKH FRPSDQLHV¶ UHOXFWDQW WR IROORZ WKH PLQLPXP GLVFORVXUHV LQ WKH ILQDQFLDO
statements. The quality and quantity of disclosure made in the annual reports 
thus varies substantially (Akhtaruddin and Rouf 2011). No effective mechanism 
exists to enforce the requirements for accounting and financial reporting 
provided in the Companies Act 1994. The office of the Registrar of Joint Stock 
Companies (RJSC) has legal authority to enforce the provisions of Companies 
Act 1994. The RJSC has no technical capacity to identify accounting and 
auditing violations; in most cases it does not even enforce timely filing of annual 
audited financial statements. The RJSC records lack up-to-date information to 
verify the number of companies that have not submitted the required annual 
audited financial statements and returns (World Bank 2003). 
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The BSEC is the only regulatory body working to improve the quality of financial 
reporting. The BSEC lacks sufficiently trained staff to conduct detailed analysis 
to monitor compliance with accounting and financial reporting requirements. 
The banking regulator has no mechanism to monitor and enforce accounting 
and financial reporting requirements. The Bangladesh Bank, as the regulator of 
banking and non-banking financial institutions, conducts routine supervision 
exercises to monitor and enforce prudential regulations. Bangladesh Bank 
inspectors examine whether financial statements have been prepared in 
accordance with established regulations. In this inspection process, no attempt 
is made to assess the degree of compliance with requirements on preparing 
general-purpose financial statements. Also, no attempt is made to determine 
WKHUHOLDELOLW\RIWKHDXGLWRU¶VRSLQLRQRQDVHWRf financial statements.  
 
In the case of insurance companies, financial statements are not subjected to 
monitoring and enforcement actions. The Insurance Act 1938 vested adequate 
power in the Chief Controller of Insurance to regulate the financial reporting of 
insurance companies. In practice, these powers are rarely exercised to ensure 
compliance with financial reporting requirements. Every year the chief controller 
appoints external auditors to conduct special audits in order to prepare reports 
on compliance with various prudential requirements. To conduct these special 
audits, the chief controller normally appoints small audit firms and sole 
practitioners, who in many cases lack knowledge of the insurance industry.  
 
There is a widespread view that the low-level skills among accounting 
professionals and the lack of enforcement mechanisms contribute to non-
compliance with established accounting requirements and auditing standards. 
No effective and efficient institutional arrangement exists to ensure compliance 
with auditing standards and codes of ethics. The ICAB has not established an 
effective and efficient mechanism to ensure member compliance with 
established auditing standards and the professional code of ethics. The ICAB 
has not made an effective effort to review the practices of the auditors and audit 
firms to evaluate the degree of compliance with the auditing requirements. 
 
The stock exchanges are owned and dominated by brokers, so their businesses 
take precedence over the governance of their respective exchanges. The 
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management of the two exchanges is weak at the strategic, senior, and mid-
management levels; hence their membHUV¶ DFWLYLWLHV DUH QRW VXSHUYLVHG
effectively. Due to government policy the SEC has limited capacity to regulate 
and monitor activities within its remit and has limited resources to devote to 
development functions. There are too few qualified accountants and financial 
analysts due to high staff turnover, and the SEC does not have enough legal 
experts to effectively exercise its oversight authority (Rasul 2013). 
 
2.7 Conclusion: 
An outline of legal framework of corporate reporting in Bangladesh is necessary 
to answer the research question one and two: to what extent do Bangladeshi 
companies disclose mandatory reporting requirements on the internet? To what 
extent do Bangladeshi companies disclose voluntary information on the 
internet? To achieve the research objective one, a mandatory disclosure 
checklist has been developed in chapter 5 on the basis of these legal 
requirements of Bangladesh. This check list will be used to determine the extent 
of mandatory disclosure in first part of chapter 6: descriptive statistics. 
Moreover, legal framework is also necessary to determine the extent of 
voluntary information beyond mandatory requirements which is discussed in the 
later part of chapter 6. In chapter 7, hypotheses were also tested by using this 
checklist. 
 
The general corporate environment of Bangladesh is characterised by a poor 
regulatory framework, dependence on bank financing and a lack of effective 
monitoring (Rahim and Alam 2013).The accounting and auditing practices in 
Bangladesh suffer from institutional weaknesses in regulation, compliance, and 
enforcement of standards and rules. The preparation of financial statements 
and conduct of audits, in many cases, are not consistent with internationally 
acceptable standards and practices. Weak national financial architecture, 
inadequate transparency and accountability, and a dearth of appropriate policy 
LQWHUYHQWLRQVDUHDPRQJWKHLPSHGLPHQWVFLWHGIRUWKHFRXQWU\¶VVORZHFRQRPLF
development (World Bank 2003). Although the BSEC, the exchanges, and the 
ICAB have taken legal actions against wrongdoers from time to time, these 
actions are viewed by some as insufficient since many who break the law are 
- 48 - 
 
believed to go undetected (World Bank 2002, 2003;  Uddin and Choudhury 
2008; World Bank 2009; Rashid 2011). 
 
The quality of audited financial statements is a concern to investors and other 
users of financial statements. There is a widespread view that the low-level 
skills among accounting professionals and the lack of enforcement mechanisms 
contribute to non-compliance with established accounting requirements and 
auditing standards (World Bank 2009).Steps should be taken to ensure that the 
legal and regulatory requirements on accounting, auditing, and financial 
reporting fully protect the public interest. This might necessitate the enactment 
of a new Financial Reporting Act and the repeal of the provisions on accounting, 
auditing, and financial reporting in Companies Act (Amendment) 2013, Bank 
Companies Act 2013, Insurance Act 2010, and other related regulations.  
 
To protect the public interest and ensure transparency in corporate sector, the 
Government should take the necessary steps to strengthen the capacity of the 
Securities and Exchange Commission, Bangladesh Bank, and Controller of 
Insurance. It must enable these regulatory bodies effectively deal with the 
accounting and financial reporting practices of the regulated entities. Moreover 
the BSEC should raise awareness among the top management of listed 
companies of the importance of compliance with accounting and auditing 
requirements.  
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Chapter: 3 
Literature review 
3.1 Introduction: 
Corporate reporting is a vital component of the accounting process that seeks to 
provide decision useful information and extend accountability to numerous 
stakeholders. It is argued that disclosure and transparency, accountability, and 
corporate governance play an important role in gaining the market confidence 
(Ghazali and Weetman 2006). Accounting researchers have investigated 
relationships between corporate characteristics and disclosures in corporate 
annual reports since 1960s. Since early work on this subject, pioneered by Cerf 
(as cited in Fremgen 1963, p. 467) many studies have examined the quality of 
information disclosures in various contexts. Examples of such studies are: 
Owusu- Ansah (1998); Ho and Wong (2001), Joshi and Ramadhan (2002); 
Chau and Gray (2002); Naser et al. (2002); Naser and Nuseibeh (2003); 
Akhtaruddin (2005) and Ofoegbu and Okoye (2006). Each of these studies has 
been distinguished by: differences in research setting, differences in definition 
of the explanatory variables, differences in disclosure index construction and 
differences in statistical analysis.  
 
This chapter reviews the relevant prior literature regarding financial reporting on 
the internet and its determinants to gain an overview of previous studies and, in 
particular, the nature of the gap in the literature. Moreover, this review is the 
basis from which to choose the relevant theoretical framework and to develop 
the hypotheses. As the study is focusing on the extent of mandatory and 
voluntary reporting on the internet, section 3.2 reviews the relevant literature on 
corporate financial reporting on the internet; section 3.3 examines the idea of 
mandatory disclosure and then reviews the literature of corporate mandatory 
reporting on the internet. Section 3.4 provides the definition of voluntary 
disclosure and then reviews the literature of corporate voluntary disclosure on 
the internet. Relevant literature on corporate reporting on the internet in 
Bangladesh is reviewed in section 3.5, followed by the gap in the literature in 
section 3.6 and the conclusion in section 3.7.  
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3.2 Corporate Financial Reporting on the Internet: 
The internet offers companies "new opportunities to supplement, replace and 
HQKDQFHWUDGLWLRQDOZD\VRILQYHVWRUDQGVWDNHKROGHUFRPPXQLFDWLRQ´0DUVton 
and Annika 2004, p. 286), and therefore, it has become, in a very short time, an 
³LQGLVSHQVDEOH FRPPXQLFDWLRQ WRRO IRU RUJDQLVDWLRQV´ &DSULRWWL DQG 0RUHQR
2007, p. 224). Various authors have stated that in recent years the internet has 
increasingly been used as a means of communication for business reporting 
purposes (Gallhofer and Haslam 2006; Lymer 1999; Marston 2003). This could 
be attributable both to the opportunities the internet SURYLGHV DQG LQYHVWRUV¶
demand for being informed online. 
 
According to Beattie (2005), a company that distributes corporate financial news 
and performance information using internet technologies such as the web is 
said to practice internet corporate reporting. Oyelere et al. (2003) classified a 
company as practicing corporate internet reporting when it provides a 
comprehensive set of financial statements, including footnotes; partial sets of 
financial statements; and/or financial highlights that may include summary 
financial statements or extracts from such statements on their website. The 
nature of financial reporting started to change to meet the needs of the users 
including shareholders, and investors. These changes were influenced by 
several factors. Among these, the emergence of new technology, particularly 
the internet, has shifted the way information is being presented, communicated, 
and disseminated. It is undeniable that internet technology plays a significant 
role in disseminating corporate information to dispersed shareholders all over 
the world.  
 
Researchers argue that firms have to reconsider their disclosure strategy in 
order to benefit from technology innovation. Globally accessible web sites 
enable corporations to communicate with, and disseminate information to, 
anonymous recipients who are actively seeking information. Given this, 
corporations are able to shape and define their image and are able to create 
information rich web sites with the ability to inform and educate individuals 
scattered around the world (Robbins and Antonis 2003). Thus reporting of 
corporate performance has undergone a critical change in the period since the 
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beginning of widespread commercial adoption of the internet (Lymer and 
Debreceny 2003). 
 
As academic researchers have recognised the internet as an emerging 
communication medium, the number of studies focusing on the use of the 
internet for corporate reporting in both developed and developing countries has 
increased consistently since the late1990s.The literature, with regard to internet 
financial reporting, has covered many developed countries e.g. Petravick and 
Gillet 1996 (USA); Lymer and Anders 1997 (Finland and the UK); Lymer 1997 
(UK); Koreto 1997 (Ireland); Deller et al. 1999 (US, UK and Germany); Hussey 
and Sowinska 1999 (UK); Gowthorpe and Amat 1999 (Spain); Hedlin 1999 
(Sweden); and Abdelsalam et al. 2007 (UK) while some of these studies 
covered emerging countries (e.g. Xiao et al. 2004; Momany and Al-Shorman 
2006; Al-Shammari 2007; Mohamed et al. 2009; Mohamed and Oyelere 2009; 
and Desoky 2009). Emerging markets are an important yet highly understudied 
subject, as noted in recent surveys of the state of research on corporate 
governance in emerging markets (Claessens and Yurtoglu 2013) and there is a 
dearth of research on the internet financial reporting practices of firms located in 
the context of emerging economies like Bangladesh. 
 
These literatures can be divided into three categories: descriptive, comparative 
and explanatory. Descriptive research focuses on the number of firms using the 
web as a medium to disseminate information and to what extent these firms 
include financial information on their web sites (Gowthorpe and Amat 1999; 
Deller et al. 1999; Ettredge et al. 2001; Hurtt et al. 2001; Khadaroo 2005; Abdul 
Hamid 2005; Oyelere and Mohamed, 2007). Another research stream 
compares web-based disclosure across countries (Deller et al. 1999; Allam and 
Andrew 2003). The third category of research is explicative and examines the 
determinants of such practices (Ashbaugh et al.1999; Pirchegger and 
Wagenhofer 1999; Marston 2003; Oyelere et al. 2003; Marston and Polei 2004; 
Xiao et al. 2004; Bonson and Thomas 2006; Sriram and Laksmana 2006; 
Abdelsalam et al. 2007; Gutierrez-Nieto et al. 2008). 
 
Brennan and Hourigan (1999) examined the use of the internet for financial 
reporting purposes by 109 Irish companies in 1998. They examined the level of 
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use of the internet by Irish companies for corporate reporting. By using the 
content analysis approach this study tried to identify the impact of some 
company characteristics- size, leverage, demand for corporate information, and 
industry that may be common to Irish companies reporting on the internet. Their 
results showed that 37% listed and 100% semi-state companies had a web site. 
Larger companies and companies in the services and financial sector were 
significantly more likely to have a web site. But they did not find any association 
between presence of an internet site and leverage and number of shareholders. 
The major limitation of the study is that it did not classify the information as 
mandatory or voluntary and it considers only four company characteristics as 
explanatory variables. 
 
Again Brennan and Sorka (2000) investigated Irish company investor relations 
material on the internet from two perspectives. Firstly, it looked at the extent of 
information disclosed by Irish publicly listed companies (plc); secondly, it looked 
at Irish company investor relations materials, and the coverage of Irish plcs, on 
third-party web sites. Their results showed that 67% Irish listed companies had 
a web site. Of these, 84% contained investor relations material. The most 
common type of material was background information on the company. The 
least common was background information on the industry in which the 
company operates. This study also performed content analysis of investor 
relations material on ten third party sites and found that 90%of sites provided 
some form of investor relations material free of charge to users. Share prices 
were provided on 90% of third-party sites whereas Historic share prices on 60% 
sites. No site covered all Irish plcs.  
 
Ettredge et al. (2001) examined corporate web site financial disclosure 
practices. They evaluated and compared the web site disclosure levels of 17 
industries, and concluded that corporate web sites present, on average, about 
38% of the accounting data items on their checklist and 30% of the other 
financial data items. Larger, more established firms tend to provide a higher 
level of disclosure than do the smaller, emerging technology firms. 
 
In a comprehensive work, Debreceny et al. (2002) suggest that internet 
disclosure is a function of both firm-specific characteristics, as well as 
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environmental characteristics. In respect of firm characteristics they found that 
firm size, level of technology employed and growth prospects and intangibles 
are associated with internet financial reporting. They extended their literature by 
examining the association of internet financial reporting with general cross-
listings and listing in the broad and deep market of the US and found that US 
listing is an important determinant of internet financial reporting. But in case of 
cross listing, they found negative association which is inconsistent with prior 
voluntary disclosure studies and suggests further research.  
 
Another comparative studywas performed by Allam and Andrew (2003). They 
also focused on the very largest companies in USA, Canada (North America), 
UK (Europe), Australia (Australia) and Hong Kong (Asia). Their sample includes 
50 companies from each of the five countries for a total of 250 companies. The 
results of the survey indicated continued progress in the area of corporate 
reporting over the internet and that reporting practices differ significantly 
between companies in different domains. Moreover this study considered only 
size as an explanatory variable but no relationship was found to be significant in 
any of the five countries with the exception to Australia. 
 
Marston (2003) surveyed the business reporting practices of 99 Japanese 
companies in 1998 and found that 78 of these companies had a web site in 
English: of these, 68 reported some financial information with 57 providing 
detailed accounting information. The results also showed that company size has 
significant positive association with the existence of a web site but the extent of 
financial disclosure was not related to size. In addition, the researcher found 
non-significant association of profitability, industry grouping, and overseas 
listing status with internet disclosure. The major limitation of the study is that the 
research was limited to the top 99 Japanese companies and only four 
hypotheses were tested. It might have been better to look at the companies 
from a wider range and there may be scope for explaining internet disclosure 
using other variables. 
 
Marston and Annika (2004) examined the use of the Internet for the disclosure 
of financial and investor-related information by German companies between two 
points of time: 2000 and 2003. The descriptive part of the study reve
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significant improvements in the amount and the presentation of information on 
corporate web sites have occurred since the initial survey in 2000. The second 
part of the study tried to identify reasons for the differences in the online 
disclosure practices of companies by testing the association between five firm-
specific factors and the level of web disclosure. The results of multivariate 
analysis showed that firm size is the only significant explanatory variable stable 
over time, for the amount of information disclosed on corporate web sites. 
Foreign listing status was only significant for the year 2003 and free float 
appeared to be only significant for the year 2000. Systematic risk and 
profitability have no predictive value for the internet reporting practices of the 
sample companies. Another important result was that the explanatory power of 
their model is greater for the dimension measuring the amount of information 
disseminated than for the presentation dimension. 
 
By considering the implications of web technology for business reporting in the 
future and the challenge it poses for standard setting bodies, Khadaroo (2005) 
compared business reporting practices in Malaysia and Singapore. It provides 
an understanding of the present state of delivery of business information in 
these countries albeit at one point in time: it must be remembered that web 
page contents are very dynamic. The results show that 75% of Malaysian 
companies had web sites as compared to 87% Singaporean companies. One of 
the findings was that listed companies in Singapore have a greater web 
presence compared with Malaysia. Another major finding was that companies in 
Singapore were making better use of the potential the internet had to offer 
compared with companies based in Malaysia. 
 
Ezat and Ahmed (2008) examined the factors that influence the timeliness of 
corporate internet reporting by Egyptian listed corporations. They selected the 
most active 37 Egyptian listed companies on the basis of market capitalisation, 
after excluding the companies which did not have a web site. This study 
performed two regression models: multiple regression and logistic regression. 
According to the multiple-regression model, the study found that company size, 
liquidity, ownership structure, service activity type, board composition and board 
size have significant positive association with corporate internet reporting 
timeliness while profitability, leverage, issue of shares and role duality have 
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non-significant association. On the other hand, according to logistic regression, 
the study found that the entire variables are significantly associated with 
different timeliness items. The findings of this study are based on a small 
sample size, and may differ if the sample size were changed. Moreover, they 
used a checklist of only 11 items, considering items related to timeliness and 
did not consider any item of content or presentation. 
 
In order to find out whether there is any expectation gap in internet reporting, 
Turel (2010) examined the level of internet financial reporting in Turkey. In their 
study, expectation gap refers to the difference between (1) what financial 
statement users perceive to be important in decision making and (2) what 
companies actually disclose or present in their web pages. It was found that, the 
entire sample of companies (98) included in the study had web pages and 95% 
of these companies disclosed financial information on their web pages.Their 
findings indicated that an expectation gap exists; financial statement users have 
higher expectations for various facets than  companies actually report: the gap 
existed in  areas including: reports of analysts, phone number to investor 
relations, segmental reporting, financial data in processable format, and 
summary of financial data. 
 
Aly et al. (2010) examined the potential factors that might affect the level of 
corporate internet reporting in a developing country ± specifically Egypt and 
found that 56% of Egyptian companies report a significant proportion of 
information on their web sites. In addition, researchers found that some financial 
characteristics explain the variation in the degree of internet reporting between 
Egyptian listed companies. The result also showed that profitability measured 
by ROE, foreign listing and industrial type are the most important factors that 
affect the amount and presentation formats of information disclosed on Egyptian 
FRPSDQLHV¶ ZHE VLWHV +RZHYHU RWKHU ILUP FKDUDFWHULVWLFV VXFK DV ILUP VL]H
leverage, liquidity and auditor size do not explain corporate internet reporting. 
However, the result of this study is difficult to generalise as the number of 
companies was relatively small due to company websites being a recent 
phenomena in Egypt.  
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To find out whether there was a significant difference between the firms listed in 
the Corporate Governance Index of the Istanbul Stock Exchange (ISE) and 
those that are not, in terms of level of disclosure on the corporate web sites 
Uyar (2011), investigated the utilisation of the internet by the Turkish companies 
listed on the ISE. He also examined some company characteristic (XCORP 
listing, firm size, industry, profitability) that influence the information disclosure 
level and found that firms, which are listed in the ISE Corporate Governance 
Index (XCORP), disclose significantly more information on corporate web sites 
compared to the firms that are not listed in the XCORP. In addition, the results 
indicated that firm size and being listed in the XCORP are significant 
explanatory variables for the total disclosure score on the corporate web sites, 
while industry and profitability are not. 
 
In Indonesia, another developing country, the determinants of internet financial 
reporting was examined by Puspitaningrum and Sari (2012). The aim of this 
study was to find empirical evidence of whether corporate governance 
mechanisms (ownership structure, independent commissioners, and audit 
committee characteristics) affect the level of voluntary disclosure of internet 
financial reporting. By employing a purposive sampling method, 95 companies 
were selected from all of 420 Indonesian companies listed in Indonesian Stock 
Exchange in the period of 2010. The result indicated that among corporate 
governance mechanisms, only audit committee meeting frequencies influence 
voluntary disclosure of internet financial reporting. Moreover they also found 
that size tends to affect the level of internet financial reporting while profitability, 
liquidity, and leverage did not affect the level of internet financial reporting. 
 
However, internet financial disclosure is not homogeneous. It varies 
substantially with respect to the depth and volume of released information, as 
well as the manner in which the data are delivered in terms of timeliness, 
technology, and user support (Marston and Leow 1998; Lymer et al. 1999; 
Ettredge et al. 2002; Lybaert 2002). There appears to be a higher degree of 
homogeneity in company sites of firms that belong to the same industry, 
indicating that companies are inspired by and wish to keep pace with their rivals 
(Lybaert 2002; Matherly and Burton 2005). A number of studies predict that the 
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increasing use of the internet by investors is likely to continue and is expected 
to increase the supply of voluntary disclosures (Healy and Palepu 2001). 
 
It is noticeable that most of these prior studies were undertaken for developed 
countries, especially the US and European countries. The number of factors 
that drive firms to use the internet reporting in these studies is not identical. 
These factors include firm characteristics (i.e. firm size, profitability, industry 
type, leverage, and audit type) and corporate governance characteristics (i.e. 
ownership structure, board composition, board size, and role duality). However, 
the results are often mixed. In addition, the findings of these studies may not be 
generalisable to different countries at different stages of development, or with 
different business environments and cultures. A few studies on the 
determinants of internet reporting were conducted in developing countries such 
as Thailand (Davey and Homkajohn 2004), Malaysia (Abdul Hamid 2005), some 
Arab countries (Ismail 2002; Al-Htaybat and Napier 2006); Egypt (Aly et al. 
2010) and China (Xiao et al. 2004; Zhang et al. 2007). A summary of the 
literature review is given in the table 3.1. 
 
In Bangladesh, a limited number of studies have been undertaken to examine 
internet reporting. However, the researchers have only used descriptive 
analysis to offer a general overview of the current situation (Bhuiyan et al. 2007; 
Dutta and Bose 2007; Khan et al.2009). There are also some studies which 
examined a particular aspect of corporate reporting (such as corporate 
environmental reporting, Dutta and Bose 2008; Banerjee and Probal 2009; 
sustainability disclosure by Sobhani et al. 2012). There is only one study 
(Nurunnabi and Monirul, 2012) that examined the extent of corporate internet 
reporting and seven company characteristics as the determinants of it. The 
main limitation of this study is that there is no classification of information as 
voluntary or mandatory. Although the study published in 2012, it used 
information from 2009. In addition, the study was performed before the 
notification of the BSEC in 2010 regarding the disclosure of quarterly financial 
VWDWHPHQWVRQWKHFRPSDQ\¶VZHEVLWH 
 
In order to remove the gap in the literature, the current research investigates the 
level of corporate mandatory and voluntary information on the internet and their 
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determinants. As the study measure the disclosure level through the disclosure 
of mandatory and voluntary information on the internet, the following section of 
this chapter will highlight the relevant literature for the study, according to the 
category of information.  
 
3.3 Mandatory Disclosure: 
Mandatory disclosure refers to those aspects and information which must be 
published as a consequence of the existence of some legal or statutory 
stipulations, capital markets, stock-exchanges commissions or accounting 
DXWKRULWLHVUHJXODWLRQV7KHDLPRIPDQGDWRU\GLVFORVXUHLVWRVDWLVI\WKHXVHUV¶
inforPDWLRQDO QHHGV HQVXULQJ TXDOLW\ FRQWURO WKURXJK WKH ODZV DQG VWDQGDUGV¶
observance (Adina and Pares 2008). Wallace and Naser (1995) defined 
mandatory disclosure as the presentation of a minimum amount of information 
required by laws, stock exchanges, and the accounting standards setting body 
to facilitate evaluation of securities. More specifically, Akhtaruddin (2005) 
defined mandatory reporting concentrating on items of information required by 
the Companies Act 1994, the listing rules of the stock exchanges, and the 
DSSURYHG,$6¶VWKDWOLVWHGFRPSDQLHVPXVWGLVFORVHLQWKHLUDQQXDOUHSRUWV 
 
Disclosure theory indicates that corporate disclosures are complex 
constructions capable of a variety of interpretations. As Gibbins et al. (1992) 
have argued, organisations may disclose information to support the efficiency of 
exchange and production, but they also disclose information to establish their 
compliance with the social values reflected in regulations and informal norms. 
The most important publishing variant is represented by the compulsory 
disclosure. The mandatory character of reporting is ruled at national or even 
regional level through professional organisations or government authorities, 
being practiced in most of the countries by all the firms regardless of their size, 
of their judicial, fiscal or national accounting system, the favourite finance 
sources and other factors which impact on disclosure policy.  
 
In Bangladesh, corporate disclosure is largely influenced by the British 
accounting system. As mentioned in chapter two, the mandatory disclosure 
requirements in Bangladesh are generally guided by the Companies Act 1994, 
Securities and Exchange (SEC) Rules 1987, Listing Regulations issued by the 
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Security and Exchange Commission of Bangladesh, and BAS and BFRS 
adopted by the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Bangladesh (ICAB). Most 
of the studies exploring various determinants of the mandatory disclosure 
practices are on the basis of printed annual report; there are a very few studies 
regarding the determinants of corporate mandatory disclosure on the internet. 
Some authors distinguishing between mandated and non-mandated disclosed 
items (Ettredge et al. 2002; Xiao et al.  2004). 
 
3.3.1 Prior Research on Mandatory Disclosure on the Internet: 
Any corporation in the world wishing to build an international profile or tap 
international sources of funds must have a corporate web site that includes an 
investor relations component. From a demand perspective, investors rely 
increasingly on corporate web sites for periodic and annual financial statements 
and also for press releases, speeches, investor conference calls as well as links 
to products and other information. Increasingly securities regulators are 
mandating the use of the internet for corporate performance disclosure 
purposes.  
 
Ettredge et al. (2002) extended their prior research on internet financial 
reporting by providing insights into dissemination of two types of financial 
information on corporate web sites. One type consists of reports that already 
have been filed with the SEC (i.e. required filings).The second type is all other 
voluntary information for investors. They found that the presence of required 
items is significantly associated only with size and a proxy for information 
asymmetry, while voluntary information item disclosure is associated with 
variables proxying for size, information asymmetry, demand for external capital, 
DQG FRPSDQLHV¶ WUDGLWLRQDO GLVFORVXUH UHSXWDWLRQV7KHLU UHVXOWV FRQILUPHG WKDW
incentives motivating initial voluntary disclosure also explained the subsequent 
dissemination of voluntary material. 
 
Xiao et al.  (2004) studied internet corporate disclosure in China. They find that 
there is a significant and a positive relation between mandated and voluntary 
disclosure. They further show that the presentation format of internet corporate 
disclosure is associated with the employment of a Big-5 auditor and whether the 
firm is in the information technology industry; while a negative association exists 
- 60 - 
 
between profitability and the voluntary disclosures. Voluntary internet corporate 
disclosure is positively and significantly associated with the proportion of legal 
person ownership, but not with ownership by domestic private investors, foreign 
investors and the state. In addition, the proportion of independent directors has 
a positive relation with presentation format, voluntary disclosures, and the 
availability of English web pages. 
 
Mendes-da-Silva and Theodore (2004) examined the determinants of voluntary 
disclosure of financial information on the internet by Brazilian firms. They found 
that firm size, liquidity in the stock exchange and the corporate governance of 
companies has significant positive association with the level of disclosing 
information on the internet. In particular, these three determinants have 
significant positive relationships with the level of disclosing both mandatory and 
voluntary information. On the other hand, company performance has a 
significant negative association with the level of disclosing mandatory and 
voluntary information on the internet. The study did not find any association of 
leverage with disclosure level. The limitation of the study is that it does not 
consider financial firms. They also ignore non-financial information when 
developing their disclosure checklist. 
 
Again, considering only the non financial sector Alvarez et al. (2008) examined 
the validity of the hypotheses of the agency, signalling, political costs and 
proprietary costs theories in the disclosure of voluntary and mandatory 
information online. They used a content analysis approach and developed three 
disclosure indexes. Their findings emphasise the relevance of the hypotheses 
of political costs theory as the main explanatory factor for voluntary disclosure 
of information on the internet by quoted Spanish firms. In particular, they 
K\SRWKHVLVHWKDWWKHJUHDWHUWKHILUP¶VPRQRSROLVWLFSRZHUWKHPRUHYLVLEOHWKH
company is and the more political cost it faces. To reduce these costs, 
companies have an interest in disclosing greater amounts of information.  
 
Boubaker et al. (2012) investigated the determinants of web-based corporate 
reporting by French-listed firms. They also analysed the use of the internet to 
disseminate corporate information and examines the extent of web-based 
corporate disclosure by developing six disclosure indexes: total score, content 
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score, format score, mandatory score, non-mandatory score, and incremental 
score. The explanatory variables include firm characteristics: size, float, xlist, 
leverage, profitability, and equity offerings. They found that the model using the 
non-mandatory score as a dependent variable had greater explanatory power 
relative to the models using total, content, format, mandatory and incremental 
scores: the lowest explanatory power is given by the mandatory score. They 
also found that firm characteristics are rather associated with the extent of 
voluntary items disclosed at corporate web sites and to a lesser extent to 
mandatory information and to the way the information is presented on the web. 
This suggests that web sites are more suited for non-mandatory information. 
Their findings also revealed that internet corporate reporting increases with firm 
size, audit firm size and ownership dispersion and is more important for IT 
industry firms and for firms having issued bonds or new shares. However, the 
study does not cover all information provided on web sites, particularly those 
DERXWWKHLPSDFWRI,)56RQFRPSDQLHV¶DFFRXQWV7KH\DOVRH[FOXGHGEDQNLQJ
companies from their sample size. The summary of these literatures are given 
in the table 3.1. 
 
Although there are very few studies which consider disclosure of mandatory 
information on the internet, there is no detailed study in the case of Bangladesh. 
So there is a gap in the literature as to what extent do Bangladeshi companies 
disclose mandatory information on the internet and what are the determinants 
that affect this disclosure level. 
 
3.4 Voluntary Disclosure: 
The expression voluntary disclosure indicates that this disclosure is 
discretionary and subject to the decision of management. There is no formal 
obligation for the company to disclose more information voluntarily. In other 
words, no legal or formal action will be taken if a company does not disclose 
information more than the requirements. The need for voluntary disclosure 
appears as a consequence of the information asymmetry between the two 
parties: managers are better informed about the business than its owners. 
Voluntary disclosure concerns information made public thrRXJK WKH ILUP¶V IUHH 
choice. It is influenced by culture, social, economic and behavioural factors that 
are specific to each firm (Adina and Pares 2008). Although there are a large 
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number of studies which address voluntary disclosure, there is no generally 
accepted definition for voluntary disclosure (Abdel- Fattah 2008; Adina and 
Pares 2008).  
 
Meek et al (1995) indicate that voluntary disclosure± disclosure in excess of the 
requirements ± represent free choices on the part of management to provide 
information that is considered to be relevant to the users of annual reports 
(Abdel-Fattah 2008). It is argued that the reliance on the disclosure 
requirements or rules has created some limitations and unfairness in reporting 
and disclosure (Riahi-Belkaoui 2002). Therefore, theorists and practitioners 
have begun to recognise the inherent shortcomings of traditional reporting and 
have developed models for additional voluntary disclosure (Schuster and 
2¶&RQQHOO  3UHYLRXV GLVFORVXUH VWXGLHV GHVFULEH WKH term voluntary 
disclosure as items of information that are disclosed over and above the 
mandatory requirements (e.g. Cooke 1989; Ho and Wong 2001; Barako et al. 
2006). Abdel-Fattah (2008) defines voluntary disclosure in annual reports as: 
 
³,WHPVRIinformation, quantitative or qualitative, that companies disclose in their 
annual reports above the mandatory requirements specified in accounting 
VWDQGDUGVDQGRURWKHUUHJXODWLRQV´S-15) 
 
Thus voluntary disclosure is defined as being an additional offer of information 
in relation to different national regulations or international referential of business 
reporting; that is, something that is not compulsory by the law, but becomes 
voluntary through the behaviour regarding publication. In other words, the 
voluntary offer of information represents the excess of information, dependent 
both on the free choice of the enterprise leadership and on the regulations in 
force, the outside pressures of the capital markets, financial analysts, consulting 
firms and the cultural factors (Adina and Pares 2008). 
 
Adina and Pares (2008) also stated that companies often voluntarily disclose 
corporate information in order to obtain capital and to attract investors, even in 
the absence of regulation. Holland (1998) comparing the benefits to the costs of 
voluntary disclosure, states that the management will publish until they will 
reach the point when they will observe that the capital agency costs reduction 
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has equalled the increase of the information publication costs for the market 
and the other users. Moreover, agency theory highlights the reasons that cause 
managers to provide voluntary disclosures above and beyond required 
disclosures. According to this theory voluntary disclosures occur as a means for 
companies to minimise their agency costs.Disclosures in excess of that required 
by law has been an area of interest to researchers for many years. Companies 
continue to disclose voluntary information despite ever increasing mandatory 
requirements and so the motivation for such behavior has been the focus of 
much attention (Watson et al. 2002).  
 
In the absence of legislative requirements, voluntary disclosure demonstrates a 
commitment to society (Mathews 1995). Although not all benefits can be 
quantified in monetary terms (Evens 2003), companies that report on social 
responsibility and account for social and environment impacts may gain specific 
benefits by: attracting and retaining talented people (Adams 2002; Simms 
2002): having better internal control and decision-making systems; producing 
costs savings; and continuously improving products and services (Adams 
2002). By disclosing information on social and environmental issues, companies 
can minimise the risk of powerful consumer boycotts (Adams 2002); 
communicate with the community and stakeholders (Anand 2002) and construct 
a competitive advantage (King 2002). 
 
Corporations that fail to meet societal expectations with regard to social 
responsibility may lose their legitimacy, and subsequently their survival will be 
threatened. Societal expectations for financial institutions such as banks may 
include strengthening corporate governance, fighting money laundering, 
preventing tax evasion, protecting financial privacy, equal opportunity 
employment, and promoting environmental awareness. Empirical research 
(Karake 1998) found a SRVLWLYH DVVRFLDWLRQ EHWZHHQ D FRPSDQ\¶V VRFLDO 
SHUIRUPDQFH DVPHDVXUHG E\ D FRPSDQ\¶V reputation index, and its financial 
performance, as measured by its return on equity (Douglas et al. 2004). 
 
The nature and extent of corporate social reporting appears to vary between 
different countries (Gray et al. 1996). The difference in the extent to which 
companies have reported on the non-financial aspects of corporate social 
- 64 - 
 
reporting may also be a result of government policies. Mathews (1993) pointed 
out that cultural and national differences were likely to affect accounting 
practices in general and corporate social reporting practices in particular. Tsang 
(1998) suggested the stage of economic development of a country was likely to 
be an important factor affecting CSR practices. However, Adams et al. (1998) 
contended that with the increasing globalisation of business, cultural specific 
factors may not weigh as strongly as corporate and industry specific factors. 
 
With the growing awareness towards sustainable development, industries and 
corporations have a major role in environmental degradation and protection 
thereof. This awareness on sustainable development is visible through varied 
environmental management mechanisms practised amongst companies across 
the world. Environmental concerns are addressed by corporate giants through 
identification and estimation of environmental costs, benefits, investments, 
assets and liabilities into main stream accounting and reporting practices, for 
varied managerial decisions. These focused environmental efforts have 
sharpened and improved the global reporting standards (Malarvizhi and 
Sangeeta 2008). Corporate environmental reporting can be defined as a 
mechanism whereby companies disclose the environmental aspects of their 
corporate activities to stakeholders. Since the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro in 
1992, people recognised the need for sound environmental information for 
improved decision-making (DEAT 2005). Environmental reporting was 
traditionally a voluntary process but from the mid-1990s, a number of European 
countries began to introduce mandatory environmental reporting (DEAT 2005). 
Denmark was the first country to do so, in 1996. 
 
The past few years have seen a rapid increase in accountability pressures on 
companies. Financial crises in Asia and elsewhere, accounting and 
remuneration scandals, and suspicion about the social and environmental 
implications of business have led to growing demand for transparency about 
corporate behaviour on a whole range of issues (Kolk and Perego 2008). 
Corporate sustainability has been defined as the strategy adopted by a 
company to satisfy the legitimate social, economic and environmental 
expectations of its stakeholders (Husted and Allen 2000). Furthermore, 
according to legitimacy and stakeholder theories, corporate sustainability 
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disclosure (CSD) is a part of the dialogue between a company and its 
stakeholders DQG SURYLGHV LQIRUPDWLRQ RQ D FRPSDQ\¶V DFWLYLWLHV WKDW KHOS
legitimise its behaviour, educate and inform, and change perceptions and 
expectations (Gray et al.1995; Adams and Larrinaga-González 2007; Adams 
and McNicholas2007). 
 
The global issue of sustainability urge the corporate bodies to be transparent by 
disclosing those sustainability activities that may affect the earth and society at 
large (Sobhani et al. 2011). This type of disclosure around the world has been 
steadily rising since the end of 2000 and Japan is the pioneer in terms of 
companies issuing sustainability reports (Kolk 2003). Many organisations now 
report their sustainability strategies and practices in their annual reports and 
corporate websites. 
 
However, there are no rules or regulations regarding corporate social, 
environmental or sustainability reporting in Bangladesh. Neither is there any 
provision in the Companies Act 1994, nor any separate Bangladesh Accounting 
Standard (BAS) regarding social and environmental reporting (IASCF 2003). 
However, Bangladesh adopted International Financial Reporting Standards 
(IFRS) on 5thJuly, 2006 and issued BAS-1 (Presentation of Financial 
Statements) by encouraging the companies listed on the Stock Exchange of 
Bangladesh to publish additional statements on their non-financial activities. So 
it can be said that corporate social, environmental, and sustainability reporting 
are still voluntary in Bangladesh with the exception of disclosure of the total 
amount of expenditures on energy usage, which is required to be disclosed 
under the Companies Act 1994 and the Securities and Exchange rules 1987. 
 
3.4.1 Prior Studies on Voluntary Disclosure on the Internet: 
Traditionally, companies have used different media to disclose voluntary 
information. These media include the printed annual report (Lang and Lundholm 
DQGVKDUHKROGHUV¶PHHWLQJV)UDQNHOHWDO8VXDOO\WKHGLVFORVXUH
takes place when it is more convenient for the company (Abbody and Kasznik 
)UDQNHOHWDO.DV]QLNLQRUGHUWRLPSURYHFRPSDQ\¶UHVXOWV
(Dye 1990).Today, the internet constitutes a powerful means for voluntary 
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disclosure. It allows an increase in the number of potential users (Bonson and 
Tomas 2002). 
 
The extent of financial information disclosure by the largest 206 companies was 
examined by Craven and Marston (1999). The study revealed that company 
size measured by turnover, market value, number of employee and total assets 
has a significant positive association with the use and extent of financial 
disclosure on the internet. They found no significant association between 
industry type and the disclosure level. As the study considered only the 206 
largest companies of London Stock Exchange, their conclusion should be 
restricted to large company disclosure. Moreover they considered only the 
disclosure of financial information and two explanatory variables.  
 
Bonson and Tomas (2002) analysed the corporate internet reporting behaviour 
of leading companies in different European countries in order to make a 
comparative analysis. To evaluate the level of disclosure, they collected data 
from the biggest 20 companies based on their market value in each European 
Union country and developed a transparency index by considering: financial 
and non-ILQDQFLDOLQIRUPDWLRQPDQDJHPHQW¶VDQDO\VLVRIWKHILQDQFLDODQGQRQ-
financial data, forward looking information, information about management and 
VKDUHKROGHUV DQG FRPSDQ\¶V EDFNJURXQG LQIRUPDWLRQ WR HYDOXDWH WKH OHYHO RI
disclosure. Their results concluded that the information provided on the internet 
by leading European firms depends on the industry type, country of origin and 
size of the company. As they considered only the 20 biggest companies in each 
country, the result cannot be generalised to all. Results may vary if the number 
of companies increased. 
 
Again Bonson and Tomas (2006) sought to identify the differences existing 
between the information provided by the companies of Eastern Europe that 
have recently joined the EU or are now in the process of joining and the 
information required according to the initiatives of the EU and their 
determinants. In their study, they collected data from 13 countries and 
developed a disclosure index on the basis of the Spanish regulations on 
corporate transparency. However, the sample selected only those companies 
who have web pages in English. They found significant differences between the 
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information provided by Eastern European companies that have joined the EU 
and the information required by the initiatives of the EU. Among the four 
explanatory variables, company size, companies that are audited by the Big 
Four audit firms and those belonging to the financial sector, have a positive 
significant relationship with the level of information disclosed on the internet. But 
they found no relationship between the country in which the company is located 
and the disclosure level. 
 
By considering only financial information Ismail (2002) examined the extent of 
information disclosed on the internet by the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) 
countries especially Qatar, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia. Data for this study were 
collected from a cross-section of all 128 companies that are listed on the stock 
exchange of the selected GCC countries. They found that the probability of a 
ILUP¶VSXEOLVKLQJ ILQDQFLDO LQIRUPDWLRQRQ WKH LQWHUQHWGRHVQRWRQO\GHSHQGRQ
individual characteristics, but on a combination of interaction effects among firm 
characteristics (size, leverage, and profitability), industry type, and country.That 
means increasing in assets, profitability, or leverage may increase the 
probability of a firm publishing financial information on the internet when these 
variables are within a specific range; above this range an increase in such 
YDULDEOHV PD\ GHFUHDVH WKH SUREDELOLW\ RI D ILUP¶V SXEOLVKLQJ ILQDQFLDO
information on the internet. So, the final effect depends on the interaction 
among firm characteristics, industry type, and country. 
 
Oyelere et al. (2003) examined the extent and determinants of voluntary 
corporate internet financial reporting (IFR) by New Zealand companies. 
Although they consider seven explanatory variables, they used information only 
as far as 1998. They found that company size, industrial sector and liquidity 
have significant positive association and a spread of shareholding has a 
negative significant association with IFR practice. Moreover, internationalisation 
has a significant positive association with IFR practice at the univariate level but 
it is insignificant at the multivariate level. Other firm characteristics, such as 
leverage and profitability do not explain the choice to use the internet as a 
medium for corporate financial reporting. 
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Laswad et al. (2005) examines the characteristics of New Zealand local 
government authorities that influence the voluntary dissemination of financial 
information on the internet. Their result suggested that local authorities that are 
more highly leveraged or that create relatively more municipal wealth than other 
authorities are more likely to engage in internet financial reporting (IFR). 
Moreover, New Zealand local authorities that are more visible in the press are 
also more likely to use the internet to provide financial information. They also 
found that council type has negative significant association with the IFR practice 
possibly due to the urban nature of the internet and relatively lower level of 
access. However their findings did not support local authority size and level of 
political competition as the predictors of IFR. 
 
The timeliness of corporate internet reporting practices by the UK companies 
were examined by Abdelsalam and Donna (2007).Their study provided 
evidence that board independence is significantly negatively associated with 
corporate internet reporting (CIR) timeliness, thereby; suggesting a high 
percentage of outside directors may yield negative consequences. In case of 
board experience, they found that boards with less cross-directorship, more 
experience in terms of average age and lower length in service for executive 
directors provide timelier CIR. Although they revealed a positive association of 
CIR with U.S. listing and being in a technology industry, there is a significant 
negative association between providing web casts on the internet and block 
ownership (number of major shareholders) and role duality. As the sample of 
this study is drawn from the top quartile of London Stock Exchange companies, 
so caution is required in generalising the results. 
 
7UDEHOVL HW DO  DQDO\VHG WKH &DQDGLDQ FRPSDQ\¶V LQWHUQHW UHSRUWLQJ
practices to identify their determinants and consequences. Their evidence 
indicated that firms use the internet to report complementary information on firm 
background, management forecasts, and intangible assets and on social and 
environmental issues. They found that additional financial disclosures through 
corporate websites is significantly and positively associated with share turnover, 
UHVHDUFK DQG GHYHORSPHQW H[SHQGLWXUH GHJUHH RI DV\PPHWU\ ILUP¶V
performance, financing activities, Herfindahl index, firm size, and analyst 
following: it has significant negative association with competition. But they found 
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no association of ownership concentration, cross listing, relevance, and audit 
quality with the additional voluntary internet financial disclosures.  
 
2QH RI WKH HPHUJLQJ HFRQRP\¶V (J\SW LQWHUQHW ILQDQFLDO UHSRUWLQJ SUDFWLFHV
was investigated by Desoky (2009). He examined some company 
characteristics namely company size, profitability, foreign listing, industry type, 
ownership structure and legal form as the determinants of Internet Financial 
Reporting (IFR) practices. They found that company size, profitability, foreign 
listing and ownership structure are significantly positively associated with the 
IFR of Egyptian listed companies, while legal form is significantly negatively 
associated. However, industry type is not significantly associated with the IFR. 
This study is limited to a relatively small sample of 88 Egyptian listed 
companies, which may not represent all of the possible listed companies and it 
only considered the disclosure of financial information. Moreover, banking and 
insurance companies are excluded from the sample companies. 
 
Garg and Divya (2010) investigated the use of internet for corporate reporting 
by 200 companies of the BSE- 200 Index in India. They developed an Internet 
Disclosure Index (IDI) to measure the type and extent of web disclosure but 
used data of 2007 which is backdated. Their results provide evidence of 
significant positive association of industry sector, size of the company, 
association with business house with the extent of information disclosed on 
websites. But variables like age of the company, profitability, liquidity, leverage 
and ownership spread do not affect web reporting by companies. Although they 
classify information into seven categories to develop their index (Financial 
Reporting Index, Corporate Governance Information, Corporate Social 
Responsibility & Human Resource Information, Marketing Information, Investor 
Relations Communication, Right to Information Act, and Technological Aspects 
and User Support), they did not identify which are mandatory and which are 
voluntary. 
 
Using a sample of 84 publicly traded companies listed in Buenos Aires Stock 
Exchange (BCBA) in Argentina, Alali and Romero (2012) examined the internet 
reporting practices by companies and their characteristics. Their result 
suggested that companies in the transportation and gas, real estate, services 
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and mining disclose more financial and non-financial information on their 
websites than companies in other industries. Moreover, they found significant 
positive association of company size, Merval25 and majority owners (block 
holders) with the level of disclosure. Although profitability, Big-4 auditor and 
leverage do not have a significant effect; growth has a negative effect on 
corporate Internet reporting practices.  
 
The Internet media has become more popular as a new communication medium 
firms use to present themselves as socially responsible. Due to globalisation, 
there is an increased pressure on firms and managers to act ethically and in a 
socially responsible manner. The internet enables people to become aware of 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) issues such as the use of child labour, 
exploitation of workers and destruction of the environment. CSR reporting 
contributes to the reduction of information asymmetry between managers and 
investors as well as other stakeholders (Jizi et al. 2014). There are several 
reasons for firms to disclose corporate social responsibility information on the 
website.  
 
Corporations that fail to meet societal expectations with regard to social 
responsibility may lose their legitimacy, and subsequently their survival will be 
threatened. As the government is not fully able to take care of the population 
and be responsible for its quality of life, companies play an important role in 
society and try to differentiate themselves from each other through CSR actions 
(Jamali and Mirshak 2007).In the absence of legislative requirements, voluntary 
disclosure demonstrates a commitment to society (Mathews 1995). Although 
not all benefits can be quantified in monetary terms (Evens 2003), companies 
that report on social responsibility and account for social and environmental 
impacts may gain specific benefits. According to Idowu and Towler (2004) an 
organisation may derive some perceived benefits from the disclosure such as 
increased customer loyalty, more supportive communities, the recruitment and 
retention of more talented employees, improved quality and productivity, and 
the avoidance of potential reputation risk which may arise from environmental 
accident. 
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Corporate Social and Environmental Reporting was defined by Gray et al. (1987 
as cited in Rizk 2006) DV µWKH SURFHVV RI FRPPXQLFDWLQJ WKH VRFLDO DQG
HQYLURQPHQWDO HIIHFWV RI RUJDQLVDWLRQV¶ HFRQRPLF DFWLRQV WR SDUWLFXODU LQWHUHVW
groups within VRFLHW\ DQG WR VRFLHW\ DW ODUJH¶ (QYLURQPHQWDO UHSRUWLQJ ZDV
traditionally a voluntary process but from the mid 1990s, a number of European 
countries began to introduce mandatory environmental reporting (DEAT 2005). 
Sustainability reporting is the practiFH RI µPHDVXULQJ UHSRUWLQJ DQG EHLQJ
accountable to internal and external stakeholders for organisational 
SHUIRUPDQFHWRZDUGVWKHJRDORIVXVWDLQDEOHGHYHORSPHQW¶*5,S 
 
Chambers et al. (2003) investigated CSR reporting practices on the website by 
the top 50 companies from each of the seven countries in Asia. They identified 
very different levels of CSR penetration in the seven Asian countries and 
concluded that for these seven countries, the level of CSR lags behind the UK. 
Furthermore, these countries often developed their own system of reporting. 
They also suggest that globalisation is a driver for new CSR developments as 
they found that firms which operate internationally are more likely to engage in 
CSR and to institutionalise it through codes than those that do not. Since they 
considered only the top 50 companies in seven countries, the result cannot be 
generalised. 
 
Wanderley et al. (2008) examined whether CSR information disclosure on 
corporate websites is influenced by country of origin and/or industry sector in 
emerging countries such as Brazil, Chile, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, 
Thailand and South Africa. By analysing the websites of127 corporations they 
found that both the country of origin and industry sector has a significant 
influence over CSR information disclosure on the web. They also identified that 
country of origin has a stronger influence over the disclosure on the web than 
industry sector. 
 
CSR disclosure practice both in annual report and on the website were 
investigated by Ponnu and Maurice (2009).They found that Kenyan firms 
disclose significantly more corporate social information on web sites than in 
annual reports. They considered all the listed companies in Nairobi Stock 
Exchange to determine the relationship between company size (paid-up capital, 
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revenue and profit before tax) and CSR disclosure and to examine the themes 
(environment, community involvement, product and consumer and human 
resources management) of CSR disclosure. Their result revealed that there is 
no significant difference between the level of CSR disclosure among the various 
industry groupings which is similar to the results of other studies among the 
developing countries (for example, Ahmad et al. 2003; Teoh and Thong 1984; 
and Andrew et al. 1989).They also found that there is no significant relationship 
between firm size and CSR disclosure in Kenya and the theme most commonly 
disclosed was community involvement.  
 
Chatterjee and Monir (2008) also reached the same conclusion that Indian 
companies provided more environmental information on their web sites than in 
their annual reports. They selected the top 45 companies as sample on the 
basis of market capitalization as a representative of firm size because larger 
firms find disclosure of environmental information more advantageous to them 
than smaller firms. They also excluded financial firms from their sample as this 
sector has no impact on the environment. However the study revealed that 
although there are no regulations enforcing the disclosure of environmental 
information, most Indian companies have disclosed environmental information 
DQG D FRPSDQ\ EHORQJLQJ WR WKH ³GLYHUVLILHG´ VHFWRU KDV SURYLGHG WKH KLJKHVW 
number of environmental information disclosure sentences on web site. In 
addition, they found that most of the sampled companies have provided the 
news of a SRVLWLYH DQG QHXWUDO QDWXUH DQG QRQH RI WKHP GLVFORVHG DQ\ ³EDG´
news. 
 
Adams and Geoffrey (2006) examined the development of the corporate web 
site as a medium for sustainability reporting in Australia, Germany and the 
United Kingdom. They found that the majority of large companies in the three 
countries analysed had a web site at the time of the study and many companies 
felt that they needed a web site presence without actually understanding or 
having the expertise in the technology to fully appreciate its potential. This has 
resulted in a situation where a web site, once created, becomes neglected with 
content being initially imported but not regularly updated. That means there is 
some diversity in the approaches taken in utilising the web site.  
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Like Chatterjee and Monir (2008), Zhang et al. (2007) also selected the top 20 
companies on the basis of market capitalisation from the listed companies in 
China and argued that these companies act as leaders and guiders in their own 
industry and their actions toward Internet Environmental Reporting (IER) can 
have significant impact on the rest of companies in China. This study analysed 
the nature, contents, type and style of Internet Environmental Reporting that 
have been adopted by Chinese listed companies from 2002 to 2006. They 
found that IER is increasingly used by Chinese listed companies to disclose 
social and environmental activities, and companies are increasingly using the 
SKUDVHV RI µVXVWDLQDELOLW\¶ DQG µ&RUSRUDWH 6RFLDO 5HSRUWLQJ¶ LQ WKHLU ,(5
Moreover, they concluded that both the quantity of disclosure and the coverage 
of areas of social and environmental information have steadily increased 
suggesting WKDW ,(5 LV µJURZLQJ XS¶ LQ &KLQD DOWKRXJK WKHUH UHPDLQV D
considerable discrepancy in terms of reporting practices and the levels of social 
and environmental information disclosed.  
 
Malarvizhi and Sangeeta (2008) made an attempt to understand the current 
trends in internet environmental reporting practices of Indian companies. The 
research has observed that Indian companies follow diverse reporting practices 
on the internet viz., stand alone environmental reporting (satellite accounts) or 
reporting along with the Annual/Financial Reports, or Sustainability Reporting. It 
also showed that Indian companies exceed their existing legal obligations and 
anticipate more future legislation on environmental issues. Good environmental 
performance is seen to benefit investors more by reducing risk than by 
increasing return. Financial managers, in particular, need to be aware of how 
environmental matters, affect the fundamentals of financial accounting and 
reporting (Schaltegger and Burritt 2000). 
 
3.5 Prior Studies on Corporate Reporting on the Internet in Bangladesh: 
The overall corporate internet reporting practices of listed companies in 
Bangladesh were investigated by Bhuiyan et al. (2007), Dutta and Bose (2007) 
and Nurunnabi and Monirul (2012). According to Bhuiyan et al. (2007) only 
40.24% listed companies have websites among which 33.33% companies 
provide information on the web. They developed a disclosure index of 54 items 
of information which were categorized into seven major themes (1) General 
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information; (2) Accounting and financial Information; (3) Corporate social 
responsibility and human resource information; (4) Corporate governance 
information; (5) Contact details to investor relation and related conveniences; 
(6) Material processable format; and (7) Technological development and users 
supports. Their result showed that significant difference exists in the average 
internet disclosure among the sectors. They suggested that as more and more 
people of Bangladesh are connecting themselves to the internet, companies are 
expected to change their internet reporting practices, in terms of both content 
and disclosure in order to enhance the investor relations activities on the 
internet. 
 
Dutta and Bose (2007) also investigated the utilisation of the internet for 
communicating corporate information by the listed companies of Bangladesh 
and found that only 38.81 percent of the listed companies had a website and 
61.54% reported at least one financial item on the web site. Their findings 
revealed that the banking, leasing and finance sector are more advanced than 
other sectors in establishing a website for corporate reporting. Moreover, more 
than 71%of companies reported at least one corporate governance item on their 
websites and only around 38% companies provided social information on their 
websites. Like the previous study, this study also did not examine any 
determinants or factors influencing the disclosure of information on the web. 
 
Only Nurunnabi and Monirul (2012) examined the current state of voluntary 
disclosure of internet financial reporting (IFR) in Bangladesh as an example of 
an emerging economy. They investigated empirically some company 
characteristics as determinants of such practice. They developed a disclosure 
index of 56 items of information which were categorized into three sections, 
LQFOXGLQJ µµFRQWHQWV RQ ILQDQFLDO VWDWHPHQWV¶¶  LWHPV µµRWKHU ILQDQFLDO
LQIRUPDWLRQ¶¶LWHPVDQGµµSUHVHQWDWLRQDQGXVHUVXSSRUW¶¶LWHPVEXWXVHG
data from the year 2009. They found that only 29.12% companies had web sites 
RXWRIWKHOLVWHGFRPSDQLHVDQGRQO\FRPSDQLHV¶SURYLGHGILQDQFLDO
information. Moreover the study examined the association between a number of 
company characteristics and the extent of voluntary disclosure of IFR: they 
found that only big four audit firms and non-family ownership variables were 
significantly associated with the levels of voluntary disclosure. Other variables 
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such as size measured both by sales and market capitalization, profitability 
measured both by net profit margin and return on equity, age, industry category 
and corporate governance link (audit committee) are not statistically significant. 
Another important result revealed that despite the mandatory requirements to 
have an audit committee in Bangladesh, the companies without audit committee 
were disclosing more voluntary information: it raises the question on the lack of 
regulatory enforcement in Bangladesh. 
 
Khan et al. (2009) investigated the emerging issues of online corporate financial 
reporting in the global context and then made an attempt to provide an 
appraisal of the current practice of corporate financial reporting on the internet 
(FRI) by Bangladeshi companies. They selected the top 30 companies on the 
Chittagong Stock Exchange as their sample and found that only 75% of the 
companies having website disclose financial statements on the internet. They 
also analysed the issues relating to financial reporting on the internet in 
Bangladesh through focus group discussions with different stakeholders and the 
responses to a structured questionnaire. They found that the aggregate overall 
score of the opinions of the sample respondents regarding inaptness of FRI in 
fulfilling the contentment of the users of financial reporting is 1.98 and the range 
of score is from 1.76 to 2.19. They also provide evidence that FRI presently 
practiced in Bangladesh is not apposite. 
 
Again Dutta and Bose (2008) investigated the utilisation of corporate websites 
for communicating corporate environmental information by the listed companies 
of Bangladesh. The sample for the study consists of 104 listed companies 
among which only 17 companies (16.35%) disclosed environmental information 
on their websites: out of these 17 companies, 3 (17.65%) companies belong to 
the pharmaceutical and chemical sector and 2 (11.76 %) companies from each 
of the four sectors such as papers and printing, cement, engineering and 
electrical, and textile and clothing sectors, disclose environmental information 
on their websites. Like their previous studies, they did not examine any factors 
or determinants influencing the disclosure. 
 
The extent of utilization of corporate annual reports and corporate websites for 
communicating corporate environmental information by the listed companies of 
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Bangladesh was examined by Banerjee and Probal (2009). By analysing 
corporate annual reports of 30 companies and corporate websites of 17 
companies in Bangladesh, they found that corporate environmental reporting in 
Bangladesh is still in its infancy, no matter which medium of communication is 
used. They also found that there is no statistically significant difference exists 
between these two media of communication in the case of disclosing 
environmental information. 
 
Sobhani et al (2012) examined the status of corporate sustainability disclosure 
practices in the annual reports and corporate websites of the banking industry in 
Bangladesh. Their analysis revealed that most of the disclosed sentences are 
related to social issues whereas environmental issues are generally ignored. 
With respect to sustainability disclosure practices in the annual reports, 73.17% 
of sentences are found to be related to social issues and only 1.12% of 
sentences are related to environmental issues while with respect to website 
disclosure, 99.07% of sentences are related to social issues whereas only 
0.27% of sentences are related to environmental issues. Moreover, in case of 
economic disclosure, annual reports disclose more economic information than 
websites, which are 25.71% and 0.66%, respectively. The majority of the items 
of sustainability information are declarative in nature and contain positive 
messages for the organisations. Negative information or bad news is rarely 
observed in the annual reports and websites. Islamic banks disclose more 
sustainability information in comparison to conventional banks. It is also found 
that among the three generation, the older bank does not outperform the 
younger bank in terms of sustainability disclosure.The study considered only the 
banking sector and results may be different for the other sectors in Bangladesh. 
 
3.6 Gap in the literature: 
This review supports the assertion that previous studies on internet reporting in 
Bangladesh have examined either a particular aspect of corporate reporting: 
such as corporate environmental reporting, Dutta and Bose 2008; Banerjee and 
Probal 2009; Sobhani et al. 2012, or how the internet is used for corporate 
reporting: Bhuiyan et al. 2007; Dutta and Bose 2007; Khan et al. 2009; 
Nurunnabi and Monirul 2012).  There is only one study (Nurunnabi and Monirul 
2012) which considers the determinants of corporate internet reporting in 
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%DQJODGHVK EXW WKH\ GLGQ¶W FRQVLGHU how much mandatory and voluntary 
information are disclosed on the internet in Bangladesh. Although the study of 
Nurunnabi and Monirul was published in 2012 they used the data from 
2009.There are some studies regarding the extent of mandatory and voluntary 
disclosure in the printed annual report (Akhtaruddin 2005; Karim and Jamal 
2005; Hasan et al. 2008) but there is no single study which considers the extent 
of mandatory and voluntary information on the internet. 
 
In order to remove this gap, the current study not only considers the extent of 
mandatory and voluntary information on the internet but also tries to identify the 
determinants of such disclosure. Moreover, this study will focus the mandatory 
and voluntary disclosure and their different categories, which will help to identify 
the particular area where the major non compliance occurs. This study covers 
all the listed companies in Bangladesh and performs sector wise analysis of 
disclosure levels which will provide a total picture of internet disclosure to the 
interested parties including the regulators. In addition to this, there is no study 
performed after the directive circular in 2010 regarding the disclosure of 
information on the website.  
 
3.7 Conclusion: 
Reviews of the literature on mandatory disclosure on the internet have revealed 
that there is a lack of research in this area in developing countries. On the other 
hand, there are so much literature regarding voluntary disclosure on the web 
and its determinants. According to the consultative document of Institute of 
Chartered Secretaries and Administrators (ICSA), UK, (ICSA 2000) the home 
SDJH RI D FRPSDQ\¶V ZHE VLWH VKRXOG LQFOXGH D GLUHFW OLQN WR WKH SDFNDJH RI
statutory and financial information that is required to be open to the public. 
Thus, it suggests the best medium through which corporations can make 
financial information easily available to shareholders and other interested 
parties is the internet. 
 
The current study tries to contribute to the disclosure literature through 
examining the extent of mandatory and voluntary disclosure practices on the 
internet by the listed Bangladeshi companies. The study intends to cover all the 
listed companies in Bangladesh and whether the determinants of mandatory 
disclosure on the web are same for the disclosure of voluntary information. The 
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literature review is justifiable because on the basis of this review it is possible to 
identify the gap in the literature and appropriate methodology for the study 
which are discussed in chapter five. Moreover, this review helps in the 
hypothesis development process in chapter four. 
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Table 3.1: Summary of Corporate Internet Reporting Literature 
Author(s) Country Independent /Dependent 
Variables 
Analysis Findings 
Brennan and 
Denis 
(1998) 
Ireland (109 
companies) 
Independent: Size, leverage, 
demand for corporate information, 
and industry 
Dependent: Internet disclosure 
Univariate, 
bivariate and 
nonparametric 
statistics 
Findings indicate that larger listed 
companies (as defined by market 
capitalization, turnover, profits and 
employees) and companies in the services 
and finance industry are significantly more 
likely to use the Internet. They also found 
no association of internet usage with 
leverage and the total number of 
shareholders. 
Debreceny et al. 
(2002) 
22 countries 
(660 
companies) 
Independent: Size, leverage, growth 
prospect and intangible variable, 
foreign listing, us listing, level of 
technology employed, firm specific 
market risk, internet penetration and 
disclosure environmental 
Dependent: IFR-P (Internet 
Financial Reporting-presentation) 
and IFR-C (Internet Financial 
Reporting- content) 
Ordered Probit 
regression 
They found that internet disclosure is a 
function of both firm-specific 
characteristics, as well as environmental 
characteristics. In respect of firm 
characteristics they found that firm size, 
level of technology employed and growth 
prospects and intangibles are associated 
with internet financial reporting. 
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Ettredge et al. 
(2002) 
USA(220 
companies) 
Independent: Firm size, raising 
equity capital, correlation between 
earnings and returns, annual return 
and disclosure quality 
Dependent: Required disclosure, 
voluntary disclosure and total 
disclosure 
Regression 
analysis 
Disclosure of required items is significantly 
associated only with size and a proxy for 
information asymmetry, while voluntary 
information item disclosure is associated 
with variables proxying for size, 
information asymmetry, demand for 
external capital, and companies traditional 
disclosure reputations. 
Bonson and 
Thomas (2002) 
European 
Union country 
(300 
companies) 
Independent: Industry type, country 
of origin, and company size 
Dependent: Disclosure index 
Kruskal-Wallis 
test and 
ANOVA test 
They found significant positive association 
of industry type, country of origin, and 
company size with the level of disclosure. 
Ismail (2002) GCC countries 
(128 
companies of 
GCC countries) 
Independent: Size (total assets and 
turnover), leverage, profitability 
(ROA and ROE), industry type and 
country 
Dependent:  Financial disclosure on 
the internet 
Logistic 
regression 
analysis 
39.07%companies have websites and 
disclosed financial information on the 
internet. Firm assets, profitability, and 
leverage affecting the decision to 
disseminate financial information on the 
internet.  
Marston (2003) Japan (99 
companies) 
Independent: Company size, 
profitability, industrial classification, 
overseas listing. 
Dependent: Extent of internet 
Kruskal Wallis 
and chi-square 
test 
The results revealed that company size 
has significant positive association with 
the existence of a web site but the extent 
of financial disclosure was not related to 
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disclosure size. In addition, profitability, industry 
grouping and overseas listing status non-
significant association with internet 
disclosure. 
Oyelere et al. 
(2003) 
New Zealand 
(229 
companies) 
Independent: Size profitability, 
liquidity, industry type, leverage, 
internationalization and spread of 
shareholders 
Dependent: Internet financial 
reporting (IFR) 
Univariate and 
multivariate 
logistic 
regression 
The results of the study indicate that firm 
size, liquidity, industrial sector and the 
spread of ownership motivate the 
provision of IFR while no significant 
relationship was found between IFR and 
profitability, internationalization, and 
leverage in this study. 
Marston and 
Polei (2004)  
Germany (50 
companies) 
Independent: Firm size, profitability, 
ownership structure, systematic risk, 
foreign listing status. 
Dependent: Internet disclosure index 
Univariate and 
multivariate 
analysis 
The results revealed that only size is a 
significant explanatory variable for the 
amount of financial and other investor-
related information presented at 
FRPSDQLHV¶ZHEVLWHVZKLFKLVVWDEOHRYHU 
time. Foreign listing status was only 
significant for the 2003 sample and free 
float only significant for the 2000 sample 
whereas Profitability and systematic risk 
was non-significant. 
Mendez-de-silva Brazil (291 Independent: Leverage, annual Multivariate They found that firm size, liquidity in the 
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and Thoedore 
(2004) 
companies) earnings per share, firm size, 
liquidity, corporate governance, and 
profitability 
Dependent: Internet disclosure index 
analysis stock exchange and the corporate 
governance of companies has significant 
positive association and company 
performance (measured by annual 
earnings per share) has significant 
negative association with the level of 
disclosing information on the internet. But 
they did not found any association of 
leverage with disclosure level. 
Xiao et al. (2004) China (300 
companies) 
Independent: Type of auditor, 
foreign listing, share ownership, 
independent directors, industry type, 
profitability, leverage, firm size and 
proportion of fixed assets, influence 
of CSRC, right issue. 
Dependent: Extent of total internet 
corporate disclosure which was 
employed in six ways- Total score 
for all 82 disclosure items, content 
items, presentation items, CSRC-
required items, non-CSRC-required 
items, and companies having 
Univariate and 
multivariate 
analysis 
There is a significant positive relation 
between mandated and voluntary 
disclosure. They further show that the 
presentation format of ICD is associated 
with the employment of a Big-5 auditor 
and firm belonging in the information 
technology industry, while a negative 
association exists between profitability and 
the voluntary disclosures. Voluntary ICD is 
positively and significantly associated with 
the proportion of legal person ownership, 
but not with ownership by domestic private 
investors, foreign investors and the state. 
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English website 
Laswad et al. 
(2005) 
New Zealand 
(86 local 
authorities) 
Independent: Political competition, 
size, leverage, municipal wealth, 
press visibility, and council type 
Dependent: Internet financial 
reporting 
Univariate and 
multivariate 
analysis 
They found that leverage, municipal 
wealth and press visibility have significant 
positive association and council type has 
significant negative association with 
internet financial reporting practices while 
size and political competition have no 
significant association.  
Bonson and 
Thomas (2006) 
13 countries 
(266 
companies 
from 13 
Eastern Europe 
countries) 
Independent: Size, industry type and 
audit firm size, country of origin 
Dependent: Extent of disclosure on 
the internet 
Multiple 
regression 
analysis 
They found that company size, companies 
that are audited by the Big Four audit firm 
and those are belonging to the financial 
sector have a positive significant 
relationship with the level of disclosing 
information on the internet. But they found 
no relationship between the country in 
which the company is located and the 
disclosure level. 
Alvarez et al. 
(2008) 
Spain (117 
companies) 
Independent: Industry concentration, 
corporate size, industrial sector, 
profitability, and leverage 
Dependent: Internet disclosure index 
Multivariate 
analysis 
They found that industry concentration has 
a significant and positive association with 
the level of disclosing voluntary 
information on the web but not with the 
level of mandatory disclosure. Moreover, 
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size has significant positive association 
with both type of disclosure. Profitability 
(ROA) indicates a negative but non-
significant effect in the estimated models, 
while the remaining variables representing 
industry sectors ± services, industry and 
construction ± and the leverage do not 
show a significant influence. 
Ezat and Ahmed 
(2009) 
Egypt (50 
companies) 
Independent: Size, type of business, 
profitability, leverage, liquidity and 
issue of shares, ownership structure, 
board composition, role duality, size 
of the board of directors 
Dependent: Corporate internet 
reporting timeliness index 
OLS regression 
analysis and 
logistic 
regression 
analysis 
Findings indicate that company size, 
liquidity, ownership structure, service 
activity type, board composition and board 
size are positively significant and 
associated with corporate internet 
reporting timeliness while profitability, 
leverage, issue of shares, and role duality 
have non significant association. 
Desoky (2009) Egypt (88 
companies) 
Independent: Company size, 
profitability, foreign listing, industry 
type, ownership structure and legal 
form 
Dependent: Internet financial 
reporting index 
Univariate and 
multivariate 
linear 
regression 
Study found that company size, 
profitability, foreign listing and ownership 
structure are significantly positively 
associated with the internet financial 
reporting, while legal form is significantly 
negatively associated. Findings also 
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indicate non-significant association of 
industry type with the disclosure level. 
Garg and Divya 
(2010) 
India (200 
companies) 
Independent: Company size, 
profitability, leverage, liquidity, 
ownership spread, business house, 
industrial sector and date of 
establishment. 
Dependent: Internet disclosure 
Index 
Kruskal-Wallis 
Test and 
ANOVA 
The results indicated that industry sector, 
size of the company, association with 
business house have significant positive 
association with the extent of information 
disclosure on websites but age of the 
company, profitability, liquidity, leverage 
and ownership spread have non 
significant association. 
Aly  et al. (2010) Egypt (62 
companies) 
Independent: Size, profitability, 
leverage, liquidity, industry type, 
auditor size, foreign listing 
Dependent: Internet disclosure index 
Multiple 
regression 
analysis 
They found that profitability, foreign listing 
and industrial type have significant 
positive association with the amount and 
presentation formatting of information 
disclosed on (J\SWLDQ FRPSDQLHV¶ ZHE
sites. But firm size, leverage, liquidity and 
auditor size, have non- significant 
association with corporate internet 
reporting. 
Uyar, A. (2011) Turkey (43 
companies) 
Independent: XCORP listing 
(Istanbul Stock Exchange Corporate 
Governance Index), industry type, 
Multivariate 
linear 
regression 
They found that XCORP listing firms and 
size have a significant positive association 
with the level of disclosing information on 
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company size, profitability 
Dependent: Internet disclosure 
Index 
analysis the internet while industry and profitability 
have non-significant association. 
Boubaker et 
al.(2012) 
France (529 
companies) 
Independent: Firm size, ownership 
dispersion, firm performance, cross-
listing, auditor size, leverage, it-
industry, and equity offering 
Dependent: Internet reporting index 
OLS regression 
analysis 
The results showed that voluntary 
disclosures are more suited for the 
internet than mandatory disclosures. In 
addition they found that firm size, 
ownership dispersion, auditor type equity 
offerings and firms in the IT-sector have 
significant positive association with the 
level of internet disclosure but profitability, 
leverage and cross-listing have non- 
significant association. 
Puspitaningrum 
and Sari (2012) 
Indonesia Independent: Managerial ownership, 
block-holder ownership, 
independent commissioner, audit 
committee meeting frequencies, 
audit committee competency, size, 
profitability, liquidity , and leverage 
Dependent: Level of internet 
financial reporting (IFR) 
Multiple 
regression 
analysis 
The result indicated that among corporate 
governance mechanisms, only audit 
committee meeting frequencies influence 
voluntary disclosure of internet financial 
reporting. This study also found that only 
size tends to affect the level of internet 
financial reporting while profitability, 
liquidity, and leverage did not affect the 
level of IFR. 
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Alali and Silvia 
(2012) 
Argentina (84 
companies) 
Independent: Size, profitability, 
leverage, growth, big-4 auditor, 
industry effect and ownership 
structure 
Dependent: Internet disclosure index 
OLS regression 
analysis 
They found that companies in the 
transportation and gas, real estate, 
services and mining industries disclose 
more financial and non-financial 
information on their websites than 
companies in other industries. Moreover 
they found significant positive association 
of company size, Merval25 and majority 
owners with the level of disclosure. 
Though profitability, Big-4 auditor and 
leverage do not have significant effect but 
growth has negative effect on internet 
reporting practices.  
Nurunnabi and 
Monirul (2012) 
Bangladesh (83 
companies) 
Independent: Company age, 
profitability , industry type, size of 
the company, big-4 audit firm, 
ownership diffusion, audit committee 
Dependent: Internet disclosure index 
OLS regression 
analysis 
They found that the big audit firms and 
non-family ownership variables have 
significant positive association with the 
levels of voluntary disclosure while age, 
size, profitability, industry and audit 
committee have non±significant 
association. 
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Chapter: 4 
Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses Development 
 
4.1 Introduction: 
Through the discussion in previous chapters it is clear that the subject matter of 
this study is corporate internet reporting and its determinants. Chapter one 
outlines the importance, background and motivation for the research and 
chapter two represents an overview of the Bangladesh including the economy 
and legal environment as a context of the study.  It is indicated in chapter three 
that there is a need for more research on the internet disclosure practices and 
its determinants in emerging capital markets in general and Bangladesh in 
particular where there is a lack of published research about the internet 
disclosure practices. This chapter presents the theoretical base and develops 
the research hypothesis for the study. 
 
The aim of this chapter is to provide critical analysis of the most used theories 
employed in the corporate reporting literature to give a general idea of different 
theoretical perspectives and offer a critical evaluation of the various theoretical 
perspectives adopted in explaining the corporate reporting phenomenon. In 
section 4.2, different theories and their evaluation are discussed. Section 4.3 
presents the empirical evidences of some of the theories and develops a 
theoretical framework for this study in section 4.4. The hypotheses are 
developed in section 4.5 followed by a conclusion in section 4.6. 
 
4.2 Theories of Corporate Reporting: 
7KHRU\LVLPSRUWDQWDV³WKHRULHVHQDEOHVXVWRXQGHUVWDQGLQJHQHUDOWHUPVKRZ
the world works, to move around, mentally, among the objects and relationships 
to which they relate, and to act in ways that, as far as we can tell, will not defeat 
our reasonable expectations. A theory will not save us from unreasonable 
expectations nor from the vagaries of chance in any form. A theory will not tell 
us what to do; but it will tell us what is possible to do and what is not possible to 
do. In that way it removes countless things from consideration when we are 
FRQIURQWHGZLWKWKHQHFHVVLW\RIFKRRVLQJRUDFWLQJ´&KDPEHUV 
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The purpose of a theoretical framework is to describe the financial reporting and 
disclosure practices and the reasons behind non-disclosure. According to 
Haniffa (1999), these theories seem to be unclear in the sense that all of them 
are logical and acceptable but none could be nominated as the best theory to 
explain corporate social reporting and disclosure practice. In this context of 
disclosure, as an accounting topic, it can be noticed that disclosure literature 
employs several theories as guidance in explaining disclosure practices. There 
is no comprehensive theory of disclosure and more work is suggested and 
called for to understand disclosure practices (Hopwood 2000; Healy and Palepu 
2001; Verrecchia 2001). There are some differences that exist between the 
various theoretical frameworks; as they each attempt to analyse the same 
problems but from different perspectives, they do share significant 
commonalities (Solomon 2007). 
 
Different theories, including agency theory, signaling theory, cost benefit 
analysis have been used to explain company voluntary disclosure (Debreceny 
et al. 1999; Marston and Shrives 1995). Healy and Palepu (2001) indicated that 
UHVHDUFK RQ PDQDJHUV¶ UHSRUWLQJ GHFLVLRQV IRFXVHG RQ WZR DUHDV SRVLWLYH
accounting theory and voluntary disclosure. Empirical studies on positive 
accounting theory typically test whether managers make accounting method 
changes or accrual estimates as a result of agency costs. Research on 
voluntary disclosures supplements the positive accounting literature by focusing 
on stock market incentives for accounting and disclosure decisions by 
managers. For the purpose of the study, relevant theories are described below. 
  
4.2.1 Agency Theory: 
Agency theory has been widely used in disclosure literature (Chow and Wong-
Boren 1987; Cooke 1989, 1991, 1992; Firth 1980; Hossain et al. 1994; 
Nurunnabi and Monirul 2012; Bhuiyan et al. 2007; Akhtaruddin 2005; Aljifri 
2008; Marston and Annika 2004). This theory provided a necessary explanation 
of why the selection of particular accounting methods might matter, and hence 
was an important facet in the development of positive accounting theory 
(Deegan 2010). Agency theory attempts to explain accounting practices and 
standards. The agency problem was first explored in Ross (1973), with the first 
detailed theoretical exposition of agency theory presented in Jensen and 
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0HFNOLQJ  7KH\ GHILQHG WKH PDQDJHUV RI WKH FRPSDQ\ DV WKH µDJHQWV¶
DQG WKH VKDUHKROGHU DV WKH µSULQFLSDO¶ 7KLV WKHRU\ LV EDVHG RQ WKH SUREOHPV
stemming from the separation of ownership and management in the largest 
corporations. One of the principal assumptions of agency theory is that the 
goals of the principals and agent conflict.  
 
According to Deegan (2010), this theory focused on the relationships between 
principals and agents, a relationship which, due to various information 
asymmetries, created much uncertainty. Such relationship involves the 
delegation of some decision making authority to managers (Jensen and 
Meckling 1976). Therefore, managers have power to use all the resources 
available to the company and consequently have all information about the 
company. On the other hand owners, who provide the resources, have the 
power to hire managers for conducting the business and they need information 
to evaluate the performance of the managers as well as the company. So the 
SUREOHPRILQIRUPDWLRQDV\PPHWU\DULVHV,WLVDVVXPHGWKDWLQGLYLGXDOV¶DFWLRQV
are driven by self- interest to maximize their benefits. So, the theory indicates 
that there is an interest conflict; or lack of goal congruence; between agents 
(managers) and the principals (owners); agents may take decisions that 
maximise their benefits but not necessarily maximise the benefits of owners. 
Such conflict requires a number of mechanisms to measure and monitor the 
agent's behaviour and, therefore, leads to agency costs (Abdel Fattah 2008). 
 
Alvarez et al. (2008) indicated that one of the possible ways to reduce those 
FRVWVLVWRGLVFORVHLQIRUPDWLRQDERXWWKHPDQDJHUV¶DFWLRQVDQGWKHHFRQRPLF
reality of the company. With that information, shareholders will be able to 
monitor managers more appropriately. Consequently, the disclosure of 
LQIRUPDWLRQ FDQ VHUYH DV D PHFKDQLVP IRU FRQWURO RQ EHKDOI RI FRPSDQLHV¶
shareholders as well as a mechanism of legitimacy for managers. Agency 
theory explains why managers voluntarily disclose information. Shareholders 
will seek to control managers' behaviour through bonding and monitoring 
activities. These two parties may use the level of disclosure as a way to mitigate 
the severity of the problem of information asymmetry. Managers have an 
incentive to signal that they are acting in the interests of owners. On the other 
hand, owners try to encourage and sometimes force managers to disclose more 
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information. Therefore, managers may have an incentive to try and convince 
shareholders. Through greater disclosure, companies attempt to reduce the 
cost of capital by reducing investor uncertainty (Ball and Foster 1982; Watson et 
al. 2002).  
 
In the context of disclosure, information asymmetry has been identified as one 
of the motivations of voluntary disclosure decision (Healy and Palepu 2001). 
Moreover, agency theory indicates that managers will disclose social 
information if it increases their welfare, as long as the benefits of this disclosure 
overweigh its associated costs (Ness and Mirza 1991). Agency theorists argue 
that corporations are structured to minimize the costs of getting some 
participants (agents) to do what other participants (principals) desire. Therefore, 
participants agree to cooperate with each other within the organisation rather 
than dealing with each other through the market (Donaldson and Preston 1995). 
 
However, a number of authors criticise the assumption of agency theory that 
individuals act in self- interest to maximise their benefits and suggest that there 
are internal and external pressures that direct the performance of managers to 
serve the interests of owners in addition to their interests (Fama 1980; 
Eisenhardt 1989; Ashton 1991). They indicate that there is an overestimation of 
PDQDJHUV¶PRWLYDWLRQWRDFW LQWKHRZQHUV
 LQWHUHVWV$FFRUGLQJWR0ROGRYHDQX
and Martin (2001), there are two types of managerial failures that restrict the 
agent from acting perfectly towards the principals (shareholders). The first one 
is the failure of managerial competence related to unwitting mistakes in the 
discharge of managerial control; the second is, the failure of managerial 
integrity related to willful actions on the part of managers: this has negative 
impact on the value of firm's assets. In addition, there are internal and external 
pressures that direct the performance of managers to serve the interests of 
owners in addition to their own interests.  
 
Moreover, agency theory ignores the fact that managers have significant 
motivation to conceal adverse information or artificially enlarge the firm's short 
term results in order to maximise benefits related to these short term results 
(Vlachos 2001; Ghazali 2004). According to Deegan (2010), if there is no 
mechanism to make an agent pay for actions that are undertaken and which 
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adversely impact on the owners, that agent has an incentive to consume many 
perquisites, as well as to use confidential information for personal gain at the 
expense of the principals. Demski (1974) suggests that managers may also 
have incentives to disclose more information to differentiate themselves from 
more poorly run companies. Coffee (1984) pointed out that agency theory 
ignores the fact that some managers have strong incentives to withhold positive 
information. It is the incentive problems that are at the heart of agency theory. 
Okcabol and Tinker (1993) indicate that this theory fails to account for non-
financial motivations for suppressing disclosure. 
 
Again, agency theory does not assume that individuals will ever act other than 
in self-interest, and the key to a well functioning organisation is to put in place 
mechanisms that ensure that actions that benefit the individual also benefit the 
organisation. One way to align the interests of the manager with those of the 
owner of the firm might be for the manager to be given a share of profits in the 
organisation (Deegan 2010). 
 
4.2.2 Signaling Theory: 
Signaling is part of the notion of information asymmetry between management 
and ownership as adopted by Berle and Means (1932), which found that the 
level of information asymmetry is an important driver of investor uncertainty 
(Bollen et al. 2006). Signaling theory maintains that corporations could have an 
interest in providing information as a signal or mechanism that provides the 
PDUNHW ZLWK DGGLWLRQDO LQIRUPDWLRQ RQ WKH ILUP¶V HFRQRPLF UHDOLW\ VR DV WR
change investor expectations and reduce information asymmetries (Baiman and 
Verrecchia 1996).The information asymmetries have to do with the different 
amounts of company information available to managers, who have to deal with 
the daily operations and activities of the firm, and to other individuals, who 
receive delayed and filtered information from the managers (Alvarez et al. 
2008). 
 
The theory shows how asymmetry can be reduced when the party with more 
information signals it to others (Morris 1987). In such a case, companies have 
information that investors do not have. Signaling theory was mainly developed 
by Spence (1973) to explain behaviour in the labour markets but can also help 
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to explain voluntary disclosures. According to Sakarneh (2011), companies will 
try to adopt the same level of disclosure as other companies within the same 
industry: if a company does not keep up with the same level of disclosure as 
others, it may be perceived by stakeholders to be hiding bad news. 
 
Like to agency theory, the signaling theory also recognises the separation of 
ownership and management and recognises that the market pressures motivate 
managers to disclose information. Managers may wish to send signals to 
interested parties; owners, investors, and governmental agencies in order to 
distinguish themselves from other companies. In this regard disclosure is 
considered to be one of the means that can be used. Not only companies with 
good news have incentives to signal others but also companies with bad news 
or no information. Managers of companies with bad news may have incentives 
to disclose the bad news to reduce the reputation costs that may be incurred if 
they do not disclose this news in the relevant time (Skinner 1994).  
 
Financial information may be exercised by companies to indicate the underlying 
reality, and to influence external users when making decisions regarding them. 
It may be argued that only good firms will use this instrument, because the 
quality of firms can be later observed without difficulty, and firms would be 
punished by the market if they sent the wrong signals (Morris 1987). However 
the manager may exercise certain discretion by choosing the timing and extent 
of information disclosure. Verrecchia (1983) indicates that a manager's decision 
to disclose or withhold information depends upon the effect of that decision on 
the price of a risky asset. The manager decides either to withhold or release this 
signal on the basis of the information's effect on the asset's market price. He 
pointed out that there is an equilibrium threshold level of disclosure. The 
manager exercises discretion by choosing the point, or the degree of the 
information quality, below which he withholds his information, and above which 
he discloses (Abdel-Fattah 2008). 
 
For managers to signal quality successfully, the signal must be credible. In this 
case credibility is achieved, as ultimately the true quality of the firm will be 
verifiable. Verrecchia (1990) showed how a change in the quality of information 
received by a manager affects the manager's threshold level of disclosure. He 
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indicated that there is a negative relation between information quality and the 
threshold level of disclosure. The higher the quality of the information is the 
lower the threshold level of disclosure will be (Abdel-Fattah 2008). 
 
According to Morris (1987) the contribution of signaling theory is the prediction 
that higher quality firms will choose accounting policies which allow their 
superior quality to be revealed, while lower quality firms will choose accounting 
methods which attempt to hide their poor quality. The assumption of signaling 
theory that individuals are acting in their own-self interest, as in agency theory, 
has been criticised. Also, a number of authors criticize the assumption of equal 
distribution of power. They argue that it is not individuals who exercise power 
but institutions (Gray et al. 1996 as cited in Watson et al. 2002). A number of 
authors indicate that the reason for non-disclosure may be that managers do 
not have information to disclose (Penno 1997) or may be uncertain about the 
effect of disclosure on the manager's performance (Nagar 1999). 
 
According to the signaling theory, one could expect that only high quality firms 
use the internet as a medium to publish accounting information. Or at least it 
FDQEHH[SHFWHG WKDWKLJKTXDOLW\ ILUPVZRXOGSURYLGHPRUH ³FRQWHQW´RUPRUH
³IHDWXUHV´ RQ WKHLU ZHEVLWHV 'LVFORVXUH UHGXFHV WKH LQIRUPDWLRQ DV\mmetry 
towards potential investors, which alleviates the adverse selection problem. Low 
quality firms might prefer restricting access to accounting data to the more 
GHWHUPLQHGXVHUV&UDYHQDQG0DUVWRQDVVHUWWKDW³7KHYHU\XVHRIWKH
internet might itself be a signal of high quality. It implies that the firm is modern 
DQGXSWRGDWHZLWKWKHODWHVWWHFKQRORJ\UDWKHUWKDQROGDQGFRQVHUYDWLYH´ 
 
Empirical literature generally indicates that increased disclosure reduces the 
cost of capital, increases liquidity and increases information intermediation. 
Debreceny et al. (2002) and Ettredge et al. (2002) relate these findings to the 
disclosure of financial information on the internet. Singhvi and Desai (1971) 
argue that higher profitability motivates management to provide greater 
LQIRUPDWLRQEHFDXVHLWLQFUHDVHVLQYHVWRUV¶FRQILGHQFHZKLFKLQWXUQLQFUHDVHV
management compensation. It is also argued (Cooke 1989; Wallace et al. 1994; 
Wallace and Naser 1995) that a highly profitable firm is more likely to signal to 
the market its superior performance by disclosing more information in its annual 
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report. However, Lang and Lundholm (1993, p. 251) argue that disclosures are 
OLNHO\ WR EH UHODWHG WR D ILUP¶V SURILWDELOLW\ RQO\ LI SHUFHLYHG LQIRUPDWLRQ
asymmetry between managers and investors is high.  
 
4.2.3 Capital Need Theory: 
Capital need theory suggests that the main motivation for disclosure is the need 
to raise capital. Companies may think that greater financial disclosure will 
reduce investor uncertainty and reduce the cost of new capital (Choi 1973; 
Cooke 1993; Firth 1980). The prerequisites for the applicability of this theory in 
explaining disclosure practice are the demand for finance in the form of shares 
and loans and the existence of capital markets where the raising of finance 
could be facilitated (Haniffa 1999). To acquire capital more economically, either 
in the form of shares or loans, companies can use disclosure as a way to help 
in reducing investor uncertainty as well as information asymmetry.  
 
According to Dierkens (1991), information asymmetry is a significant variable in 
the case of equity issues as she found direct evidence of the importance of 
fluctuations of the information asymmetry with respect to information releases 
such as equity issue announcements and earnings announcements. Empirical 
studies on voluntary disclosure suggest that managers voluntarily enhance the 
YLVLELOLW\ RI WKHLU ILUP¶V ILQDQFLDO SURILOHV WR  UHGXFH DJHQF\ FRVWV RU
contracting costs (Chow and Wong-Boren 1987); (2) reduce its cost of capital 
(Botosan 1997; Sengupta 1998), and (3) enhance the value of the firm (King et 
al. 1990; Yeo and Ziebart 1995; Frankel et al. 1999). 
 
Alexander and Archer (1995) signify that the main role of financial reporting is to 
reduce information asymmetries in capital markets, and so it may improve the 
market efficiency. These would exert pressure on companies to expand 
information availability to a wider audience, such as potential investors 
interested in buying and selling shares and also specialist advisors who helped 
shareholders and potential investors in making share-trading decision. 
Increasing compliance with mandatory disclosure and the relative amount of 
voluntary disclosure increases the ease by which new capital can be raised 
(Cooke 1993; Marston and Shrives 1995). According to Meek and Gray (1989), 
disclosing less information by the company or non-disclosure of information 
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may be more expensive for funds because they may be perceived as more 
risky. More disclosure reduces the cost of capital, reduces information risk, and 
improves the share price (Diamond and Verrecchia 1991; Cooke 1993; Hossain 
et al. 1994; Botosan 1997, Sengupta 1998; and Healy and Palepu 2001) and 
this is possible by making disclosure that will enhance the company's image 
and reputation in the eyes of potential investors (Gray and Roberts 1989). 
 
4.2.4 Legitimacy Theory: 
This theory proposes that corporate disclosures are made as reactions to 
environmental factors (including social, economic and political) in order to 
legitimise corporate actions. Legitimacy is considered to be 'a generalised 
perception or assumption that the actions of the entity are desirable, proper, or 
appropriate within some social constructed system of norms, values, beliefs and 
definition' (Suchman 1995, p.574). Legitimacy theory is based on the notion that 
the organisation has a social contract; with its society; where it agrees to act 
according to socially desired actions (Guthrie and Parker 1989). Thus, to 
maintain their legitimacy, companies may disclose information voluntarily to try 
and improve communication with society; trying to ensure that society believes 
they are operating within society's value system. 
 
The idea of legitimacy can be directly related to the concept of a social contract 
and it is believed that an organisation's survival will be threatened if society 
perceives that the organisation has breached its social contract (Milne and 
Patten 2002). If the society is not satisfied with the operating system of the 
organisation, then the society will effectively revoke the organisation's contract 
to continue its operations. So legitimacy is regarded as a resource on which an 
organisation is dependent for its survival.  
 
By disclosing more information voluntarily, managers can communicate with 
society and its stakeholders and can influence external perception about their 
organisation. As such, managers will try to legitimise corporate activities and at 
the same time to legitimise their managerial positions. Legitimacy theory has 
been employed in disclosure literature to explain disclosure practice. The 
underlying premise in legitimacy theory, as well as political economy theory 
from which it stems, is that society, politics and economics are inseparable and 
economic issues cannot meaningfully be investigated in the absence of 
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considerations about the political, social and institutional framework in which the 
economic activity takes place (Rizk 2006). 
 
Legitimacy theory focuses on society and compliance with the expectations of 
society as embodied in the social contract. However, society is clearly made up 
of various groups having unequal power and ability to influence organisations 
and other groups. Moreover, it may be difficult to measure the concepts of 
society's values and ethics when forming testable hypotheses. However, the 
social values in which a company exists affect the manner used by that 
company to operate and report its performance (Gray et al. 1995). Therefore, it 
is assumed that considering the social and political environment may be helpful 
to address the motivation for corporate social choices (Adams et al. 1998). 
 
4.2.5 Stakeholder Theory: 
Stakeholder theory involves the recognition and identification of the relationship 
between the company's behaviour and the impact on its stakeholders (Ansoff 
1965). While agency theory concentrates only on the relationship between 
managers (agent) and shareholders (the principal), stakeholder theory 
considers the relation between managers and all stakeholders (the principal, 
including as shareholders, employees, customers, suppliers, and government). 
Based on stakeholder theory, a variety of stakeholders are involved in the 
organisation and each of them deserves some return for their involvement 
(Crowther and Jatana 2005). Stakeholders are persons or group that have or 
claim, ownership rights or interests in a corporation and its activities, past, 
present, or future. Such claimed rights or interests are the result of transactions 
with, or actions taken by, the corporation, and may be legal or moral, individual 
or collective. 
 
Stakeholders can be classified into two categories: the first is a primary 
stakeholder group which includes those who are essential to the continuation of 
the company as a going concern, such as shareholders, employees, suppliers, 
investors and the government. The second is a secondary stakeholder group, 
which includes those who are not essential to the survival of the company, but 
they affect or are affected by the company: for example the media. They have 
the ability to organise public opinion in favour of, or in opposition to, a 
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corporation's performance and thus they can cause significant damage to a 
corporation and as such, are still a force to be dealt with (Rizk 2006). 
 
According to this theory, managers should assess the importance of every 
group of stakeholders and try to satisfy them. For the purpose of benefit 
maximisation, managers must work on behalf of all stakeholders not only the 
shareholders. This is done by offering more information, especially voluntary 
disclosure, to gain the support and approval of these stakeholders. Freeman 
(1984) also suggested that stakeholder theory explains the relationship of the 
firm to its external environment. Consequently, shareholders will benefit, as the 
main stakeholder, in the long run.  
 
On one hand, Sternberg (1997); a proponent of agency theory; criticizes 
stakeholder theory based on some points. The author argues that this theory is 
incompatible with business and also with corporate governance. It rules out the 
objective of business which maximise long term owner value. Also, the theory 
implies that a company should be accountable to everyone not just to its owners 
and encourages managers to violate their prior obligations to owners. In 
addition, he indicated that balancing stakeholder benefit is an unworkable and 
unjustifiable objective and that the theory undermines private property and 
accountability. But Turnbull (1997) did not support the first two criticisms of 
Sternberg and argued that stakeholder relationships can legitimate and protect 
private property, agency, and wealth. 
 
4.3 Evaluation of Theories: 
The above three theories, agency theory, signaling theory and capital market 
theory, are derived from the pure economic approach. This approach places 
primary importance and concentration on the interests of two parties only, 
shareholders and managers. Based on the theory of 'right to know', Bedford 
(1973) suggested that company shareholders as co-owners of the company 
have a right to know everything they desire about the company. Haniffa (1999) 
also indicates that disclosure of income by companies implies that businesses 
operate for the benefit of the owners or shareholders. So, from this point of 
view, the theory falls short of recognising the existence of other stakeholders, 
such as government, taxation authorities, consumer groups and other interested 
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parties in the society. Furthermore, this theory emphasises profit maximisation 
as a main goal of managers and failed to highlight the other goals pursued by 
the managers in reality. 
 
From the above discussion of agency and signaling theories it can be seen that 
there is considerable amount of overlap between the two. In fact Morris (1987) 
explored whether these two theories are consistent, equivalent or competing, by 
examining the necessary and sufficient conditions for both of them. He points 
out that as the sufficient conditions for signaling theory are consistent with those 
of agency theory, the two theories are consistent: that is, if one theory is 
µFRUUHFW¶ WKH RWKHU WKHRU\ PD\ DOVR EH µFRUUHFW¶ +RZHYHU DV LQIRUPDWLRQ
asymmetry, a necessary condition for signaling theory is not a necessary 
condition of agency theory, signaling theory is not implied by agency theory and 
therefore they are not equivalent. Morris suggested that this consistency opens 
up the possibility of joining the two theories to provide fresh insights into the 
principal-DJHQWSUREOHPDQGLQWRILUPV¶DFFRXQWLQJSROLF\choices.  
 
The legitimacy theory and the stakeholder theory provide an explanation of 
disclosure practices but both suffer from some limitations. While legitimacy 
theory explains and predicts that companies use disclosure to legitimise their 
business, it is insufficient to fully explain disclosure practices. Rizk (2006) 
questioned the applicability of legitimacy theory to developing countries that 
have a low level of social disclosure. On the other hand, stakeholder theory 
implies that managers identify the importance of stakeholders based on their 
power. Stakeholder theory can be viewed as an extension of the traditional 
agency model: instead of simply restricting the focus of analysis to the 
relationship between manager and shareholders, it extends this to consider the 
relationship between managers and all stakeholders, i.e. managers being 
viewed in this sense as agents of all stakeholders (Hill and Jones 1992). This 
aspect of stakeholder theory has been subjected to the greatest criticism. 
 
Abd El Salam (1999) indicated the applicability of disclosure theories in 
developing countries. According to the author, the most common disclosure 
theories were originated in western countries and have been based on the 
assumption of efficient capital markets. The author also suggested that both 
- 100 - 
 
theoretical models of agency and capital need appear to be applicable to the 
findings in developing countries studies, but the applicability of signaling theory 
is not clear due to several reasons: investors may be less sophisticated or there 
may not be available data. Due to the limitations of an economic approach, a 
number of studies employ the political economic approach which considers 
relations with society and other institutions. 
 
4.4 Developing a Theoretical Framework: 
The theoretical discussion has shown that there is no one theory that can fully 
explain disclosure practices. Moreover, it is clear that there is overlap among 
these theories. Reviewing these theories indicates that each theory takes a look 
at disclosure from a different perspective. While the agency theory, signaling 
theory, and capital market theory focuses on parties related closely with 
economic activities and assumes that individuals are motivated by economic 
self interest only, legitimacy theory and stakeholder theory focuses on those 
parties in addition to governmental agencies and assumes that people are 
motivated by power and economic self interest. Furthermore, these theories 
assume that people are motivated by societal values so it considers all parties 
inside and outside the company.  
 
When explaining why particular disclosures are made, or in describing how 
organisations should make particular disclosures, reference is made to a 
particular theoretical perspective (Rizk 2006). Cormier et al. (2005) argued that 
disclosures are a complex phenomenon that cannot be explained by one single 
theory. Moreover, some theories may be more appropriate and relevant to 
some countries than others (Mallin 2010). Choosing one theory does not mean 
that it has some absolute superiority over the other theories. For example, 
Agency theory, signaling theory and cost- benefit analysis can all be used to 
indicate that there may be a positive relationship between size and disclosure 
(Marston 2003). Nurunnabi and Monirul (2012) employ agency theory, signaling 
theory and innovation diffusion theory to investigate empirically, some company 
characteristics as determinants of voluntary disclosure of internet financial 
reporting (IFR) in Bangladesh. 
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The current study addresses the mandatory and voluntary disclosure practices 
on the internet and their determinants by the listed companies in Bangladesh, 
therefore, agency theory, signaling theory and capital need theory will be 
appropriate for the study. As corporate internet reporting can enhance the 
monitoring role of accounting by providing investors with easier, faster and more 
cost-effective access to accounting data on corporate performance, it may 
possible that in this classic set-up model a risk adverse agent may voluntarily 
and frequently provide information through internet reporting in order to reduce 
monitoring costs and to encourage outside investors to invest in the company. 
Thus it helps to reduce the adverse effect of information asymmetry which is an 
important driver oILQYHVWRUV¶XQFHUWDLQW\ 
 
 Again, firms may use internet disclosure to keep pace with other firms in the 
VDPHLQGXVWU\&UDYHQDQG0DUVWRQSVWDWHGWKDW³WKHYHU\XVHRI
the internet might itself be a signal of high quality. It implies that the firm is 
modern and up-to-date with the latest technology rather than old fashioned and 
FRQVHUYDWLYH´ ,W LV DOVR DUJXHG WKDWPDQDJHUVRI SURILWDEOH ILUPV LQFUHDVH WKH
level of disclosure to signal to investors that the firm is profitable and to support 
their continuation and compensation (Oyeler et al. 2003, p. 36). Debreceny et al 
(2002), Ettredge et al. (2002) also indicated that a company generally tries to 
distinguish itself from others by signaling its specific qualities to investors. In 
addition, cost benefit approach is also helpful but according to Marston and 
Leow (1998) cost benefit analysis cannot perhaps be termed a theory of 
disclosure because the costs and benefits themselves can be predicted by 
theory or theories such as agency theory. Forker (1992) used a cost benefit 
analysis to build a predictive model for disclosure of share options but in doing 
this he used agency theory to justify some of the hypotheses.  
 
Marston and Leow (1998) used agency theory, signaling theory and cost benefit 
analysis to investigate the relationship between company characteristics and 
internet disclosure. Marston and Annika (2004) also used agency theory, 
signaling theory and cost-benefit analysis to examine the association between 
five firm-specific factors and the level of web disclosure by German companies. 
Watson et al. (2002) investigated whether the voluntary disclosure of ratios, in 
corporate annual reports, can be explained by agency theory and signaling 
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theory and suggested that if managers can reduce agency costs by improving 
disclosure quality then agency theory can explain why managers seek to 
disclose accounting ratios. Hossain et al. (1994) also applied agency theory as 
the theoretical framework for an empirical analysis of the levels of voluntary 
disclosure practice by the companies listed on the Kuala Lumpur Stock 
Exchange. 
 
As stakeholder theory does not utilize the concept of information asymmetry 
which is the main focus of internet reporting and legitimacy theory is based on a 
social contract between the company and society. Legitimacy theory is most 
successful in explaining social and environmental reporting (Gray et al. 1995 
and Milne 2002). This study focuses on overall disclosure, including social and 
environmental but not only social or environmental disclosure. That is why it is 
assumed that stakeholder theory and legitimacy theory will not support the 
study. 
  
In summary, this study supports agency theory, signaling theory, and capital 
need theory to develop the entire research hypothesis. It is assumed that 
organisations disclose mandatory and voluntary information on the internet for 
three reasons: firstly, to reduce the information asymmetry; secondly, to signal 
to their market about their quality and performance at a lower cost; and thirdly, 
WR UHGXFH WKH FDSLWDO FRVWV DQG WR LQFUHDVH WKH FRPSDQ\¶V PDUNHW YDOXH DW D
lower cost of elaborating and communicating the voluntary information. 
However, it must be noticed that choosing these theories does not mean that 
they have some absolute superiority over other theories. Each theory has some 
inherent limitation and their focus regarding disclosure practice is also different. 
So this study fails to support that a single theory can alone be used to 
accurately capture, convey and explain the reporting practices. 
 
Therefore, it is the intention of the study neither to focus on any single theory 
nor to discard any of these theories rather to carry them throughout the thesis 
with the aim of revisiting them in light of the results of the study. These theories 
are used to develop the hypotheses in the next section, which will be empirically 
tested at a later stage. The most frequently identified determinants are: firm 
VL]H DXGLW ILUP¶V LQWHUQDWLRQDO OLQN PXOWLQDWLRQDO SDUHQW SURILWDELOLW\ OHYHUDJH
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liquidity, industry type, board size, independent director in the board, market 
category, dual leadership structure, ownership structure, and company age. A 
brief review of these variables is provided below.  
 
4.5 Hypothesis Development: 
4.5.1 Firm Size: 
Many disclosure studies (e.g. Cooke 1991, Ahmed and Nichollas 1994) suggest 
that there is a significant relationship between firm size and the extent of 
voluntary disclosure. Singhvi and Desai (1971) and Buzby (1975) describe three 
reasons for an association between disclosure and size. Firstly, larger firms 
generally have a more diverse product range and more complex distribution 
networks than smaller firms. As a result, larger and more complex management 
information systems and databases are required for management control 
purposes. Consequently, disclosure costs may be generally lower for larger 
firms. Secondly, larger firms make more extensive use of capital markets for 
external financing relative to smaller firms. Such firms can increase the 
marketability of their securities in capital markets, and obtain capital more easily 
and cheaply through more extensive disclosure. Finally, smaller firms may be 
more likely than larger firms to consider that full disclosure of information could 
endanger their competitive position.  
 
According to Bonson and Thomas, (2002) large companies may be more able 
to access financial markets if they disclosed more information online. Some 
studies point out that the proportion of disclosure costs is smaller for larger 
companies (Lang and Lundholm 1993; Verrecchia 2001). It is argued that the 
larger the company, in terms of numbers of shareholders, the larger the 
informational gap or information asymmetry among investors on the one hand 
and between investors and the management on the other; so more disclosure 
might be used to reduce the information asymmetry problem (Debreceny et al. 
2002). Larger firms have an increased need for external capital. As a result, by 
disclosing more information in internet financial reporting, the managers will 
reduce the agency cost to appear trustworthy to the shareholders: agency 
theory would be justified in this situation (Nurunnabi and Monirul 2012). With 
low incremental costs, large firms are more likely to supplement traditional 
financial disclosure with internet reporting to benefit from decreasing agency 
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costs. The benefits of such disclosures increase with firm size (Oyelere et al. 
2003).  
 
Wallace and Naser (1995) argue that larger firms naturally attract a large 
number of suppliers, customers, and analysts, which consequently increases 
the demand for information about their activities. Many of the empirical studies 
investigate the relationship between the size of the companies and online 
disclosure and found a positive association. For example, Ashbaugh et al. 
(1999), Craven and Marston (1999), Brennan and Hourigan (1999), Debreceny 
et al. (2002), Ettredge et al. (2002), Marston (2003), Marston and Annika 
(2004), Oyelere et al. (2003), Xiao et al. (2004), Bonson and Thomas (2006), 
Bollen et al. (2006) and Al-Shammari (2007), Desoky (2009), Garg and Divya 
(2010): however, there are a number of notable exceptions, e.g., Lau (1992); 
Malone et al. (1993); Ahmed and Nicholls (1994); and Ahmed (1996). 
 
Although there are several proxies of company size used in prior research, 
including number of shareholders (Cooke 1991), total assets (Ashbaugh et al. 
1999; Ismail 2002; Aly and Simon 2008), turnover (Craven and Marston, 1999; 
Ismail 2002), total sales (Aly and Simon, 2008) and market capitalisation 
(Debreceny et al. 2002; Ettredge et al. 2002; Bollen et al. 2006), the disclosure 
literature does not provide a theory or criterion to choose among different 
proxies. However, there is no criterion to choose the best proxy of firm size 
(Hassan et al. 2006). Drawing on the theoretical and empirical evidence from 
prior studies, the current study can expect a positive relationship between the 
firm size and the level of mandatory and voluntary disclosure on the internet by 
the listed companies in Bangladesh. The study measures firm size by a log of 
total assets. 
 
Hypothesis ± H1: There is significant positive association between firm size and 
the level of disclosure on the internet. 
 
4.5.2 Profitability:  
Profitability as a measure of performance is considered to be one of the most 
common explanatory variables that have been used in disclosure literature. A 
number of theoretical and empirical bases can be observed. Signaling theory 
suggests that profitable companies have an incentive to disclose more 
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information, tRVLJQDOWKHILUP¶VSURILWDELOLW\WRLQYHVWRUVWRVXSSRUWPDQDJHPHQW
continuation of their positions and levels of compensation (Oyeler et al. 2003), 
and to raise capital at the lowest price (Marston and Annika 2004). Companies 
with bad news may be motivated to disclose more information to reduce the risk 
of legal liability and severe share devaluation or loss of reputation (Skinner 
1994).  
 
Agency theory also suggests that managers of profitable companies have an 
incentive to disclose more information in order to boost their compensation (Abd 
El Salam 1999). Managers can use disclosure to deal with the problem of 
information asymmetry; they look to improve the corporate image and to 
maintain their positions (Singhvi 1968). Singhvi and Desai (1971) found a 
positive relationship between the rate of return and the quality of disclosure. 
Their results suggest that the firm profitability can be regarded as an indicator of 
good management, as management tends to disclose more information when 
the rate of return is high. Based on this, it may be argued that profitable 
companies have extra financial resources to disseminate financial information 
voluntarily or in compliance with additional regulations imposed: they might 
have incentives to show the public and stakeholders that they are more 
profitable than their counterparts in the same industry.  
 
Previous researchers used a number of profitability measures. They include net 
profit to sales, earnings growth, dividend growth and dividend stability (Cerf 
1961), rate of return and earnings margin (Singhvi 1967 and Singhvi and Desai 
1971), and return on assets (Belkaoui and Kahl 1978). Empirically, the prior 
studies provide mixed evidence of the relation between profitability and the level 
of disclosure. While some studies show a significant positive association 
between profitability and disclosure (such as, Singhvi 1968; Ng and Tai 1994; 
Patton and Zelenka 1997; Owusu-Ansah 1998; Haniffa and Cooke 2002; Naser 
et al. 2002, Desoky 2009) other studies report a negative association between 
profitability and disclosure (such as: Wallace and Naser 1995; Inchausti 1997; 
Chen and Jaggi 2000; Xiao et al. 2004).  
 
On the other hand, Wallace et al (1994), Raffounier (1995), Meek et al (1995), 
Hackston and Milne (1996), Oyelere et al. (2003), Marston and Anika (2004), 
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Garg and Divya (2010), Uyar (2011), and Puspitaningrum and Sari (2012) found 
no significant association between profitability and disclosure. Ashbaugh et al. 
(1999) found that the relationship was non-significant. The results of previous 
research are inconclusive and these motivate this research to test this 
relationship in the emerging economy. Therefore, the third hypothesis is: 
 
Hypothesis ± H2: 7KHUH LV VLJQLILFDQW SRVLWLYH DVVRFLDWLRQ EHWZHHQ ILUP¶V
profitability and the level of disclosure on the internet. 
Hypothesis - +D 7KHUH LV VLJQLILFDQW SRVLWLYH DVVRFLDWLRQ EHWZHHQ ILUP¶V
profitability measured by return on equity and the level of disclosure. 
Hypothesis ± H2b: There is significant positive association between ILUP¶V
profitability measured by return on asset and the level of disclosure. 
 
$XGLW)LUP¶V,QWHUQDWLRQDO/LQN 
A number of prior disclosure studies test audit firms as a variable that may 
affect the level of disclosure. The audit firm responsible for reporting to 
shareholders can significantly influence the amount of information disclosed in 
the corporate annual report (Belkaoui and Kahl 1978; Ahmed and Nicholls 
1994, and Owusu-Ansah 1998). Healy and Palepu (1993) assert that managers 
can improve their communication with investors (owners of the firms) by 
developing disclosure strategies. To reinforce its credibility, a firm has greater 
motivation to choose appropriate reporting strategies to act as quality signal to 
the market. It is proposed that such a signal would include the use of a Big-4 
audit firm. It has been argued that larger, well known audit firms may be able to 
exercise greater influence and they may be associated with higher disclosure 
levels (Firth 1979). 
 
According to signaling theory, audit firm may benefit from the higher level of 
disclosure in the annual reports of its clients as a signal of its own quality and 
reputation. The client company may attempt to improve the appearance of its 
financial position and results of operations and errors and inadequate 
disclosure, which support such motives and may be considered to be purposely 
caused by the management of the company (Hossain 1999).Therefore, auditing 
firms may support and encourage their clients to comply with mandatory 
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disclosure requirements and to increase the extent of information voluntarily 
disclosed (Ahmed and Nicholls 1994; Inchausti 1997; Abd El Salam 1999). 
 
In Bangladesh, the law does not permit Big 4 or any foreign auditing firms: they 
only can perform this audit work through the affiliation with a local firm. To 
enhance the reputation of its capital market, Bangladesh attracted the 
international Big 4 audit firms to operate through a local audit firm (Kabir et al. 
2011). So, the audit firms in Bangladesh can be classified into two groups: local 
audit firms with international affiliations with the Big 4 and local audit firms 
without international affiliations with the Big 4. At present four local audit firms 
are members of the Big 4 audit firms; Rahman Rahman Huq (RRH), Hoda Vasi 
Chowdhury, A Qasem and Co. and S F Ahmed are linked with KPMG 
International, Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, Price Waterhouse Coopers and Ernst 
and Young respectively.  
 
Haque (1984) indicated that in Bangladesh, only large audit firms enjoy the 
SULYLOHJH RI FKRRVLQJ WKH FOLHQWV DQG WKH DXGLW MRE ,Q SUDFWLFH WKH DXGLWRU¶V
reputation or quality is apprehended by his belonging to the major audit firms 
named Big 4 (Brown et al. 2010). Several authors advocated that the financial 
information is more reliable for BIG 4 clients in comparison with other 
companies (Teoh and Wong 1993; Becker et al. 1998). Al-6KDPPDUL¶V 
findings supported this inference with a positive relationship between larger 
auditing firms and the level of disclosure in internet financial reporting. Some 
studies have examined empirically the relation between the characteristics of 
the audit firm (size of audit firm or international link of the auditing firm) and the 
extent of internet financial reporting and found positive association between the 
audit firm size and the level of disclosure. However, there is also empirical 
evidence of no significant relation between the size of the firm and the extent of 
disclosure (Xiao et al. 2004). The authors argue that affiliation with a Big 4 
international accounting firm may not improve the quality of the audit provided 
by the local affiliate vis-à-vis other local audit firms unless there is market 
demand for quality differentiated audits and a strong monitoring and 
enforcement regime  in place. 
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In prior research, a positive association between audit type and disclosure has 
been found (Ahmed and Nicholls 1994; Raffournier 1995; Bonson and Thomas 
2006; Nurunnabi and Monirul 2012). Other researchers found non-significant 
association (Hossain et al. 1995; Abd El Salam 1999; Wallace et al.1994; Aly et 
al. 2010; Alali and Romero 2012). Based on these arguments, this study 
hypothesises that: 
 
Hypothesis ± H3: There is a significant positive association between firms 
audited by a local audit firm with international affiliations to the Big 4 and the 
level of disclosure on the internet. 
 
4.5.4 Industry Type: 
Mitchell et al. (1995) found that the disclosure of financial information is affected 
by the industry to which the firm belongs. Industry type has been used in prior 
studies as a determinant of internet reporting.  For example, Lymer (1997); 
Ismail (2002); Debreceny et al. (2002); Oyeler et al. (2003); Xiao et al. (2004); 
Bonson and Thomas (2006); Hussainey and Al-Nodel (2008); Aly et al. (2010); 
Garg and Divya (2010) found a significant positive association between industry 
type and the extent of internet reporting while Nurunnabi and Monirul (2012) 
found negative association with the level of disclosure. In contrast, Craven and 
Marston (1999) found no association between the two variables. This may be 
due to the fact that different industry classifications were used in prior research. 
 
Wallace and Naser (1995) argue that differential levels of disclosure of similar 
items in financial reports published by firms in different industries may arise 
from the adoption of industry-related disclosures. Differences in disclosure 
levels between industries could also be attributed to the high level of voluntary 
disclosure by a dominant firm within an industry, which leads to a bandwagon 
effect (Cooke 1989). Signaling theory explains that companies within the same 
industry tend to adopt the same level of disclosure. If a company within an 
industry fails to follow the same disclosure practices, including internet 
disclosures, as others in the same industry, then it may be interpreted as a 
signal that the company is hiding bad news (Craven and Marston, 1999).  
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Evidence supporting an association between industry and the extent of financial 
information provided on corporate websites was recently provided by Ettredge 
et al. (2001). Their results reinforced comments obtained by the researchers 
from a sample of InYHVWRU5HODWLRQVGLUHFWRUV WKDW WKH\PRQLWRUHGFRPSHWLWRU¶V
websites to benchmark their own site content and to avoid their company being 
SHUFHLYHGDV ³EDFNZDUGV´ UHODWLYH WR LQGXVWU\SHHUV2Q WKHRWKHUKDQGVRPH
studies provide evidence of non significant association between the industry 
type and the extent of disclosure (Wallace et al. 1994; Raffournier 1995; 
Inchausti 1997; Naser et al. 2002; Eng and Mak 2003; Alsaeed 2006; Brennan 
and Hourigan 1999; Marston 2003; Al-Shammari 2007; Juhmani 2008; Desoky 
2009).  
 
Hypothesis ± H4: There is significant positive association between industry type 
and the level of disclosure on the internet. 
 
4.5.5 Multinational Parents: 
It is generally believed that Multinational Corporation (MNC) affiliation status 
affects the level of information disclosure. As foreign listing status extends the 
dispersion of shareholders, which, in turn, increases the information asymmetry 
EHWZHHQ PDQDJHUV DQG VKDUHKROGHUV EHFDXVH µµIRUHLJQ¶¶ VKDUHKROGHUV GR QRW
XQGHUVWDQGWKHGLVFORVXUHUXOHVRIWKHFRPSDQ\¶VKRPHFRXQWU\7KLVLVOLNHO\WR
result in the need for additional disclosure requirements that will provide more 
information than purely domestically listed companies: this is to comply with the 
regulation of foreign stock markets if their requirements are greater than, or 
different to, those of their domestic exchanges (Cooke, 1992). Ahmed and 
Nicholls (1994) found that subsidiaries of multinational companies showed a 
higher degree of compliance to disclosure requirements. In another study on 
Bangladeshi companies Ahmed (1996) found that multinationality is the 
significant predictor of disclosure levels while Karim and Jamal (2005) found 
negative significant association. MNC's are expected to demand more 
information because of various reasons associated with emerging economies 
(Owusu-Ansah, 1998).  
 
There are some reasons for disclosing more information by the subsidiaries of 
multinational corporations operating in developing countries as they are 
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expected to observe higher standards of reporting. Firstly, they have to comply 
with the regulations of not only the host country but also the parent company 
where substantially higher standards of accounting and reporting are 
maintained (Karim and Jamal 2005). Secondly, the demand for information is 
expected to be higher from foreign investors due to the geographical separation 
between management and owners (Bradbury 1992; Craswell and Taylor 1992). 
Thirdly, they are under closer scrutiny from various political and pressure 
groups within the host country that view them as sources of economic 
exploitation and agents of imperialist power (Ahmed and Nicholls 1994). Finally, 
diffusion of ownership has been empirically found to be an important variable in 
explaining the variability of corporate financial disclosure (Leftwich et al. 1981; 
Craswell and Taylor 1992; Hossain et al. 1994), and the demand for information 
is expected to be greater when foreign investors hold a high proportion of 
shares. 
 
In respect of internet disclosure it seems intuitively appealing to suggest that a 
company which has gone to the trouble of listing on an overseas exchange is 
quite likely to use the internet to communicate more economically and quickly 
with investors and potential investors. Although disclosure can reduce the 
adverse effects of information asymmetry, disclosure activities have costs. 
Traditional paper-based disclosure has important limitations and associated 
costs. With the increase in investor geographic dispersion, the paper form has 
become increasingly expensive and limited in capacity to reach the users of 
information. In contrast, Internet disclosure can be cost effective, fast, flexible in 
format, and accessible to all types of users within and beyond national 
boundaries: it provides potential international investors with immediate access 
to both financial and non-ILQDQFLDOLQIRUPDWLRQFRQFHUQLQJWKHFRPSDQ\¶VDIIDLUV
at relatively little cost. Based on these arguments, this study hypothesises that: 
 
Hypothesis ± H5: There is significant positive association between the 
multinational company influence and the extent of disclosure. 
 
4.5.6 Leverage: 
The degree to which a firm's financial structure is geared has been used in a 
few disclosure studies to examine if there is any association between gearing 
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ratio and disclosure levels. Highly leveraged firms have a wider obligation to 
disclose the information, especially financial information in order to convince 
their long-term creditors that they have enough sources to fund the business 
(Mohamed et al. 2009). Agency theory has largely been used to explain the 
relationship between firm leverage and corporate disclosure. It is argued that as 
leverage increases, there are wealth transfers from fixed claimants to residual 
FODLPDQWV $V GHEHQWXUH KROGHUV DUH DEOH WR ³SULFH-SURWHFW´ WKHPVHOYHV
managers and shareholders have an incentive to voluntarily increase the level 
of monitoring, such as by increasing the disclosure of additional information 
about the firm activities (Myers 1977; Schipper 1981).  
 
Management could voluntarily disclose on the internet to allow creditors to 
monitor constantly the affairs of the company and help them assess the ability 
of the company to pay its obligations on time. Debreceny et al. (2002) observed 
that increases in the debt-equity ratio create agency costs.  Ismail (2002) added 
that although there are extra costs associated with dissemination of corporate 
information on the internet, this dissemination might provide more up-to-date 
reliable information to creditors and would, in return, reduce agency costs. 
 
Empirical evidence regarding the association between leverage and internet 
reporting is inconclusive. A positive association was found by Ismail (2002); 
Laswad et al. (2005) Momany and Al-Shorman 2006; Xiao et al. 2004 while 
Debreceny et al. (2002); Oyelere et al. (2003); Debreceny and Rahman (2004); 
Alvarez et al. (2008); Ezat and Ahmed (2008); Puspitaningrum and Sari (2012); 
Alali and Romero (2012) found non significant association. According to 
Oyelere et al. (2003) leverage does not explain the decision to use internet for 
corporate financial reporting. They explained that this may be due to differences 
between internet reporting and the traditional print-based financial reporting 
environment and culture, manifested in the differences of costs, benefits and 
demand and supply structures of the two environments. These conflicting 
results provide genuine incentives for further investigation of this relationship. 
So the hypothesis is: 
 
Hypothesis ± 6: There is significant positive association between the leverage 
and the level of internet reporting for non-financial companies. 
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4.5.7 Liquidity: 
A high liquidity ratio is an indicator of good management performance. 
Accordingly, companies with higher liquidity ratios are expected to disclose 
more information. Some of prior disclosure studies use signaling theory to 
explain the relation between liquidity and disclosure.  Abd El Salam (1999) 
argued that companies, according to signaling theory, will disclose more 
information if their liquidity ratio is high, to distinguish themselves from other 
companies with less favourable liquidity. The concern that regulators, investors, 
DQGRWKHUXVHUVKDYHUHJDUGLQJFRPSDQLHV¶JRLQJFRQFHUQVWDWXVPDy motivate 
highly liquid companies to make their high levels of liquidity known through 
voluntary disclosures (Wallace and Naser 1995; Owusu- Ansah 1998). The use 
of Internet for providing financial information may be an expression of 
PDQDJHPHQW¶VFRQILGHQFHLQDFRPSDQ\¶VVROYHQF\DQGIXWXUHSURVSHFWV 
 
On the other hand agency theory suggests that companies with a low-liquidity 
ratio may provide more information to satisfy the information requirements of 
shareholders and creditors. It may be worth noticing that managers may 
consider the balance between profitability and liquidity when they decide the 
level of disclosure. According to stakeholders, managers may be motivated to 
disclose more information about liquidity. 
 
Several studies have examined the relationship between liquidity and the extent 
of disclosure. However, again the results are mixed. For instance, Oyelere et al. 
(2003) found that liquidity is considered one of the primary determinants of 
internet financial reporting among New Zealand companies, and found a 
positive relationship between company liquidity and voluntary use of internet 
reporting. Moreover, Ezat and Ahmed (2008) also found significant positive 
association. However, Wallace et al. (1994) found that companies with lower 
liquidity provide more information in their annual reports. Other disclosure 
studies have found no association between disclosure and liquidity (Ahmed and 
Courtis 1999; Garg and Divya 2010; Puspitaningrum and Sari 2012).  
 
Hypothesis ± 7: There is significant SRVLWLYHDVVRFLDWLRQEHWZHHQILUP¶VOLTXLGLW\
and the level of disclosure on the internet by the listed companies of 
Bangladesh. 
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Hypothesis ± D7KHUHLVVLJQLILFDQWSRVLWLYHDVVRFLDWLRQEHWZHHQILUP¶VOLTXLGLW\
measured by current ratio and the level of disclosure on the internet 
Hypothesis ± E7KHUHLVVLJQLILFDQWSRVLWLYHDVVRFLDWLRQEHWZHHQILUP¶VOLTXLGLW\
measured by quick ratio and the level of disclosure on the internet. 
 
4.5.8 Market Category: 
Stock exchange security categories are all significantly associated with the 
extent of disclosure (Karim and Jamal 2005).The first security category in 
Bangladesh "Group A" and "Group B" was introduced from July 2, 2000 based 
on financial strength and performance to give clear information to investors for 
taking informed decision. DSE has further categorised the securities by 
introducing "Group Z" which came into effect from September 26, 2000. The 
Stock Exchange introduced another company category "Group G" on June 30, 
2002. The categorisation greatly helps the investors in choosing companies 
before making investment decisions. N Category, the most recent, was 
launched through an order of SEC on July 3, 2006. Listed companies have 
been categorised on the basis of the regularity of their holding AGMs and/or 
payment of dividends. This variable was examined by Karim and Jamal (2005) 
and they found a significant negative association with the level of disclosure. 
This implies that the disclosure level was higher for a company whose 
security(ies) is(are) not categorised as Z category securities, 
 
³$¶&DWHJRU\ These categories of companies are regular in holding the Annual 
General Meetings and have declared dividends at the rate of 10 percent or 
more in a calendar year. (Mutual Funds, Debentures and Bonds are being 
traded in this Category) 
  
³%¶ &DWHJRU\ These companies are regular in holding the Annual General 
Meetings but have failed to declare dividends at least at the rate of 10 percent 
in a calendar year. 
  
³=¶ &DWHJRU\ &RPSDQLHV Companies which have failed to hold the Annual 
General Meetings or failed to declare any dividend or which are not in operation 
continuously for more than six months or whose accumulated loss after 
adjustment of revenue reserve, if any, is negative and exceeded its paid up 
capital. 
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³*¶&DWHJRU\&RPSDQLHV The Companies which are operating as Greenfield 
Companies. 
  
³1¶ &DWHJRU\ &RPSDQLHV All newly listed companies except Greenfield 
companies will be placed in this category and their settlement system would be 
like B-category companies. 
 
Hypothesis ± 8: 7KHUH LV VLJQLILFDQW QHJDWLYH DVVRFLDWLRQ EHWZHHQ WKH µ=¶
category company and the level of disclosing information on the internet. 
 
4.5.9 Independent Directors on the Board: 
Board independence is an important element in monitoring the corporate 
financial accounting process (Klein 2002) and affecting the reliability of financial 
reports (Anderson et al. 2004). A high percentage of independent directors on 
the board enhances the monitoring of managerial opportunism and reduces 
PDQDJHPHQW¶VFKDQFHRIZLWKKROGLQJLQIRUPDWLRQ(PSLULFDOHYLGHQFHVXJJHVWV
a positive association between corporate disclosure and board independence. 
Beasley (1996) finds that the proportion of independent directors on the board is 
SRVLWLYHO\UHODWHGWRWKHERDUG¶VDELOLW\WRLQIOXHQFHGLVFORVXUHGHFLVLRQV&KHQJ
and Courtenay (2006) found that boards with a larger proportion of independent 
directors are significantly and positively associated with higher levels of 
voluntary disclosure in Singapore. In addition, Abdelsalam and Donna (2007), 
Adams et al. (1998) and Chen and Jaggi (2000) found a positive relationship 
between a board with a higher proportion of independent directors and 
comprehensiveness of corporate disclosure. Based on findings from the largest 
300 Chinese companies, Xiao et al. (2004) suggest that internet financial 
reporting format and disclosure of information not required by the China 
Securities Regulatory Commission are positively associated with the proportion 
of independent directors. 
 
Ajinkya et al. (2005) provide evidence on the relation between board 
independence and voluntary disclosure. They find that firms with a greater 
percentage of outside directors are more likely to issue earnings forecasts 
(proxy for voluntary disclosure) and to make more frequent forecast disclosures 
DQGFRQFOXGHWKDWµµPRQLWRULQJPHFKDQLVPVDUHUHODWHGWRWKHH[WHQWDQGTXDOLW\
- 115 - 
 
of dLVFUHWLRQDU\ LQIRUPDWLRQ D PDQDJHU GLVFORVHV´ ,Q FRQWUDVW WR WKH DERYH
findings, Eng and Mak (2003) find that increased presence of outside directors 
is associated with reduced disclosure using a sample of Singapore firms. Gul 
and Leung (2004) also report a negative association between independent 
directors and voluntary disclosures using a sample of Hong Kong companies. 
These findings suggest that independent directors play a substitute-monitoring 
role leading to a decrease in the demand for additional disclosure. But Haniffa 
and Cooke (2002) and Ho and Wong (2001) did not find any significant 
relationship. Depending on the mixed results provided by previous studies, the 
next hypothesis is: 
 
Hypothesis ± 9: There is significant positive association between the number of 
independent directors in the board and the level of internet reporting. 
 
4.5.10 Dual Leadership Structure: 
Role duality exists when the chief executive officer (CEO) is also the chairman 
of the board. Role duality creates a strong individual power base, which could 
affect the effective control exercised by the board (e.g. Jensen and Meckling 
1976; Fama and Jensen 1983; Donaldson and Davis 1991; Whittington 1993) 
and enables the CEO to act rapidly and provide strong leadership (Brickley et 
aI. 1997) as it is a full-time position and is responsible for the daily management 
of the company as well as setting and implementing company strategies. On the 
other hand, the position of the chair is usually part time and the main 
responsibility is to ensure the effectiveness of the board (Weir and Laing 2001). 
Moreover, the dual role CEO and chairman is in a better position to make good 
decisions due to his better knowledge about the firm.  
 
According to Gandia (2008), the CEO presides over the executive board and 
the chairman presides over the supervisory board, and these two roles will 
always be held by different people: this ensures a distinction between 
management by the executive board and governance by the supervisory board 
allowing for clear lines of authority. The aim is to prevent a conflict of interest 
and too much power being concentrated in the hands of one person. However, 
some researchers suggest that the existence of role duality improves the 
ERDUG¶VHIIHFWLYHQHVVDOORZLQJJRRGFRQWURORYHUWKe board and the selection of 
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its members and reporting (Eisenhardt 1989; Dahya et al. 1996; Rechner and 
Dalton 1991; Donaldson and Davies 1991). Forker (1992) found positive 
significant association and argued that role duality increases the monitoring 
quality and improves the level of disclosure. Nandi and Ghosh (2012) and Gao 
and Kling (2012) also found significant positive association. 
 
From the point of view of agency theory, the efficacy and efficiency of the board 
can be compromised if the position of president and chairman of the board is 
held by the same person (Blackburn 1994). This concentration of power can 
prejudice the corporate governance disclosure of the company, generating 
information of a low quality (Forker 1992). A number of studies provide 
evidence of a negative significant relationship of role duality with the extent of 
voluntary disclosure in Malaysia and Hong Kong (Haniffa and Cooke 2002; Gul 
and Leung 2004). On the other hand, some studies conclude that role duality is 
not associated with the level of voluntary disclosure (Arcay and Vazquez 2005; 
Cheng and Courtenay 2006; Ghazali and Weetman 2006; Abdel-Fattah 2008; 
Ezat and Ahmed 2008). 
 
Hypothesis ± 10: There is significant positive association between the role 
duality and the level of internet reporting. 
 
4.5.11 Board Size: 
7KHQXPEHURIGLUHFWRUVRQ WKHFRPSDQ\¶VERDUGVKRXOGSOD\DFULWLFDO UROH LQ
monitoring of the board and in taking strategic decisions. The majority of good 
governance codes consider that the board must be formed E\D ³UHDVRQDEOH´
number of members, since the optimal number depends on their efficiency in 
the fulfillment of their supervisory functions (Gandia 2008). Some studies argue 
that a large board assists in performing more monitoring, providing companies 
with the diversity that help them in providing critical resources and eliminate 
environmental uncertainties, alleviating the dominance of the CEO, and 
increasing the pool of expertise that yields from the diversity of the board (Singh 
et al. 2004; Yermack 1996). Other studies illustrate that a large board could 
cause more conflict between the members of the board and delay or avoid 
critical decisions. In addition, a large board causes poorer communication and 
processing of information (Huther 1997; John and Senbet 1998).  
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While the concentration of board positions can induce a lack of transparency, a 
large number of board members, in spite of increasing the supervisory capacity, 
can harm the company by lengthening the decision-making process and 
communication procedures (Jensen 1993). Moreover, the size of the board 
would affect the disclosure of information positively since increased disclosure 
of information provides as much of a positive impression of the company as of 
the decisions of the members of the board (Chiang 2005; Raheja 2005). Abdel-
Fattah 2008 and Ezat and Ahmed 2008 found significant positive association 
However, a number of studies conclude that board size is not associated with 
the level of voluntary disclosure (Arcay and Vazquez 2005; Cheng and 
Courtenay 2006; Gandia 2008). 
 
Depending on the above argument, it is expected to find a relationship between 
WKH VL]H RI WKH GLUHFWRUV¶ ERDUG DQG WKH RQOLQH GLVFORVXUH DV D UHVXOW RI WKH
GLYHUVLW\ RI WKH ERDUG¶V PHPEHUVKLS DQG WKHLU GHVLUH WR GLVFORVH PRre 
LQIRUPDWLRQRQWKHLUFRPSDQ\¶VZHEVLWHWRDWWUDFWPRUHLQYHVWRUVDQGVDWLVI\WKH
VKDUHKROGHUV¶ QHHGV &RQVHTXHQWO\ WKH ODUJHU WKH QXPEHU RI WKH ERDUG¶V
directors, the greater the desire for online disclosure.  
Hypothesis ± 11: There is significant positive association between the board 
size and the level of disclosure on the internet. 
 
4.5.12 Ownership Structure: 
,QWHUPRIHTXLW\¶VVFRSHWKHUHDUHWZRFOXVWHUVHLWKHUWKHFRQFHQWUDWLRQRUWKH
dispersion of the ownership. Concentration of ownership refers to the group 
who has the most influence among the equity owners, while dispersion 
(diffusion) of ownership looks only at the separation of ownership between 
managers and equity owners as a group (Haniffa and Cooke 2002). Due to this 
separation of ownership and control in modern corporations, there is a conflict 
of interest between the principal (owners) and the agent (management). So 
ownership structure is one of the most important factors shaping the corporate 
governance system of any country. It plays an important role in determining a 
ILUP¶V REMHFWLYHV VKDUHKROGHUV¶ ZHDOWK DQG KRZ PDQDJHUV RI D ILUP DUH
disciplined (Porter 1990; Yammeesri and Lodh 2004; Yammeesri et al. 2006) 
and performed an active role as a good monitor in countries where investor 
protection is weak (Shleifer and Vishny 1997; La Porta et al. 1998, 2000). 
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Companies whose ownership structure is diffuse (widely held companies) tend 
to disclose more information on their web sites to supply the shareholders with 
necessary information, while closely held companies (with a concentrated 
ownership structure) tend to disclose less information on their web sites 
because their shareholders can access the required information and obtain it 
internally (Marston and Annika 2004). Tan (2000) also suggested that family 
controlled firms have concentrated power and are very reserved in making 
voluntary disclosures but tend to adhere to rules and regulations. Chau and 
Gray (2002) found that the level of information disclosure is likely to be less in 
family-controlled firms because the demand for information is less compared to 
firms that have wider ownership. 
 
Bangladesh tends to have a higher concentrated ownership of shares. The 
corporate control mechanisms in Bangladesh is predominantly owned and 
controlled by founder families or groups of families or foreign owners (Farooque 
et al. 2007). It is found that in Bangladesh 72.5 percent of the outstanding 
shares are owned by households/sponsors and individuals (Nurunnabi and 
Monirul 2012). Chowdhury (2006) observed that even when the company is 
listed on the stock exchanges, few shares are available for trading, as the 
majority remains held by the original sponsors. The spread of share ownership 
in public limited companies in Bangladesh is not wide and the economic power 
of businesses is concentrated in dominant shareholder groups. A few 
shareholders account for a significant proportion of the total share value.  
 
,Q%DQJODGHVK3XEOLF/LPLWHG&RPSDQLHV¶RZQHUVKLSSDWWHUQVLQFOXGHVSRQVRU
ownership, institutional ownership, government ownership, foreign ownership 
and public ownership (Bhuiyan et al. 2007). Most public companies in 
Bangladesh are mainly controlled by founding sponsors/directors who are family 
members, leading to a very high degree of ownership concentration and control. 
Representatives of these concentrated owners hold positions on the company 
board and in management. Sponsors represented the concentrated ownership 
(more than 50%) by the sponsors of the company. If ownership is concentrated 
by the sponsor in a company it is expected that the disclosure pattern might be 
influenced (Hossain and Arifur 2006).  
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The significance of ownership structure is mixed: some studies show no 
significant relationship between this variable and online disclosure (Abdelsalam 
and Donna 2007; Trabelsi and Labelle 2006), while others prove a significant 
positive relationship (Debreceny and Rahman 2005; Marston and Annika 2004; 
Momany and Al-Shorman 2006; Oyelere et al. 2003; Ezat and Ahmed 2008; 
Nurunnabi and Monirul 2012).On the other hand, Ho and Wong (2001) find a 
negative relationship between family controlled firms and the level of voluntary 
disclosure. So the next hypothesis is: 
Hypothesis ± 12: There is significant positive association between ownership 
structure and level of internet reporting in Bangladesh. 
 
4.5.13 Company Age: 
According to Owusu- Ansah (1998) corporate age is related to its stage of 
development and growth. Older, well-established companies are likely to 
disclose much more information in their annual reports than younger 
companies. New companies do not have a disclosure 'track record' and 
therefore have diminished incentives to disclose. The premise on which this 
diminished incentive is based appears to be the fact that any additional 
disclosure, beyond what is currently disclosed raises the expectations bar for 
users. A company would thus be expected to continuously improve its 
disclosures with the passage of time in accordance with this expectation.  
 
The date on which a company was listed in the capital markets may affect 
disclosure levels (Choi 1973; Spero 1979). Older companies with more 
experience are likely to include more information in their annual reports in order 
to enhance their reputation and image in the market (Owusu-Ansah 1998; 
Akhtaruddin 2005).A number of researchers have argued that older companies 
are more likely to have established reporting systems at a lower cost (e.g. 
Haniffa and Cooke 2002; Al-Shammari 2007; and Gandia 2005, 2008).  
 
However, Al-Shammari (2007) argued that a younger company may suffer a 
greater competitive disadvantage if it discloses certain items such as 
information on research and development expenditure, capital expenditure and 
new products. Researchers like Haniffa and Cooke (2002) have argued that 
companies only recently listed would have an incentive to disclose more 
information in order to combat scepticism and raise the confidence of investors. 
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Owusu- Ansah (1998, p. 605) pointed out three factors that may contribute to 
this phenomenon. Firstly, younger companies may suffer competition; secondly, 
the cost and the ease of gathering, processing, and disseminating the required 
information may be a contributory factor; and finally, younger companies may 
lack a track record on which to rely for public disclosure.  
 
The results of the previous studies are inconclusive. While Owusu- Ansah 
(1998) found significant positive association, Akhtaruddin (2005); Al-Shammari 
et al. (2007); Nurunnabi and Monirul (2012) found non-significant association of 
company age with the level of disclosure. Older companies may be more 
motivated to disclose information voluntarily, and as a result, it would be done 
through internet financial reporting. It is expected that the older companies are 
more likely to disclose more information than the newer firms. For this study, it 
is expected that company age is a critical factor in determining the level of 
corporate disclosure. 
Hypothesis ± 13: There is significant positive association between company age 
and level of internet reporting in Bangladesh. 
 
4.6 Conclusion: 
The previous chapter provides a critical review of disclosure literature while the 
following chapters will present the methodology and empirical section of this 
study. The current chapter, with chapter five, helps in making a link between the 
theoretical and empirical sections. Based on the proposed theoretical 
framework in this chapter, the evidence from disclosure literature in chapter 
three and the legal framework of corporate reporting in Bangladesh in chapter 
two, thirteen hypotheses related to corporate governance characteristics, 
ownership structure and firm characteristics have been developed in the current 
chapter.  These hypotheses will be tested in the chapter seven to answer the 
third research question. The next chapters discuss the methodology that has 
been applied in this study. Before dealing with the hypotheses testing in chapter 
seven, chapter six will present a descriptive analysis of the results of disclosure 
checklist to answer the first two research questions: to what extent do 
Bangladeshi companies disclose mandatory and voluntary information on the 
internet. 
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Chapter: 5 
Methodology 
5.1 Introduction 
The previous chapters presented the theoretical framework and hypotheses 
development for this study: reviewing key theories, their empirical evidence and 
hypotheses in chapter four; reviewing relevant literature in chapter three; an 
overview of the corporate reporting environment and the legal framework of 
reporting in Bangladesh are discussed in chapter two, and an outline of the 
importance of corporate internet reporting, background and motivation are 
discussed in chapter one. The main objective of this chapter is to justify 
methodology used in the study's empirical analysis. The empirical section in the 
present study aims to measure the extent of disclosure of mandatory and 
voluntary information on the internet, by the listed companies in Bangladesh. 
Moreover, the research justifies the investigated level of corporate disclosure by 
examining the different determinants of this sort of disclosure. The determinants 
are firm size, profitability, industry type, leverage, liquidity, company age, 
PXOWLQDWLRQDOSDUHQWVPDUNHWFDWHJRU\DXGLWILUP¶VLQWHUQDWLRQDOOLQNERDUGVL]H
independent director in the board, ownership structure, and dual leadership 
structure.  
 
The current chapter outlines the research method and the procedures employed 
in the empirical section. Section 5.2 outlines the research design including 
research philosophy and research approach. Section 5.3 describes the 
construction process of research instrument and section 5.4 is related to the 
data collection process and section 5.5 explains the sample size. The analysis 
techniques that are employed to answer each of the research questions are 
described in section 5.6, 5.7 and 5.8 respectively. Section 5.9 described the 
statistical method used to test the hypotheses and this is followed by the 
conclusion in section 5.10. 
 
5.2 Research Design: 
According to Saunders et al. (2007) the steps of the research process can be 
viewed as layers of a research onion. This research onion consists of six layers- 
research philosophies, approaches, strategies, choices, time horizons, and 
techniques and procedures. The researcher needs to be peel away these 
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important layers of the research onion before embarking on data collection and 
data analysis.  
 
The current study aims to address the extent of disclosing corporate mandatory 
and voluntary information on the internet by the listed companies in 
Bangladesh. In addition, it aims to explain whether the impact of firm size; 
profitability, liquidity, leverage, industry type, ownership structure, multinational 
SDUHQW PDUNHW FDWHJRU\ DXGLW ILUP¶V LQWHUQDWLRQDO OLQN age, board size, 
independent director in the board, and role duality have any impact on 
corporate internet reporting. It is therefore necessary to explore the objectives 
motivating the disclosure decision. The key assumption here is that 
organisations are rational entities, in which rational explanations offer solutions 
to rational problems. As functionalist paradigm would be appropriate for an 
evaluation study of a communication strategy to assess its effectiveness and 
make recommendations as to the way in which it may be made more effective 
and so, a functionalist paradigm would be the appropriate research nature and 
philosophy for the current study. 
 
This study doesn't aim to develop a theory but it seeks to describe the 
disclosure practices on the internet and to investigate the relationship between 
the extent of such disclosure and a number of determinant variables. Therefore, 
the deductive approach is considered to be more suitable to the present study 
DV WKH GHGXFWLYH UHVHDUFK¶V VWDUWLQJ SRLQW LV WKH search to explain causal 
relationship between variables leading to the hypothesis development. 
Accordingly, it needs to collect quantitative data, or even qualitative data, to test 
the developed hypothesis using a highly structured methodology to facilitate the 
replication of the findings (Gill and Johnson 2002). This approach begins with 
the development of a set of hypotheses, deduces what follows from them and 
then tests them to identify their correctness. 
 
The key underlying assumption is whether quantitative or qualitative research 
approaches would be appropriate. It is believed that objectivity is an essential 
aspect in quantitative research while in qualitative research, objectivity is not 
possible. Again in quantitative research variables are considered to be essential 
as it is primarily concerned with the relationships between them to establish the 
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causal formation of the variables. Therefore, it is believed that quantitative 
research would be appropriate to test the developed hypotheses. 
 
In the current study, survey technique is used to collect the required data 
because this type of quantitative research is usually linked with the deductive 
approach. Surveys allow the collection of large amounts of data from a sizable 
population in an economical way and give the researcher more control over the 
research process (Saunders et al. 2003). This study is a single country study: it 
focuses on the corporate internet reporting practices by the listed companies in 
Bangladesh and employs cross sectional analysis of the internet reporting 
practice in a specific point of time, one year, because information contained in 
the web is very dynamic. It will also focus on the total and the categories of 
mandatory and voluntary disclosure practices on the internet. Furthermore, it 
will help in determining the significant variables that influence the extent of 
disclosing information on the internet by the investigated companies. This type 
of analysis is helpful to all parties interested in financial reporting especially in 
emerging capital markets and developing countries. It provides an analytical 
view of the information disclosed on the internet and may help in improving the 
mandatory and voluntary disclosure practices. It sheds light on the aspects or 
types of information that may need more disclosure and more attention from the 
capital market authority. 
 
5.3 Index Construction: 
A disclosure index is a research instrument to measure the extent of information 
reported in a particular disclosure vehicle(s) by a particular entity(s) according 
to a list of selected items of information (Hassan and Claire 2010). It has been 
XVHG LQ SULRU GLVFORVXUH VWXGLHV LQ WKH OLWHUDWXUH DIWHU &HUI¶V VWXG\ LQ
1961(Marston and Shrives 1991; Hussainey 2004). It is an extensive list of 
selected items which may be disclosed in company reports (Marston and 
Shrives 1991, p.195). According to them it can be used to show compliance 
with regulations if the items in the index are so chosen or conversely it can be 
used to show the level of voluntary disclosure. Again it can also include a 
mixture of mandatory and voluntary items if this suits the purpose of the 
research project (Marston and Shrives 1991). The disclosure index is a ratio the 
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actual disclosure scores awarded to a company to the maximum possible 
disclosure required or expected (Cooke 1989 and Hodgdon 2004).  
 
Based on the extent of content analysis, the disclosure studies using a 
disclosure index can be classified into two types: a partial content analysis and 
a holistic content analysis. In a partial content analysis, researchers identify a 
list of disclosure topics, while in holistic content analysis researchers investigate 
the whole annual report to construct their disclosure index (Beattie and Ken 
2001 and Hussainey 2004). The selection of items included in the disclosure 
index is a major task in the construction of any disclosure index (Marston and 
Shrives 1991). 
 
In previous disclosure literature, the construction of a disclosure index varies in 
terms of the degree of the researcher involvement in constructing the index, the 
type of information disclosure and the number of items of information included 
in the index. In constructing a disclosure index, the degree of the researcher 
involvement varies from full involvement to no involvement. In full involvement, 
the researcher controls the entire process of index construction for selecting the 
items of information to be included while in no involvement, the researcher 
depends on available disclosure indices from prior studies or professional 
organisations. Between these two extremes, the researcher involvement varies 
(see, for example, Choi 1973; Buzby 1974; Buzby 1975; Firth 1979; Chow and 
Wong-Boren 1987). Disclosure items have been identified from other studies 
that examining disclosure in the Bangladesh by using the disclosure index 
methodology (Parry and Groves 1990; Ahmed and Nicholls 1994; and Karim 
1995). 
 
5.3.1 Steps of Constructing Disclosure Index: 
Three steps must be considered to construct a disclosure index. The first is 
developing a checklist by selecting informational items to be included in this 
checklist. The second is to score the items and the third is to compute the 
disclosure index. These steps involve some practical problems that may 
influence the reliability and validity of the disclosure index e.g. using partial 
scores, weighted scores, and scoring inapplicable items (Marston and Shrives 
1991). The following paragraphs deal with these steps. 
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5.3.1.1 Developing the checklist: 
The first step is the selection of items that might be expected to be reported. 
However, Wallace (1988) indicated that there is no general theory on the items 
that should be selected to assess the extent of disclosure. Moreover, the 
relevant literature shows that there is no commonly used theory to determine 
the number and selection of items for a disclosure index (Hooks et al. 2000). 
Marston and Shrives (1991) are of the opinion that the usefulness of the 
disclosure index as a measure of disclosure is dependent on the selection of 
items to be included in the index. The selection of items depends on the focus 
of the research (Wallace and Naser 1995). The majority of disclosure studies 
base their selection of items on many sources such as previous studies, laws 
and regulations, recommendations from specialised professional organisation, 
and comments from the users of annual reports. The major task of the present 
research is to develop a suitable disclosure index comprising items of 
information that are expected to be disclosed on the internet from the viewpoint 
of emerging countries. 
 
The present study follows the prior disclosure literature and develops a self 
constructed mandatory and voluntary disclosure index to measure the extent of 
disclosing information on the internet by the listed companies in Bangladesh. 
The steps of developing the checklist are as follows: 
 
 $ PDQGDWRU\ GLVFORVXUH LQGH[ ZDV FRQVWUXFWHG E\ FRQVLGHULQJ HDFK RI WKH
financial reporting requirements: Company Act 1994; BAS- the approved IAS; 
BFRS; SEC rules 1987 and guidelines in Bangladesh. However, for preparing 
the voluntary disclosure checklist this study focuses on the whole hard copy 
annual report and prior studies concerning voluntary disclosure in corporate 
annual reports and voluntary items recommended for disclosure by professional 
organisations. It starts with preparing a preliminary checklist that contains the 
expected voluntary information items.  
 
 7KH LWHPV RI LQIRUPDWLRQ LQFOXGHG LQ WKH GLVFORVXUH LQGH[ KDYH EHHQ
considered from the viewpoint of a general-purpose context rather than a 
specific user group context. To ensure the clear division between the items on 
the mandatory and voluntary checklists, the preliminary checklist that includes 
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voluntary disclosure items, is reviewed against the mandatory disclosure 
requirements in accounting standards, the company act, listing rules and other 
laws.  
 
$VRQHRI WKHVWHSVXVHG WRDFKLHYH WKHYDOLGLW\RI WKH UHVHDUFK LQVWUXPHQW
three Bangladeshi academics will have been asked to refine the preliminary 
checklist for independent review. 
 
5.3.1.2 Scoring in the Disclosure Index: 
Once the final list of items of information was determined, the next step was to 
assign a score to each item included in the list. To capture the extent of 
disclosures, Cooke (1989) indicates two main approaches of developing a 
scoring scheme: The first approach depends on the presentation of information. 
Here the researcher mentions the number of words used to describe an item 
disclosed. Such an approach leads to a scale of disclosure that varies between 
zero and one. Cooke (1989) criticizes such procedure of scoring due to the 
subjectivity in allocation of scores and suggests the second approach; a 
dichotomous procedure. Under this procedure, a required disclosure item 
scores one if it is disclosed and zero if it is not disclosed. The total disclosure 
score for a company is additive. 
 
However, to avoid any negative effect on the reliability and validity of the 
disclosure scores, two issues related to the scoring process must be 
considered: weighting the score and inapplicable items. The weighted approach 
assumes that the importance to user groups varies from item to item, while un-
weighted approach assumes all disclosure items are equally important. The 
fundamental issue of un-weighted disclosure index is that all the items of the 
index are considered equally important and the advantage of this approach is 
that it considers all user groups rather than focusing on specific groups (Firth 
1979). Spero (1979) also support the un-weighted approach. According to him, 
attaching weights is irrelevant because those enterprises that are better at 
GLVFORVLQJ µLPSRUWDQW LWHPV¶DUHDOVREHWWHUDWGLVFORVLQJ µOHVV LPSRUWDQW LWHPV¶
i.e. firms are consistent in their disclosure policies. On the other hand, those 
who supported the use of the weighted scores believe that the weighted scores 
help in measuring the quality of disclosure not only the extent of the disclosure.  
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In addition, the weighted scores may help in mitigating the problems of 
subjectivity. (Botosan 1997; and Hodgdon 2004).A major issue for the weighted 
approach is that if different user groups are asked to weight the importance of 
various items, they may weight the same items of information differently. The 
weighted approach has, in fact, encountered several problems. However, those 
who argue against the use of the weighted index contend that the weighting 
does not significantly alter the results (Chow and Wong- Boren 1987; Wallace 
and Naser 1995). In all cases, Chow and Wong-Boren (1987) and Robbins and 
Austin (1986) obtained the same results under the un-weighted and weighted 
indexes. So, the un-weighting system is viewed to be superior to the differential 
weighting system (Owusu-Ansah 1998). Therefore, the un-weighted approach 
has been used in this study. 
 
For inapplicable items, the current study follows Cooke (1989) and employs the 
dichotomous approach; scoring the item one if it is disclosed and zero if is not 
disclosed: all disclosure items of information are not relevant and applicable to 
all companies. Scoring inapplicable items means penalising companies and 
affects the reliability and validity of the disclosure index. Therefore, companies 
shouldn't be penalized for not disclosing inapplicable items. In this regard 
Cooke (1989 and 1991) suggests that the researcher can read the entire annual 
report to decide whether an item is applicable for a company or not. He 
recognises that this procedure introduces an element of subjectivity into this 
approach but he argued that failure to adopt such procedure would mean that 
larger more diversified companies would be able and likely to disclose more 
information. 
 
Owusu- Ansah, 1998 suggested the use of a relative index for companies 
having non-applicable items. The relative index approach is the ratio of what a 
particular company actually disclosed to what the company is expected to 
disclose. In spite of the subjective discrimination between non-disclosure and 
non-applicable items, this approach is considered to be a more accurate 
measure than one that assumes that all companies are identical and, therefore, 
no difference need exist in disclosure requirements. This approach has been 
employed in several prior studies (for e.g., Cooke 1989; Inchausti 1997; Owusu-
Ansah 1998; Wallace and Naser 1995; Wallace et al. 1994). 
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5.3.1.3 Computing the Disclosure Index: 
The relative index is the ratio of what the reporting company actually discloses 
to what the company is expected to disclose under a regulatory regime. The 
relative index approach has been used in prior studies (e.g., Wallace 1988; 
Cooke 1989, Wallace et al. 1994; Inchausti 1997, Leventis and Weetman 2004; 
Aktharuddin 2005; Barako et al. 2006 and Ghazali and Weetman 2006). This 
can be presented mathematically as follows:  
 
8,[ >7tx]/ nx 
 
Where, UIx is the unweighWHGLQGH[VFRUHGE\FRPSDQ\[,[7tx is the 
information item disclosed by company x; nx is the maximum number of items 
expected to be disclosed by a company; 
 
5.4 Data Collection: 
Data for this study is based on a cross-section, one year, because information 
contained in the web is very dynamic and collected by browsing the websites of 
the sample companies. Firstly, the location of the corporate websites of the 
sample companies was identified.The websites of the stock exchanges were 
used to locate the homepage of therespective companies. In case of 
unavailability of such links, popular search enginessuch as MSN, Google, 
Yahoo, Alta Vista etc. were used to locate the homepage of therespective firms. 
The period of collecting data relating to corporate reporting on the Internet was 
from December 01, 2013 to March 31, 2014. The web sites were revisited in 
$SULODVDYDOLGLW\FKHFNDQGQRFKDQJHVLQWKHFRPSDQLHV¶ZHEVLWHVZHUH
found. In the case of companies whose websites were under construction, it 
was confirmed that they were still underconstruction up to the end of April 2014. 
After collecting relevant data, ascoring scheme was developed in order to 
measure quantitatively the extent of mandatory and voluntary disclosure on the 
internet. 
 
5.5 Sample Size: 
The sample initially included all the listed companies on the Dhaka Stock 
Exchange (DSE) at 31 March, 2014 was 531. Out of 531 companies, there are 
3 Corporate bond, 41 Mutual funds, 221 Treasury bond and 8 Debenture which 
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are excluded from the sample and therefore, the population size of the present 
study reduced to 258. Out of these 258 companies only 251 companies (97.29 
percent) were found to have corporate websites; 11 companies were not 
accessible during the period of data collection and 6 companies had only the 
homepage. As a result, the sample size reduced to only 234 companies (90.70 
percent) whose websites were accessible during the period of data collection. In 
2012, Nurunnabi and Monirul found only 83 companies (29.12 percent) that 
have websites.  
Table 5.1: Sample size 
Particulars Sample size 
Total population size 258 
Companies with no website (7) 
Companies with only homepage (6) 
Website under construction (11) 
Adjusted sample size 234 
 
An overview of sector wise sample size is shown below.  
Table 5.2: Sector Wise Population and Sample Size 
I Sector Population Sample Percentage 
Bank 30 29 96.67% 
Cement 7 7 100% 
Ceramics 5 5 100% 
Engineering 25 25 100% 
Financial Institutions 23 23 100% 
Food and Allied 18 15 83.33% 
Fuel and Power 15 14 93.33% 
Insurance 46 41 89.13% 
IT sector 6 6 100% 
Jute 3 1 33.33% 
Miscellaneous 9 7 77.78% 
Paper and printing 1 1 100% 
Pharmaceuticals and Chemical 25 21 84% 
Services and Real Estate 3 3 100% 
Tannery Industries 5 3 60% 
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Telecommunication 2 2 100% 
Textile 32 28 87.50% 
Travel and Leisure 3 3 100% 
Total 258 234 90.70% 
 
5.6 Extent of Mandatory Disclosures on the Internet: 
Here the study aims to investigate the internet disclosure practices of listed 
companies in Bangladesh to see how they comply with mandatory rules 
established by the three regulatory bodies. The major task of the present 
research is to develop a suitable disclosure index comprising items of 
information that are expected to be disclosed on the internet from the viewpoint 
of emerging countries. The findings of the study would be of immense interest 
to listed companies, investors, and those involved in standard setting 
processes. It measures the extent of total mandatory disclosure and its 
categories, in corporate annual reports based on a self constructed checklist of 
mandatory disclosure items and using an un-weighted disclosure index. 
  
A disclosure index was constructed based on a thorough and rigorous study of 
the existing regulatory frame work for listed companies and an examination of 
the IASs and IFRS adopted in Bangladesh until January 2010 (last updated in 
Bangladesh). The extent and nature of disclosures of the listed companies are 
influenced by Securities and Exchange (SEC) Rules 1987 (Government of 
Bangladesh, 1987), the IASs adopted by the Institute of Chartered Accountants 
of Bangladesh (ICAB) and the disclosure provision of the Companies Act 1994 
(Government of Bangladesh, 1994). These three regulatory bodies provide the 
framework for corporate disclosures in Bangladesh. The checklist would form a 
disclosure index revealing the level of mandatory corporate disclosure. 
  
The checklist is composed of different sections showing the whole mandatory 
disclosure categories which is given in appendix A. The disclosure level is 
measured using the percentage of the present items over the whole disclosure 
index items. Table 5.4 shows the mandatory disclosure checklist. The presence 
of the item in the internet corporate reports is represented by (1), while the 
absence of the item in the internet reports is represented by (0). This approach 
has been employed in several prior studies e.g., Akhtaruddin (2005), Das and 
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Shilpi (2008), Hassan et al. (2008).This can be presented mathematically as 
follows:  
 
8,[ >7W[@Q[ 
:KHUH8,[LVWKHXQZHLJKWHGLQGH[VFRUHGE\FRPSDQ\[,[7W[LVWKH
information item disclosed by company x; nx is the maximum number of items 
expected to be disclosed by a company. 
 
Table 5.3: Distribution of the Index Items into Different Parts  
 Major Parts of Report Total Percentage 
M
a
n
da
to
ry
 
D
is
cl
os
ur
e
 
General Information 23 22.33 
Directors Report 8 7.77 
Balance Sheet 36 34.95 
Profit and Loss Account 36 34.95 
 Total 103 100% 
 
5.7 Extent of voluntary disclosures on the internet: 
The study investigates the extent of disclosing voluntary information on the 
internet by the listed companies in an emerging capital market, namely 
Bangladesh, which lacks prior voluntary disclosure studies. It measures the 
extent of total voluntary disclosure and its categories in the corporate internet 
reporting based on self constructed checklist of voluntary disclosure items using 
unweighted disclosure index which is given in appendix B. The checklist would 
form a disclosure index that shows the level of voluntary corporate disclosure by 
examining the presence or absence of the different items of the checklist using 
binary codes. The presence of the item in the corporate websites is represented 
by (1), while the absence of the item is represented by (0). The checklist is 
composed of different sections showing the whole voluntary disclosure 
categories (table 5.5). The disclosure level is measured using the percentage of 
the present items over the whole disclosure index items. This approach has 
been employed in several prior studies e.g., Nurunnabi and Monirul (2012), 
Dutta and Bose (2008), Rouf (2011), Wallace (1987), Cooke (1991, 1992), 
Karim (1995), Hossain et al.(1994), Ahmed and Nicholls (1994), and Hossain 
(2000). This can be presented mathematically as follows:  
8,[ >7W[@Q[ 
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:KHUH8,[LVWKHXQZHLJKWHGLQGH[VFRUHGE\FRPSDQ\[,[7W[LVWKH
information item disclosed by company x; nx is the maximum number of items 
expected to be disclosed by a company. 
 
For the purpose of this study, voluntary reporting will be classified as; General 
information, Corporate strategic information, Corporate governance/directors 
information, Financial information, Corporate Social reporting, Environmental 
reporting and Sustainability reporting, Investor Related Information and 
Information Presentation Format on the internet. 
 
Table 5.4: Distribution of the Index Items into Different Parts 
 Major Parts of Report Total Percentage 
Vo
lu
nt
a
ry
 D
is
cl
o
su
re
 
General Corporate Information 10 7.81 
Corporate Strategic Information 7 5.47 
Corporate Governance/ Directors Information 14 10.94 
Financial Information 17 13.28 
Corporate Social Responsibility reporting 14 10.94 
Corporate Environmental Information 13 10.16 
Sustainability Information 25 19.53 
Investor Related Information 13 10.16 
Presentation Format 15 11.72 
 Total 128 100% 
 
5.8 Factors influencing disclosures of information on the internet: 
Based on the literature review in chapter three and theories of disclosure in 
chapter four, the study determines Firm Size, Profitability, Liquidity, Industry 
Type, Multinational Parents, Market Category, Independent Director in the 
board, Board Size, Dual Leadership Structure, Leverage, AXGLW ILUP¶V
international link, Ownership Structure, and Company Age as determinants of 
corporate internet reporting for listed companies in Bangladesh. In chapter four 
these variables are discussed and hypotheses are developed. 
 
5.8.1 Measurement of Variables: 
5.8.1.1 Firm Size 
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Firm size can be measured in a number of different ways and there is no 
overriding reason to prefer one to the others (Cooke 1991). Numerous studies 
combine some measures into one measure (Cooke 1992) while others use one 
measure. However, there is no criterion to select the finest proxy of firm size 
(Hassan et al. 2006). Reviewing the literature, it can be noticed that the most 
common measure of firm size is total assets. In the present study, the size of 
the company is determined by taking assets as the basis and the log of asset 
(LDASST) is used consistently in the disclosure models as the size variable. 
 
5.8.1.2 Profitability:  
A number of profitability measures were used in previous literature, including 
net profit to sales, earnings growth, dividend growth and dividend stability (Cerf 
1961), return on asset and return on equity (Oyelere et al. 2003) net profit to 
sales and return on equity (Nurunnabi and Monirul 2012) and return on assets 
(Belkaoui and Kahl 1978). Following Belkaoui and Karpik 1989; Bewley and Li 
2000; Magness 2006, Oyelere et al. 2003, the current study employs both the 
return on equity (ROE) and return of assets (ROA) as a measure of WKHILUP¶V
profitability. 
 
5.8$XGLW)LUP¶VLQWHUQDWLRQDOOLQN 
In the present study, an international link of audit firms was considered for use 
as an explanatory variable. The audit firms in Bangladesh can be classified into 
two groups: local audit firms with international affiliations with the Big Four and 
local audit firms without international affiliations with the Big Four. Audit firms 
having an affiliation with an international Big Four firm were treated as 'Big' and 
audit firms' failing to meet the criterion were treated as non big firms in the 
context of Bangladesh.  A dichotomous procedure was used awarding one if the 
company's audit firm was big and zero otherwise.  
 
5.8.1.4 Industry type: 
Some previous disclosure studies have focused only on non-financial 
companies (see for example, Wallace 1987 and Ahmed and Nicholls 1994). 
Because, in many countries different types of disclosure regulations are applied 
to banks, insurance and investment companies for the unique nature of their 
transactions and the asset portfolio of such entities. In the present study, 
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financial institutions are considered, as they form a major part of the corporate 
structure in Bangladesh. Companies listed on the Dhaka Stock Exchange 
Bangladesh are classified into eighteen categories. These are divided into two 
groups in this study: financial and non-financial companies. A dummy variable is 
used entering with the value of 1 if the company is in the financial sector and 
zero otherwise. 
 
5.8.1.5 Multinational Parents: 
The influence of a multinational parent is used by means of a dummy variable 
with 1 for MNC subsidiaries and 0 for domestic companies. 
 
5.8.1.6 Leverage: 
In the present study, debt equity ratio is used as the measure of leverage and 
used only for non-financial companies. 
 
5.8.1.7 Liquidity: 
In this study, liquidity is measured by current ratio and quick (acid test) ratio as 
it is a more stringent measure of corporate liquidity. Current ratio can be defined 
as the ratio of current assets to current liabilities where quick ratio can be 
defined as the ratio of current assets less inventories to current liabilities. For 
financial companies both current ratio and quick ratio are the same as they 
have no inventory items in their balance sheet but in the case of non financial 
companies, both current and quick ratio vary. 
 
5.8.1.8 Market category: 
It is expected that companies in the Z category are likely to have less voluntary 
information than those in the other categories. The phenomenon is captured 
with a dummy variable with the value of 1 if it is in the Z category and 0 
otherwise.  
 
5.8.1.9 Independent directors in the board: 
A firm may have higher level of disclosure if the boards consist of more 
independent directors. In this study we used number of independent director in 
the board as a measure. 
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5.8.1.10 Dual leadership structure:    
Based on mixed findings the current study was motivated to determine the 
effects of dual leadership structure on corporate reporting on the internet. In this 
study a dummy variable 1 is used if any company has dual leadership structure 
in the board and otherwise 0. 
 
5.8.1.11 Board size:  
In this study board size has been measured by the number of board members. 
 
5.8.1.12 Ownership structure: 
In Bangladesh, most of the companies are predominantly owned and controlled 
by founder families, groups of families or foreign owners (Farooque et al. 2007). 
So ownership plays a significant role in the corporate sector of Bangladesh. The 
ownership pattern of Public Limited companies in Bangladesh includes sponsor 
ownership, institutional ownership, government ownership, foreign ownership 
and public ownership (Bhuiyan et al. 2007). As we are focusing on the  listed 
firms in Bangladesh which are of limited liability in nature, so we determine 
sponsor as a dependent variable which reflects the concentrated ownership 
(50% or more) by the sponsors of the company. According to Hossain and 
Arifur (2006) concentrated ownership might influence the disclosure pattern. 
The phenomenon is captured with a dummy variable with the value of 1 if it has 
concentrated sponsor and 0 otherwise.  
 
5.8.1.13 Company age: 
To measure the age of the company that we can use two dates -one is 
HVWDEOLVKPHQWGDWHDQGDQRWKHURQHLVWKHFRPSDQ\¶VOLVWHGGDWH,QWKHSUHVHQW
study, both are applied and the variables measured by simple counting the 
number of years passed from it listing year on a particular sample year. 
 
5.8.2 Regression model: 
Dependent Variables: 
ICRIM = Internet Corporate Reporting Index for Mandatory 
ICRIV= Internet Corporate Reporting Index for Voluntary 
 
Control variables: 
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Explanatory variables and their expected sign of the study are given below: 
Table 5.5: Explanatory Variables and their Expected Sign 
Determinants Variables Variable 
Level 
Expected 
sign 
Firm Size Natural log of total asset LDASST + 
Profitability Return on Equity  and 
Return of Assets 
ROE and ROA + 
Audit Firm¶V
International link 
Audit firms link with Big Four 
Firm 
AUDITOR + 
Industry Type Financial and Non Financial 
Sector 
FIN + 
Leverage Debt to equity ratio LEV + 
Multinational 
Parents 
Subsidiary of a multinational 
company 
MNC + 
Liquidity Current Ratio and Quick 
Ratio 
CURRENT 
and QUICK 
+ 
Market Category Market category of DSE, 1 
for Z, 0 otherwise. 
MKTCATE - 
Independent 
Director in Board 
Number of independent 
director in the board 
IND + 
Dual Leadership 
Structure 
Dummy variable 1 for CEO 
Duality or Role Duality, 
otherwise 0. 
RODUAL + 
Board Size Number of Board member BOSIZE + 
Ownership 
Structure 
Sponsor hold 50% or more  
ownership 
SPONSOR - 
Company Age &RPSDQ\¶VHVWDEOLVKPHQW
year and listing year 
LISYR and 
ESTABYR 
+ 
 
The study developed the two regression models to justify the association 
between the dependent and independent variables in the form of ICRIM 
(Internet Corporate Reporting Index for Mandatory) index ICRIV (Internet 
Corporate Reporting Index for voluntary) and the relevant hypotheses. The first 
model is based on the combined sample and the second model is based on the 
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non-financial sector. This type of regression model has been widely used in the 
disclosure literature. For example Nurunnabi and Monirul (2012) developed the 
two models of the general form of OLS (Ordinary Least Squares) regression 
model to justify the association between the dependent and independent 
variables in the form of TDS (Total Disclosure Score) index.  Such as 
< ȕȕ$JHȕ3URILWDELOLW\ȕ,QGXVWU\ȕ6L]Hȕ%LJDXGLW
firm 5 + ȯ 
where: 
Y = the total voluntary IFR disclosure index or TDS (total disclosure score). 
ȕ FRQVWDQW 
ȕL L  SDUDPHWHUV 
ȯ= error term. 
Hossain et al. (2006) also developed a disclosure checklist of 60 items and 
used following multiple linear regression techniques to test hypotheses.  
6(', Įȕ52$66(76ȕ130$5*,1ȕ08/7,&20ȕ,1'87<3( 
ȕ6$/(6ȕ,1/,1.ȕ$66(76ȕ$*E + ȯ .................(1.1) 
Where, 
SEDI = total score received each sample company under social and 
environmental disclosure index; 
Į WKHFRQVWDQWDQG 
ȯ = the error term. 
 
Like these Oyelere et al. (2003), Abdel- Fattah (2008), Bonson (2006), Uyar, A. 
(2011), Alsaeed (2006), Aly et al. (2010), Abdelsalam and Donna (2007), 
Debreceny et al. (2002) and Eng and Mak (2003) also employ this type of 
regression equation to test the hypotheses. In this study the following multiple 
linear regression is used to investigate the association between the 
determinants and the level of disclosure in Bangladesh: 
 
For Combined Sample: 
Equation 1:  
,&5,0 ȕ0 ȕ/'$667ȕ52(ȕ52$ȕ$8',725ȕ01&ȕ
FIN ȕ&855(17ȕ0.7&$7(ȕ,1'ȕ%26,=(ȕ52'8$/
ȕ6321625ȕ/,6<5ȕ(67$%<5ȯ 
Equation 2:  
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,&5,9 ȕ0 ȕ/'$667ȕ52(ȕ52$ȕ$8',725ȕ01&ȕ
FIN ȕ&855(17ȕ0.7&$7(ȕ,1'ȕ%26,=(ȕ52'8$/
ȕ6321625ȕ/,6<5ȕ(67$%<5ȯ 
 
For Non-Financial Sector Companies: 
Equation 3:  
,&5,0 ȕ0 ȕ/'$667ȕ52(ȕ52$ȕ$8',725ȕ01&ȕ
LEV ȕ&855(17ȕ48,&.ȕ0.7&$7(ȕ,1'ȕ%26,=(
ȕ52'8$/ȕ6321625ȕ/,6<5ȕ(67$%<5ȯ 
Equation 4:  
,&5,9 ȕ0 ȕ/'$667ȕ52(ȕ52$ȕ$8',725ȕ01&ȕ
LEV ȕ&855(17ȕ48,&.ȕ0.7&$7(ȕ,1'ȕ%26,=(
ȕ52'8$/ȕ6321625ȕ/,6<5ȕ(67$%<5ȯ 
  Where, 
  ICRIM = Internet Corporate reporting Index for Mandatory 
           ICRIV = Internet Corporate Reporting Index for Voluntary  
  ȕ0 =Constant 
  
ȕ1- ȕ15 =Explanatory variables 
  ȯ (UURUWHUP 
7KLVPRGHO LVQRWDQHFRQRPHWULFPRGHOEHFDXVHKHUHZHGRQ¶WPHDVXUH WKH
value of different parameters. This is a statistical model, which has been 
developed to test the hypotheses. This type of regression equation has been 
used to test hypotheses in the previous literature. 
 
5.9 Statistical Tests: 
This section gives an overview of the statistical techniques that will be 
employed in this study. The study will first analyse the extent of total mandatory 
disclosure and voluntary disclosure; then the categories of such disclosure in 
chapter six. Here Spearman correlation and Pearson correlation will be applied 
to identify the correlation between the dependent and independent variables. 
 
To identify the appropriate regression test, the study performed regression 
diagnostic to measure the normality of data set in chapter seven. In this study 
both numerical (skewness-kurtosis and Shapiro-Wilk) and graphical (Q-Q plot; 
P-P plot) method have been applied to check the normality of residuals. For 
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checking the linearity assumption, the residuals will be plotted against the 
independent variable(s) values; for heteroscedasticity, two tests will be 
conducted, the first is Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg and White's tests and 
the second is Cameron and Trivedi's decomposition of IM test. Finally to check 
the multicollinearity, the study will use the correlation coefficients; parametric 
(Pearson) and non parametric (Spearman); and variance inflation factors (VIF) 
in addition to tolerance values.  
 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression with robust standard error will be 
employed to examine the developed hypotheses as the data set is not normally 
distributed. The robustness tests have been applied as a non parametric test to 
overcome this problem.  
 
5.10 Conclusion: 
The current chapter helps in making a link between the theoretical and empirical 
sections. Based on theoretical framework in chapter four, evidence from 
corporate literature in chapter three and legal framework in chapter two, it seeks 
to examine empirically the extent of mandatory and voluntary reporting on the 
internet and the factors affecting this disclosure level. The study follows the 
deductive approach that requires developing hypotheses based on a theory. As 
indicated in chapter four, the current study employed multi approach theoretical 
framework that benefits from integrating a number of theories. As such, the 
study is considered to be a quantitative study. It measures the extent of 
reporting and its categories based on self constructed checklist of mandatory 
and voluntary reporting items. The final sample consists of 234 listed 
companies in Bangladesh. This chapter developed two sets of disclosure 
checklists and regression equation that are tested in the next empirical chapters 
six and chapter seven to answer all the research questions of this study. 
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Chapter: 6 
 Extent of Mandatory and Voluntary Disclosure 
6.1 Introduction: 
As discussed in chapter five, the present study developed two checklists to 
measure the level of mandatory and voluntary disclosure and its categories on 
the internet by the listed companies in Bangladesh. Reviewing the literature in 
chapter three revealed the importance of subdividing the total mandatory and 
voluntary disclosure into subgroups. To understand the disclosure practice, it 
may be better to look in depth into the results of the score sheet. The self 
constructed checklist consists of 103 mandatory items and 128 voluntary items 
of information which are then classified into different subgroups. The aim of this 
chapter is to provide the result of first two research questions which are: 
 
RQ1: To what extent do Bangladeshi companies disclose mandatory reporting 
requirements on the internet? 
RQ2: To what extent do Bangladeshi companies disclose voluntary information 
on the internet?  
 
It provides answers to these questions through descriptive analysis of the 
results of the disclosure checklist. The chapter starts with the analysis of the 
extent of total mandatory disclosure on websites in section 6.2 followed by the 
extent of voluntary disclosure on the internet in section 6.3. Section 6.4 provides 
descriptive statistics for sector wise disclosure performance. After that, the 
determinants of disclosing both mandatory and voluntary information is 
discussed in section 6.5. Finally the co-relation analysis is performed for both 
combined and non-financial sample companies in section 6.6 and 6.7 
respectively followed by a conclusion in section 6.8. 
 
6.2 The Extent of Mandatory Disclosure on the Internet: 
6.2.1 Combined Sample: 
To identify the level of mandatory information disclosure on the internet by the 
listed companies in Bangladesh, a checklist of 103 mandatory items was 
constructed and then divided into the four subgroups which described in 
appendix A. A total of 234 company websites we are visited to collect the 
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information. The percentage of awarded disclosure score to the applicable 
score represents the extent of mandatory disclosure. 
 
To start the analysis, table 6.1 presents the descriptive statistics of the total 
mandatory disclosure and its categories all together. The mean of the total 
mandatory disclosure score is 66.24% with a standard deviation of 97.09%. 
This average suggests a low level of compliance, which is to be expected. This 
result is comparable with the study of Akhtaruddin 2005, who reported that the 
extent of mandatory disclosure in Bangladesh is only 44%. The findings are in 
line with other studies. For example, Glaum and Street 2003 (83.7% in 
Germany), Owusu Ansah and Yeoh 2005 (New Zealand, 78% in 1992 and 88% 
in 1997) and Aljifri 2008 (68% in UAE). 
 
The table also reveals the wide range of mandatory information disclosure on 
the internet where it varies from 2.91% (minimum) to 97.08%.One possible 
reason for the variation is the lack of regulatory enforcement in Bangladesh 
(Akhtaruddin 2005). Mendes-da-Silva and Theodore (2004) also documented 
the importance of recognising the lack of rules and guidelines concerning the 
use of the internet as a vehicle for disclosing financial information by Brazilian 
companies.  
 
In addition, the table also indicates the variation in the level of mandatory 
reporting categories. It can be observed that the maximum disclosure of all 
categories is 100% represented by general disclosure, disclosure of the 
GLUHFWRU¶VUHSRUWDQGWKHSURILWDQG ORVVDFFRXQW ,W LVD common notice for the 
whole categories of disclosure is that the minimum disclosure for any category 
of disclosure is 0%, which means that at least one company of the examined 
FRPSDQLHV IDLOHG WR GLVFORVH WKH GLUHFWRU¶V UHSRUW WKH EDODQFH VKHHW RU WKH
profit and loss account on their website. 
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Table 6.1: Descriptive Statistics for Mandatory Disclosure (combined) 
Mandatory Disclosure 
 
N Mean Median 
Std.  
Deviation 
Mini- 
Mum 
Maxi- 
Mum 
General Disclosure 234 0.7689 0.9565 0.292 0.043 1 
Director Report 234 0.5107 0.6250 0.388 0 1 
Balance sheet  234 0.6580 0.8056 0.313 0 0.972 
Profit and loss A/C 234 0.6326 0.7500 0.299 0 1 
Total Mandatory  234 0.6624 0.8107 0.9709 0.0291 0.9708 
 
6.2.2 Non Financial Companies: 
To measure the level of mandatory disclosure on the website by the listed non 
financial companies in Bangladesh, the same checklist of 103 mandatory items 
has been used. A total of 141 company websites were visited to collect the 
information. The percentage of awarded disclosure score to the applicable 
score represents the extent of mandatory disclosure. 
 
Table 6.2 represents the descriptive statistics for mandatory disclosure and its 
different categories for non financial companies. The mean of the total 
mandatory disclosure score is about 60.57% with a standard deviation of 
32.04%. This result indicates a lower level of compliance in comparison to the 
combined sample. The table also suggests that the level of disclosure by the 
examined companies varies from 2.91% to 96.12%.  
 
Moreover, the general information disclosure represents the highest disclosure 
level of 71.94% on the LQWHUQHWZKLOHGLVFORVXUHRIGLUHFWRU¶VUHSRUWSUHVHQWVWKH
lowest disclosure level of 45.30%. In addition, it can be observed from the 
examined companies that the maximum disclosure of all categories is 100% 
represented by general disclosure, disclosure RIGLUHFWRU¶VUHSRUWDQGSURILWDQG
loss account: this is also similar in case of the combined sample. The minimum 
disclosure for any category of disclosure is 0%, which means that at least one 
company of the examined companies failed to disclose the direcWRU¶V UHSRUWRU
the balance sheet on their website. 
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Table 6.2: Descriptive Statistics of Mandatory Disclosure (non financial) 
Mandatory Disclosure 
N 
Mean Median 
Std.  
Deviation 
Mini- 
Mum 
Maxi- 
Mum 
General Disclosure 141 0.7194 0.9130 0.3135 0.0435 1 
Director Report 141 0.4530 0.5000 0.3982 0 1 
Balance sheet  141 0.5985 0.7778 0.3303 0 0.9722 
Profit and loss A/C 141 0.5743 0.6944 0.3252 0.0278 1 
Total Mandatory  141 0.6057 0.7767 0.3204 0.0291 0.9612 
 
6.3 The Extent of Voluntary Disclosure on the Internet: 
6.3.1 Combined Sample: 
To measure the level of voluntary disclosure on the internet by the listed 
companies in Bangladesh, a checklist of 128 items was constructed and divided 
into nine groups. A total of 234 company websites were visited to collect the 
necessary information. The percentage of awarded disclosure score to the 
applicable score represents the extent of voluntary disclosure, which is the 
dependent variable in this study. 
 
Table 6.3 represents the descriptive statistics of the total voluntary disclosure 
level and the level of disclosing each category of information on the corporate 
website. The table indicates that the mean of the total voluntary disclosure 
score is about 35.46%. This average suggests a low level of voluntary 
disclosure on the internet by the Bangladeshi companies which is also to be 
expected. This result can be compared with the previous studies of Nurunnabi 
and Monirul (2012) who found that the level of average voluntary internet 
financial reporting is 32.14% in Bangladesh. 
 
The table shows that the extent of voluntary disclosure has a wide range. While 
the minimum disclosure index obtained is 0%, the maximum is 85.93%. 
Moreover, it is observed that the maximum disclosure of all categories is 100% 
represented by general corporate information, corporate strategic information, 
financial information, social responsibility information, corporate environmental 
information and investor related information. The minimum disclosure for any 
category of disclosure is 0%, which means that at least one company of the 
examined companies missed general corporate information, corporate strategic 
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information, corporate governance information, financial information, social 
responsibility reporting, corporate environmental reporting, sustainability 
UHSRUWLQJ LQYHVWRUV¶ UHODWHG LQIRUPDWLRQ DQG SUHVHQWDWLRQ IRUPDW RQ WKHLU
website. In addition, the general corporate information represents the highest 
disclosure level of 70%, while the corporate environmental information 
disclosure presents the lowest disclosure level of 11.97%. 
 
Table 6.3: Descriptive Statistics of Voluntary Disclosure (combined) 
Voluntary Disclosure 
N 
Mean Median 
Std.  
Deviation 
Mini- 
Mum 
Maxi- 
Mum 
 General Corporate Info 234 0.7 0.7 0.2061 0 1 
Corporate Strategic Info 234 0.3102 0.2857 0.3163 0 1 
Corporate Governance 234 0.5375 0.6729 0.3376 0 0.9285 
Financial Information 234 0.4982 0.5294 0.2844 0 1 
Social Responsibility Info 234 0.1920 0.0000 0.2950 0 1 
Corporate Env Info 234 0.1197 0.0000 0.2568 0 1 
Sustainability Information 234 0.1858 0.1200 0.1953 0 0.88 
Investor Related Info 234 0.4096 0.3846 0.1999 0 1 
Presentation Format 234 0.3972 0.4000 0.1804 0 0.8666 
Total Voluntary Disclosure 234 0.3546 0.3398 0.2014 0 0.8593 
 
 
6.3.2 Non Financial Sample: 
Table 6.4 showed the descriptive statistics for the level of total voluntary 
disclosure and the level of disclosing each category of information using the 
non-financial sample for the year 2013. The results indicate that the mean total 
voluntary disclosure is about 29.50% which varies between 0% to 85.94% for 
the least and highest non financial companies of Bangladesh respectively. It 
can be observed that the voluntary disclosure level for non financial companies 
is lower than the combined sample. 
 
 
 
 
 
- 145 - 
 
Table 6.4: Descriptive Statistics of Voluntary Disclosure (non financial) 
Voluntary Disclosure 
N 
Mean Median 
Std.  
Deviation 
Mini- 
Mum 
Maxi- 
Mum 
 General Corporate Info 141 0.6610 0.7 0.2154 0 1 
Corporate Strategic Info 141 0.2482 0.1429 0.2772 0 1 
Corporate Governance 141 0.4564 0.5 0.3413 0 0.9286 
Financial Information 141 0.4189 0.4706 0.2706 0 1 
Social Responsibility Info 141 0.1175 0 0.2225 0 1 
Corporate Env Info 141 0.0693 0 0.2009 0 0.9231 
Sustainability Information 141 0.1155 0.08 0.1226 0 0.76 
Investor Related Info 141 0.3863 0.3846 0.2049 0 0.8462 
Presentation Format 141 0.3631 0.3333 0.1737 0 0.8667 
Total Voluntary Disclosure 141 0.2950 0.3047 0.1713 0 0.8594 
 
It is also identified that the disclosure of general information on the website is 
the highest disclosing category with the value of 66.10% and the lowest 
disclosing category is corporate environmental information which discloses only 
6.93%. Moreover, the interesting thing is that the minimum disclosure for all 
categories of voluntary disclosure is 0%, which means that at least one of the 
examined companies missed general information, corporate strategic 
information, corporate governance information, financial information, corporate 
social responsibility disclosure (CSR), corporate environmental disclosure, 
sustainability information, investor related information and presentation format 
in their website. But the maximum disclosure of all categories is 100% 
presented by general information, corporate strategic information, financial 
information and corporate social responsibility disclosure. 
 
6.4 Sector Wise Disclosure Performance: 
In order to gain a detailed understanding of corporate internet reporting 
practices, it is necessary to discuss sector wise performance of the listed 
companies in Bangladesh. It will help to identify the highest and lowest 
disclosing sector. From the table 6.5 it can be observed that among the fifteen 
sectors, the telecommunication sector discloses the most mandatory 
information at 85.44% followed by the financial Institution sector which discloses 
81.93% mandatory information and then the banking sector, with 81.62%. The 
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tannery sector discloses the lowest with only 37.86% of mandatory information 
posted on the internet.  
Table 6.5: Sector Wise Disclosure Level 
Sector Mandatory Voluntary 
Bank 81.62% 62.23% 
Cement 63.38% 34.15% 
Ceramics 56.50% 27.50% 
Engineering 55.42% 25.72% 
Financial Institutions 81.93% 47.86% 
Food and Allied 59.48% 26.72% 
Fuel and Power 68.03% 35.10% 
Insurance 66.07% 30.09% 
IT sector 72.01% 25.00% 
Miscellaneous, Jute and paper 63.54% 23.09% 
Pharmaceuticals and Chemical 72.77% 37.87% 
Services and Real Estate 74.76% 34.38% 
Tannery Industries 37.86% 22.40% 
Telecommunication 85.44% 55.47% 
Textile 48.27% 25.33% 
Travel and Leisure 64.08% 34.64% 
 
In the case of voluntary disclosure, the banking sector discloses the highest 
amount of information on the internet which is 62.23% followed by the 
telecommunication sector, which discloses 55.47%. The tannery sector 
discloses the lowest amount of voluntary information (22.40%). So it can be 
concluded that Tannery sector of Bangladesh discloses the lowest amount of 
mandatory and voluntary information on the internet. 
 
6.5 Measuring the Determinants of Disclosure: 
One of the objectives of this study is to examine the relationship between the 
level of disclosure and the determinants of disclosing both mandatory and 
voluntary information on the internet. As discussed in Chapter 5 (methodology), 
the determinants of the level of disclosure that are tested in this study are firm 
VL]H SURILWDELOLW\ PHDVXUHG E\ 52( DQG 52$ DXGLW ILUP¶V LQWHUQDWLRQDO OLQN
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multinational parent, leverage, liquidity measured by current ratio and quick 
ratio, market category, industry type, independent director, board size, dual 
leadership structure, ownership structure, and company age measured by listed 
year and establishment year. These determinants are then divided into two 
equations-one is for the combined sample and the other is for non-financial 
companies. Here the study examines the relationship between the level of 
disclosure and the determinants for non financial companies. 
The equation based on the combined sample stands as: 
Equation 1:  
ICRIM  ȕ0 ȕ/'$667ȕ52(ȕ52$ȕ$8',725ȕ01&ȕ
),1ȕ&855(17ȕ0.7&$7(ȕ,1'ȕ%26,=(ȕ52'8$/
ȕ6321625ȕ/,6<5ȕ(67$%<5ȯ 
 
Equation 2:  
ICRIV  ȕ0 ȕ/'$667ȕ52(ȕ52$ȕ$8',725ȕ01&ȕ
),1ȕ&855(17ȕ0.7&$7(ȕ,1'ȕ%26,=(ȕ52'8$/
ȕ6321625ȕ/,6<5ȕ(67$%<5ȯ 
 
The equation based on the non-financial companies stands as: 
Equation 3:  
ICRIM  ȕ0 ȕ/'$667ȕ52(ȕ52$ȕ$8',725ȕ01&ȕ
/(9ȕ&855(17ȕ48,&.ȕ0.7&$7(ȕ,1'ȕ%26,=(
ȕ52'8$/ȕ6321625ȕ/,6<5ȕ(67$%<5ȯ 
Equation 4:  
ICRIV  ȕ0 ȕ/'$667ȕ52(ȕ52$ȕ$8',725ȕ01&ȕ
LEV + ȕ&855(17ȕ48,&.ȕ0.7&$7(ȕ,1'ȕ%26,=(
ȕ52'8$/ȕ6321625ȕ/,6<5ȕ(67$%<5ȯ 
 
6.5.1 Descriptive Statistics for Dependent Variable (Combined Sample): 
Table 6.6 represents the descriptive statistics for the determinants of disclosing 
information (both voluntary and mandatory) on the internet. The minimum score 
of zero, in the table, reveals that some companies do not disclose information 
under any of the categories. The mean indicates the average number of items 
disclosed by companies under each category. 
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As indicated in the table, the mean firm size is 9.53 with a minimum 0.0816 and 
a maximum 11.684. The profitability measured by ROE ranges from - 832% to 
99.8% with an average of 9.47%, while profitability measured by ROA ranges 
from -36.73% to 99.1% with an average of 7.12%. It is also identified that only 
19.66% observation audited by Big four audit firm and 12.82% companies are 
operated by multinational parents. Regarding the market category, only 12.82% 
of companies DUH LQ WKH³=´FDWHJRU\7KHDYHUDJHVL]HRIERDUG LVDURXQG
members and the number of independent directors is only one member. In 
86.75% company, different people occupy the position of CEO and chairman 
and 45.73% companies have a concentrated ownership structure. 
 
Moreover, it is observed from the table that the data is not normally distributed 
as the skewness of firm size, profitability measured by ROE and ROA, 
multinational parent, liquidity, market category, board structure measured by 
dual leadership structure and company age measured by year of establishment 
exceeds the standard normality range of ± 1.96 (Haniffa and Hudaib 2006). In 
the same way, with reference to the standard kurtosis the data is also 
considered not to be normally distributed as firm size; profitability (ROE); 
profitability (ROA); audit firm; multinational parent; liquidity; market category; 
number of independent directors in the board; board size; and dual leadership 
structure, and company age measured both by number of year listed and 
number of years established exceeds the standard normality range of ±3 
(Haniffa and Hudaib 2006; Gujrati 2003). The figures in table 6.5 indicate that 
the observations have some extreme figures (outliers) which need further 
investigation. Therefore, based on the skewness and kurtosis the data of the 
different variables is not normally distributed and is considered to be non 
parametric data. 
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Table 6.6: Descriptive Statistics for Dependent Variable (combined) 
 
N 
Mean Media 
Std.  
Deviat 
Mini- 
mum 
Maxi- 
Mum 
Skew- 
Ness 
Kur- 
Tosis 
Firm Size 234 9.5329 9.505 1.077 0.0816 11.684 -2.759 26.972 
ROE 234 0.0947 0.090 0.591 -8.3256 0.998 -12.377 178.198 
ROA 234 0.0712 0.035 0.173 -0.3673 0.991 3.793 19.501 
Audit Firm  234 0.1966 0 0.398 0 1 1.527 3.332 
Industry type 234 0.3974 0 0.490 0 1 0.419 1.176 
Multi Parents 234 0.1282 0 0.335 0 1 2.224 5.947 
Liquidity 234 1.959 1.522 1.491 0.053 9.803 1.957 7.582 
Mkt Category 234 0.1282 0 0.335 0 1 2.224 5.947 
Inde Director 234 1.3632 1 0.954 0 5 0.528 3.557 
Board Size 234 10.0171 9 4.307 2 22 0.882 3.086 
Role Duality 234 0.8675 1 0.340 0 1 -2.168 5.701 
Owner Struc 234 0.4573 0 0.499 0 1 0.172 1.029 
Listed Year  234 14.4872 13 10.232 0 45 0.481 2.292 
Estab year  234 23.9316 18 16.402 1 190 4.731 46.220 
 
6.5.2 Descriptive Statistics for Dependent Variable (non financial sample): 
Table 6.7 shows the descriptive statistics for the determinants of disclosing both 
mandatory and voluntary information on the internet by the non financial listed 
companies in Bangladesh. From the table it can be observed that there are 141 
number of observation which indicates the sample size for non-financial 
FRPSDQLHV7KHµPHDQ¶LQGLFDWHVWKHDYHUDJHQXPEHURILWHPVGLVFORVHGE\WKH
companies under each category. 
 
The firm size is about 9.23 with a minimum of 0.082 and a maximum of11.068: 
WKLV LV TXLWH VLPLODU WR WKH UHVXOW RI FRPELQHG VDPSOH )LUP¶V SURILWDELOLW\
measured by ROE is about 0.0462 with minimum of -8.326 and maximum of 
 WKHPHDQRI ILUP¶VSURIitability measured by ROA is about 0.0494. It is 
notable that only 16.31% companies are audited by Big four audit firms and only 
14.18% companies have multinational parent. Also leverage which is measured 
by debt to equity ratio is 1.45:1 for non financial companies and the liquidity 
ratio measured by current ratio and quick ratio are 1.73 and 1.21 respectively. 
Only 18.44% non-financial companies are in the Z category. Regarding the 
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number of independent director, the average is about 1.18 or 1 person, which 
varies from 0 to 4 persons whereas the average size of the board is about 7.46 
or 7 person. It can also be observed that 79.43% of companies have dual 
leadership structure while 51.06% of companies are operating under sponsor 
ownership. 
 
The skewness of the different determinants indicates that the data of the 
different variables are not normally distributed because the maximum skewness 
is 9.105 represented by leverage, while the minimum skewness is -10.770 
represented by profitability measured by ROE. This value of maximum 
skewness is not within the range of ± 1.96 which indicates that the data set is 
not normal (Haniffa and Hudaib 2006). Therefore the data set is considered as 
non parametric data. Again the maximum kurtosis is 123.42 represented by 
profitability measured by ROE is also not within the range of ±3 (Haniffa and 
Hudaib 2006). Therefore the data set is not normal and considered to be non 
parametric data. 
 
Table 6.7: Descriptive Statistics for Dependent Variable (non financial) 
 
N 
Mean Median 
Std.  
Deviation 
Mini- 
Mum 
Maxi- 
Mum 
Skew- 
Ness 
Kur- 
Tosis 
Firm Size 141 9.2334 9.3379 1.070 0.082 11.068 -4.546 39.402 
ROE 141 0.0462 0.0795 0.731 -8.326 0.908 -10.770 123.742 
ROA 141 0.0494 0.0387 0.081 -0.308 0.475 0.551 11.522 
Audit Firm  141 0.1631 0 0.371 0 1 1.824 4.325 
Multi Parents 141 0.1418 0 0.350 0 1 2.053 5.215 
Leverage 141 1.454 0.678 2.5572 -6.38 12.26 2.203 9.9207 
Liqu.(Curr ratio) 141 1.735 1.3048 1.455 0.0526 9.803 2.689 11.798 
Quick Ratio 141 1.212 0.8633 1.305 0.0441 8.953 3.171 15.058 
Mkt Category 141 0.1844 0 0.389 0 1 1.628 3.649 
Inde Director 141 1.1844 1 0.789 0 4 0.275 3.117 
Board Size 141 7.5106 7 2.0305 4 14 0.6755 3.3861 
Role Duality 141 0.7943 1 0.406 0 1 -1.456 3.121 
Owner Struc 141 0.5106 1 0.502 0 1 -0.043 1.002 
Listed Year 141 15.7305 16 11.293 0 45 0.240 2.003 
Estab Year 141 26.7518 23 19.684 1 190 4.160 34.592 
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6.6 Correlation Analysis for Mandatory (Combined) Model: 
Correlation analysis gives an estimate as to the degree of association between 
the variables. In fact, it tests for interdependence of the variables. In this study, 
correlation analysis is used to identify the degree of association between the 
dependent and independent variables. With the help of this type of analysis, it is 
also possible to identify the correlation among the independent variables. 
Moreover, it recognises whether the data needs to change or whether any 
independent variables need to remove. So, before moving to the regression 
analysis, this study performed correlation analysis to identify whether all the 
independent variables are suitable for the multiple regression analysis. 
  
6.6.1 Correlation of Independent Variables for Mandatory Disclosure: 
To start the analysis, this section examines the association between the extent 
of total mandatory disclosure as the dependent variable and each of the 
independent variables for the combined sample. As the data set is non 
SDUDPHWULF WKH 6SHDUPDQ¶V UDQN FRUUHODWLRQ LV XVHG WR WHVW WKH DVVRFLDWLRQ
between the variables. After that the study also uses Pearson correlation 
coefficient. The significance association is identified using a confidence level of 
99% and 95%. 
 
Referred to table 6.8 the correlation coefficient of both the Spearman test and 
the Pearson test, shows there is a significant positive relationship (at 1% and 
5% significance level) between total mandatory disclosure and firm size, audit 
firm, industry category, multinational parent, independent director, board size, 
dual leadership structure. This means that there is a strong association between 
these variables and the level of mandatory disclosure on the internet. The 
results suggest that companies with big size, audited by Big four audit firm, 
financial companies, multinational companies, high number of independent 
director in the board, large board size and dual leadership structured 
companies, disclose more mandatory information on their website. On the other 
hand there is a significant negative association between the level of mandatory 
disclosure and market category and company age measured by listed year. 
This implies that companies that are in the Z category disclose less mandatory 
information on their website. 
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0RUHRYHUDFFRUGLQJWRWKH6SHDUPDQWHVWILUP¶VSURILWDELOLW\PHDVXUHGE\52(
and liquidity are significantly positively associated with the level of disclosing 
mandatory information on the internet, although the Pearson test found non 
significant association between them. Similarly, while the Pearson test found 
that firm profitability measured by ROA, has a significant positive association 
with the disclosure level, it is found non-significant association in Spearman 
test. 
 
+RZHYHU FRPSDQLHV¶ RZQHUVKLS VWUXFWXUH DQG HVWDEOLVKPHQW \HDU KDYH QR
significant relationship with the level of mandatory disclosure on the internet 
under both tests. This result suggests that the ownership concentration does 
not affect the level of disclosing the information on the internet and at the same 
time company age also has no impact. 
 
Table 6.8: Correlation between Mandatory Disclosure and Independent 
Variables (combined) 
Variables Spearman Pearson 
Firm size .384** .285** 
ROE .137* .064 
ROA .088 .131* 
Audit firm .389** .309** 
Industry .248** .234** 
Multinational parent .219** .162* 
Liquidity .147* .091 
Market category -.317** -.329** 
Independent director .304** .305** 
Board size .246** .175** 
Role Duality .383** .447** 
Ownership .103 .095 
Listed year -.132* -.136* 
Establishment year -.053 -.035 
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6.6.2 Categorical Independent Variables for Mandatory Disclosure: 
Regarding the different categories of mandatory disclosure under Spearman 
correlation coefficient (table 6.9) there is a significant positive association 
EHWZHHQGLIIHUHQWFDWHJRULHVRIPDQGDWRU\GLVFORVXUHDQGILUPVL]HDXGLWILUP¶V
international link, industry type, multinational parent, independent director in the 
board, board size and dual leadership structure. The result also indicates that 
there is a significant negative association between the categories of disclosure 
and market category. In addition, there is significant positive association 
between the total mandatory disclosure, general disclosure and income 
statement disclosure with the profitability measured by ROE. On the other hand, 
profitability measured by ROA has only positive association with general 
disclosure. Liquidity measured by current ratio is also significant for disclosing 
total mandatory information, general information and balance sheet information 
on the web but company age measured by listing year is significantly negatively 
associated with total mandatory disclosure and general disclosure on the 
website. 
 
Table 6.10 represents the correlation between the different categories of 
mandatory disclosure and the determinants of disclosing information on the 
website for the combined sample by using 3HDUVRQ¶VFRUUHODWLRQFRHIILFLHQW7KH
UHVXOWV RI FRPELQHG VDPSOH XVLQJ 3HDUVRQ¶V FRUUHODWLRQ GR QRW VLJQLILFDQWO\
GLIIHU IURP WKH UHVXOWV RI FRPELQHG VDPSOH XVLQJ 6SHDUPDQ¶V FRUUHODWLRQ ZLWK
the exception of profitability (measured by ROE and ROA) and liquidity of the 
companies. 
 
From the table 6.10 it can be observed that profitability measured by ROE has 
no significant relationship with total mandatory disclosure and its different 
categories but profitability measured by ROA has a significant positive 
relationship with total mandatory disclosure and balance sheet disclosure. 
Moreover liquidity has no significant relationship with the total mandatory 
disclosure and its different categories but company age (listing year) is 
negatively associated with the total mandatory disclosure, general disclosure 
and balance sheet disclosure. 
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Table 66SHDUPDQ¶V&RUUHODWLRQIRU'HSHQGHQWDQG,QGHSHQGHQW9DULDEOHV0DQGDWRU\- combined) 
 
Total  
Mand General Direct B.sht Income 
Firm_ 
size ROE ROA 
Audit 
Firm 
Indust 
Ry 
Mul. 
nati 
Curren 
Trat 
Market  
Cate 
Ind 
director 
Board 
size 
Role 
duality 
Owner 
Ship 
Listed 
yr 
Estab 
yr 
Total Manda 1.00                   
General .879** 1.00                  
Direct _repo .891** .821** 1.00                 
Balancesheet .920** .813** .770** 1.00                
Income state .934** .754** .766** .826** 1.00               
Firm size .384** .411** .381** .439** .290** 1.00              
ROE .137* .208** .099 .118 .147* .122 1.00             
ROA .088 .131* .074 .047 .100 -.163* .670** 1.00            
Audit firm .389** .374** .361** .350** .330** .394** .190** -.024 1.00           
Industry .248** .222** .189** .309** .217** .333** .132* -.098 .104 1.00          
Multinational .219** .169** .199** .169** .213** .147* .168* .070 .100 -.050 1.00         
Current ratio .147* .142* .116 .173** .126 .227** .085 .169** .083 .239** -.060 1.00        
Market cate -.317** -.318** -.324** -.290** -.306** -.267** -.308** -.301** -.190** -.207** -.109 -.198** 1.00       
Indepdirector .304** .329** .340** .280** .258** .236** .061 .030 .205** .217** .140* .002 -.147* 1.00      
Board size .246** .203** .197** .281** .228** .297** .221** .073 .195** .745** -.005 .137* -.244** .269** 1.00     
Role duality .383** .393** .369** .341** .376** .187** .171** .065 .162* .266** .112 .115 -.340** .231** .247** 1.00    
Ownership .103 .096 .127 .070 .092 .077 .083 -.017 .194** -.132* .161* -.014 -.044 .079 -.024 .131* 1.00   
Listed yr -.132* -.188** -.111 -.104 -.107 -.163* -.079 -.171** .021 -.099 .145* -.087 .150* -.077 -.065 -.100 .000 1.00  
Establishe yr -.053 -.128 -.077 -.037 -.026 -.073 -.041 -.148* .106 -.202** .109 -.081 .025 -.062 -.124 .102 .183** .749** 1.00 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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Table 63HDUVRQ¶V&RUUHODWLRQIRU'HSHQGHQWDQGIndependent Variables (Mandatory- combined) 
 
Total 
Man Gener Direct 
Bal. 
sheet 
Income 
State 
Firm 
size ROE ROA 
Audit 
firm 
Indust 
Ry 
Mul. 
Nati 
Curren 
Trat 
Market  
Cate 
Ind 
Direct. 
Board 
size 
Role 
duality 
Owner 
ship 
Listed 
yr 
Estab 
Yr 
TotalMandatory 1                   
General .971** 1                  
Director_repo .857** .853** 1                 
Balancesheet .984** .951** .798** 1                
Incomestate .974** .910** .792** .942** 1               
Firm_size .285** .293** .273** .307** .232** 1              
ROE .064 .080 .070 .027 .084 .170** 1             
ROA .131* .125 .047 .151* .126 .081 .354** 1            
Auditfirm .309** .296** .351** .283** .300** .319** .043 -.029 1           
Industry .234** .209** .184** .235** .241** .343** .101 .155* .104 1          
Multinational .162* .155* .196** .137* .166* .138* .043 -.006 .100 -.050 1         
Currentratio .091 .094 .039 .090 .095 .063 .133* .367** -.002 .141* -.085 1        
Marketcate -.329** -.325** -.337** -.308** -.317** -.288** -.234** -.179** -.190** -.207** -.109 -.106 1       
inddirector .305** .309** .319** .286** .288** .201** .096 .049 .173** .231** .122 .014 -.146* 1      
Boardsize .175** .159* .162* .172** .175** .249** .143* .215** .111 .732** -.019 .062 -.219** .278** 1     
Roleduality .447** .439** .381** .429** .445** .136* .172** .108 .162* .266** .112 .113 -.340** .215** .224** 1    
Ownership .095 .073 .122 .090 .098 .047 -.059 -.077 .194** -.132* .161* -.089 -.044 .046 -.078 .131* 1   
Listedyr -.136* -.152* -.120 -.133* -.120 -.168* -.018 -.137* .047 -.150* .159* -.095 .126 -.096 -.101 -.089 .036 1  
Estab. yr -.035 -.056 -.052 -.040 -.009 -.044 .028 -.060 .170** -.212** .177** -.118 .016 -.041 -.107 .083 .205** .575** 1 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 - 156 - 
 
6.6.3 Correlation of Independent Variables for Mandatory Disclosure (non-
financial): 
To start the analysis, this section examines the association between the extent 
of total mandatory disclosure as the dependent variable and each of the 
independent variables for non-financial companies in Bangladesh. As the data 
VHW LVQRQSDUDPHWULF WKH6SHDUPDQ¶V UDQNFRUUHODWLRQ LVXVHGILUVW WR WHVW WKH
association between the variables. After that the study uses the Pearson 
correlation coefficient. 
Table 6.11: Correlation between Mandatory Disclosure and Independent 
Variables (non financial): 
Variables Spearman Pearson 
Firm size .351** .164 
ROE .175* .040 
ROA .326** .279** 
Audit firm .344** .276** 
Multinational parent .340** .267** 
Leverage -.167* -.100 
Current ratio .159 .120 
Quick Ratio .064 .106 
Market category -.302** -.297** 
Independent director .345** .378** 
Board size .157 .085 
Role Duality .397** .443** 
Ownership .186* .186* 
Listed year -.152 -.147 
Established year -.041 .005 
 
From the table 6.11 it can be observed that seven explanatory variables are 
significantly associated with the level of disclosing mandatory information on the 
internet under both the Spearman and Pearson correlation test. While 
SURILWDELOLW\ PHDVXUHG E\ 52$ DXGLW ILUP¶V international link, multinational 
parent, independent director, dual leadership structure and ownership structure 
are all positively and significantly associated with the level of mandatory 
disclosure, market category is significantly negatively associated with the 
disclosure level. This suggests that high profitability (measured by ROA) firms, 
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the firms which are audited by Big four audit firms and who have independent 
director in the board, dual leadership structure in the board and sponsored 
companies are more willing to comply with the mandatory requirement. 
 
,W LVDOVRQRWDEOH WKDW ILUPV¶ OLTXLGLW\PHDVXUHGE\ERWKFXUUHQW UDWLRDQGTXLFN
UDWLR ERDUG VL]H DQG FRPSDQ\ DJH PHDVXUHG E\ ERWK FRPSDQLHV¶ OLVWHG \HDU
and establishment year have non-significant association with the mandatory 
disclosure level. 0RUHRYHUDFFRUGLQJWRWKH6SHDUPDQWHVWILUPVL]HDQGILUP¶V
profitability measured by ROE are significantly positively associated with the 
level of disclosing mandatory information on the internet: however, the Pearson 
test found non-significant association between them. Similarly, while the 
Spearman test found leverage has significant negative association with the 
disclosure level, it is found to have a non-significant association in Pearson test. 
 
6.6.4 Categorical Independent Variables for Mandatory Disclosure (Non 
Financial Companies): 
Regarding the correlation coefficient of different categories of mandatory 
disclosure under the SpeaUPDQ¶V UDQN FRUUHODWLRQ WDEOH .12) firm size, 
profitability measurHG E\ 52$ DXGLW ILUP¶V LQWHUQDWLRQDO OLQN PXOWLQDWLRQDO
parent, independent director in the board, dual leadership structure have 
significant positive association with different categories of mandatory disclosure: 
while companies liquidity measured by quick ratio, board size and company age 
measured by establishment year have non significant association with different 
categories of mandatory disclosure on the website. Only market category is 
significantly negatively associated with all the categories of disclosure. 
 
From the table 6.12 it can also be observed that under the Spearman test, 
profitability measured by ROE has only significant positive association with 
general disclosure and income statement information disclosure whereas 
leverage has significaQW QHJDWLYH DVVRFLDWLRQ ZLWK WKH GLVFORVXUH RI GLUHFWRU¶V
report information. In addition, companies liquidity measured by current ratio is 
also positively and significantly related with the disclosure of balance sheet 
items. Moreover, company ownership has significant positive association with 
JHQHUDO GLVFORVXUH GLVFORVXUH RI GLUHFWRU¶V UHSRUW DQG EDODQFH VKHHW ZKLOH
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company age measured by listed year has significant negative association with 
WKHOHYHORIFRPSDQLHV¶JHQHUDOLQIRUPDWLRQGLVFORVXUHRQWKHinternet.  
 
The results of Pearson test (table 6.13) are also supportive with Spearman tests 
where the correlation coefficient of different categories of mandatory disclosure 
DUHVLJQLILFDQWO\SRVLWLYHO\DVVRFLDWHGZLWKILUP¶VSURILWDELOLW\PHDVXUHGE\52$, 
DXGLW ILUP¶V LQWHUQDWLRQDO OLQN PXOWLQDWLRQDO SDUHQW LQGHSHQGHQW GLUHFWRU LQ WKH
board, dual leadership structure and significantly negatively associated with 
market category. However, firms profitability measured by ROE, firms liquidity 
measured by both current ratio and quick ratio and company age measured by 
both listed year and establishment year have non significant association with 
different categories of mandatory disclosure by the non-financial companies. 
 
In addition, firm size has significant positive association with general disclosure, 
GLVFORVXUHRIGLUHFWRU¶VUHSRUWDQGGLVFORVXUHRIEDODQFHVKHHWZKLOHFRPSDQLHV¶
ownership structure has significant positive association with the disclosure of 
GLUHFWRU¶V UHSRUW EDODQFH VKHHW DQG LQFRPH VWDWHment. Leverage has only 
VLJQLILFDQW QHJDWLYH DVVRFLDWLRQ ZLWK WKH GLVFORVXUH RI WKH GLUHFWRU¶V UHSRUW RQ
their website. 
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Table 66SHDUPDQ¶V&RUUHODWLRQIRU'HSHQGHQWDQG,QGHSHQGHQW9DULDEOHV0DQGDWRU\- non financial) 
 Total  
Mand Genera Direct Balsh Income 
Firm 
size ROE ROA 
Audit 
firm 
Multi 
nation 
 
Lever 
age 
Current 
ratio 
 
Quick 
Ratio 
Market  
Cate 
Ind 
director 
Board 
size 
Dual 
leadest 
Owner 
ship 
Listed 
yr 
Estab 
yr 
Total Mandat 1.00                    
General .893** 1.00                   
Director_repo .891** .825** 1.00                  
Balancesheet .943** .830** .794** 1.00                 
Incomestate .946** .802** .785** .875** 1.00                
Firm_size .351** .373** .341** .352** .257** 1.00               
ROE .175* .238** .122 .115 .200* .203* 1.00              
ROA .326** .366** .300** .284** .289** .291** .727** 1.00             
Auditfirm .344** .350** .298** .294** .315** .282** .324** .303** 1.00            
Multinational .340** .298** .283** .288** .326** .115 .276** .253** .151 1.00           
Leverage -.167* -.145 -.194* -.157 -.159 -.098 .209* -.204* .031 .097 1.00          
Currentratio .159 .115 .158 .170* .112 .191* .007 .337** .094 -.098 -.384** 1.00         
Quick Ratio .064 .028 .065 .110 .031 .117 -.035 .279** .077 -.105 -.364** .756** 1.00        
Marketcate -.302** -.288** -.308** -.277** -.270** -.293** -.307** -.398** -.210* -.141 -.036 -.239** -.246** 1.00       
Inddirector .345** .372** .408** .330** .290** .271** .154 .191* .257** .188* .035 -.022 .012 -.157 1.00      
Boardsize .157 .087 .097 .145 .161 .284** .142 .175* .350** .074 .014 .071 .098 -.121 .245** 1.00     
Roleduality .397** .413** .390** .339** .393** .099 .160 .167* .177* .157 .034 .039 .065 -.301** .238** .099 1.00    
Ownership .186* .205* .206* .170* .165 .201* .323** .122 .317** .235** .203* -.004 -.004 -.120 .242** .262** .239** 1.00   
Listedyr -.152 -.221** -.154 -.114 -.112 -.333** -.063 -.183* .003 .147 .161 -.091 -.058 .131 -.034 .091 -.064 .039 1.00  
Establishedyr -.041 -.126 -.100 -.017 -.007 -.133 .030 -.175* .124 .112 .200* -.057 -.077 .004 -.027 .156 .182* .214* .727** 1.00 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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Table 6.13: Pearson Correlation for Dependent and Independent Variables (Mandatory- non financial) 
 Total  
Manda Genera Direct Balsh Income 
Firm 
size ROE ROA 
Audit 
firm 
Multi 
nation 
Lever 
Age 
Current 
ratio 
Quick 
Ratio 
Market  
cate 
Ind 
director 
Board 
size 
Dual 
leadst 
Owner 
ship 
Listed 
yr 
Estab 
yr 
Total Mandatory 1                    
General .978** 1                   
Director_repo .870** .859** 1                  
Balancesheet .986** .961** .817** 1                 
Incomestat .979** .930** .821** .948** 1                
Firm_size .164 .195* .167* .178* .117 1               
ROE .040 .066 .087 -.015 .065 .195* 1              
ROA .279** .286** .294** .271** .255** .369** .289** 1             
Auditfirm .276** .266** .300** .242** .286** .181* .086 .313** 1            
Multinational .267** .252** .279** .239** .278** .088 .082 .221** .151 1           
Leverage -.100 -.143 -.177* -.048 -.059 0.144 -.056 -.035 .111 -.004 1          
Currentratio .120 .125 .157 .117 .100 .103 .062 .198* .032 -.111 -.140 1         
Quick Ratio .106 .107 .021 .105 .122 .000 .040 .148 -.019 -.103 -.097 .604** 1        
Marketcate -.297** -.293** -.318** -.275** -.289** -.282** -.233** -.356** -.210* -.141 .124 -.142 -.130 1       
Inddirector .378** .376** .425** .364** .348** .187* .126 .122 .238** .163 -.124 -.017 -.090 -.158 1      
Boardsize .085 .062 .103 .075 .099 .251** .128 .163 .369** .075 -.091 .000 -.045 -.122 .241** 1     
Roleduality .443** .439** .398** .420** .442** .022 .160 .180* .177* .157 -.123 .089 .102 -.301** .231** .095 1    
Ownership .186* .159 .201* .185* .184* .170* -.020 .139 .317** .235** .171* -.015 -.071 -.120 .230** .276** .239** 1   
Listedyr -.147 -.163 -.144 -.155 -.117 -.310** .019 -.142 .005 .152 -.009 -.073 -.079 .119 -.035 .052 -.054 .048 1  
Establish yr .005 -.022 -.029 -.004 .040 -.024 .060 -.034 .218** .200* .013 -.108 -.122 -.014 .028 .162 .152 .223** .534** 1 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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6.7 Correlation Analysis for Voluntary Disclosure:  
6.7.1 Correlation of Independent Variables for Voluntary Disclosure 
(combined): 
This section examines the association between the extent of total voluntary 
disclosure as the dependent variable and each of the independent variables for 
the combined sample. As diVFXVVHGHDUOLHU6SHDUPDQ¶V UDQNFRUUHODWLRQDVD
non-SDUDPHWULF WHVWDQG3HDUVRQ¶VFRUUHODWLRQDVDSDUDPHWULF WHVWKDYHEHHQ
applied in this study. Table 6.14 represents the correlation coefficient based on 
the actual data. 
 
7KH 6SHDUPDQ¶V FRUUelation coefficient in table 6.14 indicates that nine 
H[SODQDWRU\ YDULDEOHV ILUP VL]H SURILWDELOLW\ PHDVXUHG E\ 52( DXGLW ILUP¶V
international link, industry type, multinational parent, liquidity, independent 
director in the board, board size and dual leadership structure) are significantly 
and positively associated with the level of total voluntary disclosure on the 
ZHEVLWH 2Q WKH RWKHU KDQG PDUNHW FDWHJRU\ DQG FRPSDQ\¶V OLVWLQJ \HDU DUH
significantly and negatively associated with the level of voluntary disclosure.  
 
This result suggests that the larger the size of the company, the more 
information is voluntarily disclosed. Similarly, companies with high profitability 
(measured by ROE), audited by Big four audit firm, financial companies, 
multinational parents, higher liquidity position, high number of independent 
directors in the board, large board size and dual leadership structure in the 
board  are willing to disclose more voluntary information on their website. 
However, the correlation coefficient suggests a weak or non-significant 
DVVRFLDWLRQ EHWZHHQ WKH OHYHO RI WRWDO YROXQWDU\ GLVFORVXUH DQG D FRPSDQ\¶V
SURILWDELOLW\ PHDVXUHG E\ 52$ D FRPSDQ\¶V RZQHUVKLS VWUXFWXUH DQG LWV
establishment year. 
 
As indicated in table 6.14 the Pearson correlation coefficient supports the result 
IURP WKH 6SHDUPDQ WHVW LQ UHVSHFW RI ILUP VL]H DXGLW ILUP¶V LQWHUQDWLRQDO OLQN
industry type, multinational parent, liquidity, market category, independent 
director, board size and dual leadership structure, All these variables are 
significantly associated with the level of total voluntary disclosure at 1% and 5% 
significance level. However, results regarding the profitability measured by ROA 
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and companies listing year are found to be significant under Spearman test but 
they are non- significant according to the Pearson test. 
 
Table 6.14: Correlation between Voluntary Disclosure and Independent 
Variables (combined) 
Variables Spearman Pearson 
Firm size .625** .538** 
ROE .216** .076 
ROA -.001 .016 
Audit firm .434** .450** 
Industry category .347** .365** 
Multinational parent .254** .291** 
Liquidity .166* .132* 
Market category -.332** -.310** 
Independent director .340** .315** 
Board size .297** .253** 
Dual leadership structure .425** .387** 
Ownership structure .104 .108 
Listing year -.130* -.086 
Establishment year -.100 .029 
 
6.7.2 Categorical Independent Variables for Voluntary Disclosure: 
To test the association between the dependent variable and the different 
categories of independent variable, Spearman and Pearson correlation tests 
have been employed. From the table 6.15 and 6.16, it can be concluded that 
ILUP VL]H DXGLW ILUP¶V LQWHUQDWLRQDO OLQN LQGXVWU\ W\SH PXOWLQDWLRQDO SDUHQW
independent director in the board, board size and dual leadership structure are 
significantly and positively associated with the different categories of voluntary 
disclosure on the website while establishment year has a non significant 
negative association. 
 
According to Spearman correlation coefficient profitability measured by ROE is 
significantly positively associated with all the categories of voluntary disclosure 
except environmental disclosure on the web but profitability measured by ROA 
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has only significant negative association with environmental and investor 
related disclosure. Liquidity has also significant positive association with 
strategic information disclosure, corporate governance disclosure, financial 
disclosure, sustainability disclosure and investor related information. Market 
category is significantly negatively associated withall the categories of voluntary 
disclosure except environmental disclosure. Both ownership structure and 
companies listing year have mixed result. While ownership structure has a 
positively significant relationship with general disclosure, CSR and investor 
related information disclosure, companies listing year has significant negative 
association with general disclosure, corporate governance and investor related 
information disclosure on the web. 
 
In case of Pearson correlation, profitability measured by ROE and ROA and 
companies establishment year has no significant relationship with the different 
FDWHJRULHV RI YROXQWDU\ GLVFORVXUH RQ WKH ZHE &RPSDQ\¶V OLTXLGLW\ DQG
ownership structure have significant positive association and listing year has 
significant negative association with investor related information disclosure on 
WKH ZHE &RPSDQ\¶V OLTXLGLW\ KDV DOVR VLJQLILFDQW SRVLWLYH DVVRFLDWLRQ ZLWK
FRUSRUDWH JRYHUQDQFH GLVFORVXUH ZKHUHDV D FRPSDQ\¶V RZQHUVKLS VWUXFWXUH
has a significant positiYHUHODWLRQVKLSZLWK&65GLVFORVXUH+RZHYHUFRPSDQ\¶V
listing year has a significant negative relationship with general disclosure and 
corporate governance disclosure on the web. Market category has a significant 
negative association with all the categories of voluntary disclosure except 
environmental disclosure on websites. 
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Table 66SHDUPDQ¶V&RUUHODWLRQIRU'HSHQGHQWDQG,QGHSHQGHQW9DULDEOHV9ROXQWDU\- combined) 
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Voluntary 1.00                        
General .864** 1.00                       
Strategic .870** .828** 1.00                      
Governance .888** .785** .755** 1.00                     
Financial .914** .767** .791** .826** 1.00                    
CSR .768** .624** .667** .598** .635** 1.00                   
Environmental .672** .495** .506** .517** .530** .722** 1.00                  
Sustainability .871** .673** .718** .754** .765** .721** .662** 1.00                 
Investor .751** .635** .653** .592** .641** .488** .413** .578** 1.00                
Presentation .719** .580** .551** .537** .604** .517** .466** .588** .681** 1.00               
Firm_size .625** .498** .488** .530** .541** .630** .543** .578** .360** .493** 1.00              
ROE .216** .147* .139* .194** .193** .157* .089 .186** .277** .227** .122 1.00             
ROA -.001 -.002 .036 .018 .009 -.089 -.159* -.067 .164* .049 -.163* .670** 1.00            
Auditfirm .434** .335** .360** .434** .451** .388** .313** .380** .222** .264** .394** .190** -.024 1.00           
Industry .347** .226** .242** .304** .361** .249** .232** .407** .162* .233** .333** .132* -.098 .104 1.00          
Multinational .254** .186** .201** .243** .178** .243** .263** .238** .209** .201** .147* .168* .070 .100 -.050 1.00         
Currentratio .166* .099 .161* .153* .148* .104 .033 .159* .131* .094 .250** .072 .140* .098 .242** -.050 1.00        
Marketcate -.332** -.351** -.315** -.340** -.335** -.199** -.119 -.206** -.273** -.240** -.267** -.308** -.301** -.190** -.207** -.109 -.191** 1.00       
inddirector .340** .358** .311** .356** .318** .193** .155* .228** .264** .259** .236** .061 .030 .205** .217** .140* -.005 -.147* 1.00      
Boardsize .297** .193** .195** .262** .319** .207** .186** .325** .193** .254** .297** .221** .073 .195** .745** -.005 .128* -.244** .269** 1.00     
Roleduality .425** .400** .354** .434** .391** .263** .191** .364** .336** .255** .187** .171** .065 .162* .266** .112 .106 -.340** .231** .247** 1.00    
Ownership .104 .134* .104 .121 .074 .158* .056 .001 .132* -.014 .077 .083 -.017 .194** -.132* .161* .010 -.044 .079 -.024 .131* 1.00   
Listedyr -.130* -.137* -.125 -.144* -.087 -.096 -.025 -.094 -.162* -.087 -.163* -.079 -.171** .021 -.099 .145* -.073 .150* -.077 -.065 -.100 .000 1.00  
Establish yr -.100 -.079 -.117 -.122 -.074 -.062 -.038 -.077 -.118 -.029 -.073 -.041 -.148* .106 -.202** .109 -.065 .025 -.062 -.124 .102 .183** .749 1 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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Table 6.16: Pearson Correlation for Dependent and Independent Variables (Voluntary- combined) 
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Voluntary 1                        
General .813** 1                       
Strategic .844** .734** 1                      
Governance .847** .792** .703** 1                     
Financial .882** .769** .750** .859** 1                    
CSR .830** .549** .692** .553** .592** 1                   
Environmental .728** .417** .519** .420** .470** .777** 1                  
Sustainability .884** .605** .734** .635** .684** .839** .750** 1                 
Investor .716** .631** .590** .589** .627** .450** .413** .486** 1                
Presentation .719** .592** .518** .535** .593** .489** .469** .563** .670** 1               
Firm_size .538** .386** .400** .425** .436** .527** .407** .531** .301** .426** 1              
ROE .076 .100 .076 .056 .099 .040 .024 .055 .067 .052 .170** 1             
ROA .016 .048 .047 .068 .064 -.077 -.090 -.028 .080 .048 .081 .354** 1            
Auditfirm .450** .319** .378** .394** .429** .403** .302** .442** .224** .263** .319** .043 -.029 1           
Industry .365** .234** .249** .296** .344** .312** .242** .444** .144* .233** .343** .101 .155* .104 1          
Multinational .291** .186** .202** .228** .180** .314** .304** .259** .228** .214** .138* .043 -.006 .100 -.050 1         
Currentratio .132* .119 .118 .132* .123 .077 .065 .117 .129* .072 .182** .091 .156* .084 .190** -.076 1        
Marketcate -.310** -.354** -.282** -.346** -.345** -.176** -.087 -.200** -.270** -.235** -.288** -.234** -.179** -.190** -.207** -.109 -.113 1       
inddirector .315** .321** .270** .330** .300** .235** .179** .220** .233** .255** .201** .096 .049 .173** .231** .122 -.031 -.146* 1      
Boardsize .253** .169** .164* .193** .255** .206** .137* .270** .172** .221** .249** .143* .215** .111 .732** -.019 .022 -.219** .278** 1     
Roleduality .387** .429** .314** .452** .401** .230** .167* .277** .316** .237** .136* .172** .108 .162* .266** .112 .123 -.340** .215** .224** 1    
Ownership .108 .125 .123 .109 .076 .153* .068 .032 .133* -.011 .047 -.059 -.077 .194** -.132* .161* .011 -.044 .046 -.078 .131* 1   
Listedyr -.086 -.152* -.070 -.146* -.090 .003 .036 -.024 -.147* -.078 -.168* -.018 -.137* .047 -.150* .159* -.050 .126 -.096 -.101 -.089 .036 1  
Establishedyr .029 -.013 -.003 -.076 -.009 .063 .104 .080 -.007 .086 -.044 .028 -.060 .170** -.212** .177** -.093 .016 -.041 -.107 .083 .205** .575** 1 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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6.7.3 Correlation of Independent Variables for Voluntary Disclosure (Non 
Financial): 
To start the analysis, this section examines the association between the extent 
of total voluntary disclosure as the dependent variable and each of the 
independent variables for non-financial companies in Bangladesh. As the data 
VHW LVQRQSDUDPHWULF WKH6SHDUPDQ¶V UDQNFRUUHODWLRQ LVXVHGILUVW WR WHVW WKH
association between the variables. After that the study uses Pearson correlation 
coefficient. 
Table 6.17: Correlation between Voluntary Disclosure and Independent 
Variables 
Variables Spearman Pearson 
Firm size .478** .324** 
ROE .315** .107 
ROA .422** .408** 
Audit firm .370** .405** 
Multinational parent .018 -.068 
Leverage .307** .391** 
Current ratio .123 .047 
Quick ratio .031 .025 
Market category -.339** -.324** 
Independent director .437** .419** 
Board size .163 .188* 
Dual leadership structure .441** .410** 
Ownership structure .224** .259** 
Listed year -.201* -.139 
Established year -.090 .151 
 
From the table 6.17 it can be observed that both Spearman rank correlation 
coefficient and Pearson correlation coefficient found eight explanatory variables 
that are significantly associated with the level of disclosing voluntary information 
on the internet. While firm si]H SURILWDELOLW\ PHDVXUHG E\ 52$ DXGLW ILUP¶V
international link, leverage, independent director in the board, dual leadership 
structure and ownership structure are all positively and significantly associated 
with the level of voluntary disclosure, market category is significantly negatively 
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associated with the disclosure level. This suggest that large companies with 
high profitability (measured by ROA) , companies which are audited by one of 
the Big four audit firms and who have independent director in the board, dual 
leadership structure in the board and firms which are sponsored companies are 
more willing to disclose voluntary information on their website. 
 
It is also notable that multinational firms, companies with liquidity measured by 
both current ratio and quick ratio and company age measured by the 
establishment year have a non-significant association with voluntary disclosure 
level. 0RUHRYHUDFFRUGLQJWRWKH6SHDUPDQWHVWILUP¶VSURILWDELOLW\PHDVXUHGE\
ROE is significantly positively associated with the level of disclosing voluntary 
information on the internet. However, the Pearson test found a non-significant 
association between them. Similarly, while the Spearman test found company 
age measured by listed year, has a significant negative association with the 
disclosure level, it had a non-significant association in Pearson test. The 
Pearson test found a significant positive association between board size and 
the level of disclosure, whereas Spearman found a non-significant association 
between them. 
 
6.7.4 Categorical Independent Variables for Voluntary Disclosure (Non 
Financial Companies): 
The correlation between the different categories of voluntary disclosure and the 
determinants of disclosure is shown in the table 6.18 and table 6.19 for non-
financial companies by using the Spearman Rank correlation and the Pearson 
correlation coefficient respectively. Under both methods, profitability measured 
E\ 52$ DXGLW ILUP¶V LQWHUQDWLRQDO OLQN DQG OHYHUDJH KDYH VLJQLILFDQW SRVLWLYH
association with different categories of voluntary disclosure, while companies 
liquidity measured by quick ratio, and multinational companies have non 
significant association with different categories of voluntary disclosure on the 
website. 
 
From the table 6.18  it can also be observed that under the Spearman test, firm 
size, profitability measured by ROE, independent director in the board, dual 
leadership structure have significant positive association with all the different 
FDWHJRULHV RI YROXQWDU\ GLVFORVXUH &RPSDQLHV¶ liquidity, measured by current 
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ratio, has significant positive association with the disclosure of investor related 
information on the internet. Market category has significant negative association 
with all the categories of voluntary disclosure except environmental disclosure, 
while board size has only significant positive association with corporate social 
responsibility disclosure (CSR). Again company ownership structure has 
significant positive association with all the categories of voluntary disclosure 
except environmental disclosure, sustainability disclosure and presentation 
format. On the other hand company age measured by listed year has significant 
negative association with all the categories except financial information 
disclosure, environmental disclosure and presentation format of voluntary 
disclosure, while establishment year has non-significant association with all the 
categories of disclosure. 
 
According to the Pearson correlation coefficient (table 6.19), firm size, 
independent directors in the board, company ownership structure and dual 
leadership structure have significant positive association and market category 
has significant negative association with all the different categories of voluntary 
disclosure except environmental disclosure. CompDQLHV¶SURILWDELOLW\PHDVXUHG
by ROE and companies liquidity measured by current ratio has non-significant 
DVVRFLDWLRQ ZLWK GLIIHUHQW FDWHJRULHV RI GLVFORVXUH :KLOH D FRPSDQ\¶V ERDUG
size has a significant positive association with corporate social responsibility 
reporting and sustainability disclosure; company age, measured by 
establishment year, has a significant positive association with CSR, 
environmental disclosure and sustainability disclosure on the internet. On the 
other hand company age measured by listed year has a significant negative 
association with general disclosure, corporate governance disclosure and 
investor related information disclosure on the web.  
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Table 6.18: Spearman Correlation for Dependent and Independent Variables (Voluntary- non financial) 
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Voluntary 1.000                         
General .866** 1.000                        
Strategic .855** .823** 1.000                       
Governance .879** .766** .740** 1.000                      
Financial .905** .766** .760** .826** 1.000                     
CSR .668** .529** .546** .485** .510** 1.000                    
Environmental .542** .370** .379** .359** .398** .640** 1.000                   
Sustainability .838** .607** .698** .692** .735** .648** .556** 1.000                  
Investor .816** .684** .676** .633** .694** .480** .384** .630** 1.000                 
Presentation .738** .630** .551** .551** .601** .491** .357** .561** .706** 1.000                
Firm_size .478** .416** .390** .365** .401** .520** .343** .358** .384** .452** 1.000               
ROE .315** .254** .200* .271** .256** .310** .196* .289** .319** .247** .203* 1.000              
ROA .422** .315** .351** .402** .369** .355** .284** .352** .371** .268** .291** .727** 1.000             
Auditfirm .370** .265** .285** .395** .403** .338** .177* .304** .265** .242** .282** .324** .303** 1.000            
Multinational .018 -.029 .058 .025 .082 -.011 -.122 -.030 .048 -.061 .110 -.037 .281** .073 1.000           
Leverage .307** .215* .260** .292** .240** .266** .291** .280** .244** .214* .115 .276** .253** .151 -.107 1.000          
Currentratio .123 .075 .156 .080 .155 .093 -.047 .072 .169* .058 .190* .008 .338** .093 .755** -.098 1.000         
Quickratio .031 -.014 .072 .040 .092 -.003 -.119 -.024 .055 -.049 .121 -.036 .277** .079 .776** -.104 .758** 1.000        
Marketcate -.339** -.380** -.323** -.345** -.303** -.192* -.105 -.202* -.304** -.244** -.293** -.307** -.398** -.210* -.248** -.141 -.239** -.246** 1.000       
inddirector .437** .422** .405** .442** .406** .200* .202* .222** .369** .344** .271** .154 .191* .257** .011 .188* -.022 .017 -.157 1.000      
Boardsize .163 .090 .111 .124 .161 .181* .140 .130 .131 .145 .284** .142 .175* .350** .105 .074 .070 .100 -.121 .245** 1.000     
Roleduality .441** .435** .376** .461** .391** .266** .177* .369** .349** .243** .099 .160 .167* .177* .068 .157 .039 .064 -.301** .238** .099 1.000    
Ownership .224** .240** .168* .226** .169* .287** .162 .128 .218** .105 .201* .323** .122 .317** -.012 .235** -.005 -.001 -.120 .242** .262** .239** 1.000   
Listedyr -.201* -.174* -.196* -.169* -.119 -.205* -.148 -.182* -.192* -.133 -.333** -.063 -.183* .003 -.061 .147 -.091 -.057 .131 -.034 .091 -.064 .039 1.000  
Establishedyr -.090 -.057 -.127 -.103 -.053 -.078 -.058 -.066 -.085 .024 -.133 .030 -.175* .124 -.080 .112 -.058 -.076 .004 -.027 .156 .182* .214* .727** 1.0 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).  *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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Table 6.19: Pearson Correlation for Dependent and Independent Variables (Voluntary- non financial) 
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Voluntary 1                         
General .818** 1                        
Strategic .817** .700** 1                       
Governance .853** .766** .683** 1                      
Financial .886** .763** .715** .852** 1                     
CSR .728** .438** .569** .458** .467** 1                    
Environmental .600** .313** .385** .294** .361** .643** 1                   
Sustainability .836** .533** .693** .583** .639** .809** .644** 1                  
Investor .799** .670** .634** .627** .685** .462** .407** .561** 1                 
Presentation .730** .634** .509** .534** .597** .414** .385** .518** .699** 1                
Firm_size .324** .265** .259** .248** .257** .278** .137 .275** .282** .324** 1               
ROE .107 .120 .100 .055 .113 .103 .070 .104 .072 .040 .195* 1              
ROA .408** .296** .317** .351** .335** .416** .255** .407** .310** .168* .369** .289** 1             
Auditfirm .405** .259** .308** .367** .399** .366** .194* .387** .264** .234** .181* .086 .313** 1            
Multinational -.068 -.040 -.033 -.041 -.013 -.083 -.107 -.073 -.017 -.107 -.011 .038 .140 -.032 1           
Leverage .391** .216* .297** .295** .264** .446** .406** .381** .250** .235** .088 .082 .221** .151 -.108 1          
Currentratio .047 .078 .102 .072 .122 -.032 -.090 -.045 .104 -.018 .103 .063 .198* .031 .564** -.111 1         
Quickratio .025 .055 .083 .076 .116 -.059 -.128 -.060 .067 -.037 .085 .057 .182* .013 .622** -.121 .756** 1        
Marketcate -.324** -.357** -.285** -.346** -.316** -.175* -.059 -.198* -.293** -.230** -.282** -.233** -.356** -.210* -.136 -.141 -.143 -.158 1       
Inddirector .419** .383** .358** .451** .405** .219** .158 .210* .355** .369** .187* .126 .122 .238** -.091 .163 -.018 .006 -.158 1      
Boardsize .188* .071 .122 .130 .157 .258** .095 .174* .137 .165 .251** .128 .163 .369** -.017 .075 .000 -.003 -.122 .241** 1     
Roleduality .410** .439** .330** .455** .388** .225** .149 .291** .335** .216* .022 .160 .180* .177* .111 .157 .089 .110 -.301** .231** .095 1    
Ownership .259** .225** .197* .223** .180* .327** .132 .215* .222** .114 .170* -.020 .139 .317** -.099 .235** -.016 -.011 -.120 .230** .276** .239** 1   
Listedyr -.139 -.175* -.122 -.167* -.111 -.048 .015 -.084 -.182* -.111 -.310** .019 -.142 .005 -.090 .152 -.073 -.083 .119 -.035 .052 -.054 .048 1  
Establish yr .151 .044 .057 -.024 .070 .198* .256** .322** .050 .191* -.024 .060 -.034 .218** -.127 .200* -.109 -.123 -.014 .028 .162 .152 .223** .534** 1 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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6.8 Conclusion: 
The main objective of this chapter is to empirically investigate the first two 
research question in two phases of analysis. Firstly, it examines the extent of 
mandatory disclosure on the internet by the Bangladeshi companies and 
secondly, it examines the extent of voluntary disclosure on the internet. It 
provides the descriptive analysis for this study. The results at least provide 
some sort of knowledge about corporate internet reporting practices in 
emerging economies, and Bangladesh in particular. 
 
From the findings it is revealed that the level of total mandatory disclosure on 
the internet by the listed companies in Bangladesh is low. Among the categories 
of mandatory disclosure, companies disclose the most information regarding 
JHQHUDO FRUSRUDWH LQIRUPDWLRQ DQG WKH OHDVW LQIRUPDWLRQ UHJDUGLQJ GLUHFWRU¶V
report. Nevertheless, the available literature also reveals that overall 
compliance with mandatory disclosure by Bangladeshi firms is low (for example 
Akhtaruddin 2005). Nurunnabi and Monirul (2012) also found that more than 
95% of the companies did not disclose the IFRSs or ISA compliance on the 
internet in Bangladesh. They (Akhtaruddin 2005; Nurunnabi and Monirul 2012) 
also indicated that there are lacks of regulatory enforcement on corporate 
governance compliance in Bangladesh. Moreover, Nurunnabi and Monirul 
(2012) suggested that political connectedness and corruption are the root 
causes of non-compliance standards. 
 
In the case of voluntary disclosure, the extent of disclosure is lower than the 
mandatory disclosure level. The most information disclosed on the internet is 
concerned with general corporate information and the least information is 
disclosed concerning corporate environmental information. The results also 
identified that the banking sector discloses the highest level of information while 
the tannery sector discloses the lowest level of information on the internet. This 
chapter also includes the correlation analysis between the dependent and 
independent variables and revealed a number of significant correlations 
between them. These suggest that some of the hypotheses can potentially be 
supported. To further assess the potential impact of these independent 
variables the regression analysis is performed which is discussed in the next 
chapter (chapter seven). 
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Charter: 7 
Determinants of Corporate Internet Reporting 
7.1 Introduction: 
The previous chapter (chapter six) provides the descriptive analysis of the study 
and identified the extent of mandatory and voluntary disclosure on the internet 
by the Bangladeshi companies. The aim of this chapter is to answer the third 
research question ± what are the determinants of disclosing mandatory and 
voluntary information on the internet? The current study examines the 
relationship between total mandatory and voluntary disclosure as a dependent 
variable and a number of independent variables; firm size, profitability 
PHDVXUHGE\ERWK52(DQG52$DXGLW ILUP¶V LQWHrnational link, industry type, 
multinational parents, liquidity, market category, independent directors in the 
board, board size, dual leadership structure, ownership structure, and company 
age measured by both listing year and establishment year. 
 
This chapter starts with a bivariate analysis of mandatory and voluntary 
disclosure in section 7.2. Section 7.3 represents the multiple regression models 
and section 7.4 describes the regression diagnostic for the mandatory and 
voluntary data set. Finally, regression analysis and hypothesis testing are 
discussed in section 7.5 followed by a conclusion in section 7.6. 
 
7.2 Bivariate Analysis: 
In order to identify the factors affecting the mandatory and voluntary disclosure 
level on the internet, the current study applies bivariate analysis. Bivariate 
analysis is one of the simplest forms of quantitative analysis (Babbie 2009). It 
involves the analysis of two variables for the purpose of determining the 
empirical relationship between them. In order to see if the variables are related 
to one another, bivariate analysis can be helpful in testing 
hypotheses of association.  Here each independent variable is examined 
against the dependent variable separately.   
 
The result of bivariate analysis helps to identify whether the selection of 
variables is appropriate or not. As it measures the association of how well 
independent variable relates to the dependent variable, the result is specific. 
So, this type of analysis is more suitable only to examine two variables.  This 
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study applies bivariate analysis to identify the appropriateness of independent 
variables. 
 
7.2.1 Mandatory Disclosure: 
Table 7.1 and table 7.2 provide the results of the bivariate analysis of 
mandatory disclosure for both the combined and the non-financial sample 
respectively. From table 7.1 it can be observed that profitability measured by 
52(DQG52$DXGLWILUP¶VLQWHUQDWLRQDOOLQNLQGXVWU\W\SHPXOWLQDWLRQDOSDUHQW
independent directors in the board, board size, and dual leadership structure 
have significant positive association with the level of mandatory disclosure on 
the internet at 1% level. While, firm size and liquidity measured by current ratio 
have significant positive association with the level of mandatory disclosure, 
company age measured by number of listed years and market category have 
significant negative association at 5% level.  
 
Table 7.1: Bivariate Analysis for Mandatory Disclosure (Combined) 
Total Coefficient T 
Firmsize 0.0790 2.06** 
ROE 0.0322 2.63*** 
ROA 0.2264 3.94*** 
Audit Firm 0.2315 7.16*** 
Industry type 0.1427 3.9*** 
Multi Parent 0.1444 2.89*** 
Current Ratio 0.0107 1.8* 
Mkt Category -0.2929 -5.3*** 
Inde. Director 0.0955 5.03*** 
Board Size 0.0126 3*** 
Dual Leadership 0.3928 7.23*** 
Ownership 0.0571 1.47 
No Listed Year -0.0040 -2.12** 
No Estab Year -0.0006 -0.45 
 
Table 7.2 provides the result of bivariate analysis for mandatory disclosure on 
the internet: it can be observed that the result is quite different from the results 
 - 174 - 
 
for mandatory disclosure for the combined sample. Profitability measured by 
52$DXGLW ILUP¶V LQWHUQDWLRQDO OLQNPXOWLQDWLRQDOSDUHQW LQGHSHQGHQWGLUHFWRUV
in the board, and dual leadership structure are positively and significantly 
associated with the level of disclosure (at 1% level) by non-financial companies. 
In addition, profitability measured by ROE, ownership structure, and liquidity 
measured by quick ratio has significant positive association with the disclosure 
of mandatory information. Only market category, company age measured by 
number of listed years, and leverage has a significant negative association. 
 
       Table 7.2: Bivariate Analysis for Mandatory Disclosure (Non Financial) 
Total Coefficient T 
Firm Size 0.0492 1.01 
ROE 0.0177 1.66* 
ROA 1.0985 4*** 
Audit  Firms 0.2381 4.54*** 
Multi Parent 0.2439 4.23*** 
Current Ratio 0.0265 1.55 
Mkt Category -0.2441 -3.78*** 
Inde Director 0.1534 5.48*** 
Board Size 0.0161 1.27 
Dual Leadership 0.3495 5.76*** 
Ownership 0.1190 2.23** 
No Listed Year -0.0042 -1.81* 
No Est Year 0.0001 0.06 
Leverage -0.0038 -1.81* 
Quick Ratio 0.0266 1.7* 
 
7.2.2 Voluntary Disclosure: 
Table 7.3 represents the results of voluntary disclosure on the internet for 
combined sample. In this case, firm size, profitability measured by ROE, audit 
ILUP¶V LQWHUQDWLRQDO OLQN LQGXVWU\ W\SH PXOWLQDWLRQDO SDUHQWV LQGHSHQGHQW
directors in the board, board size, and dual leadership structure have significant 
positive association and market category has significant negative association 
with the level of voluntary disclosure on the internet at the 1% level. Moreover, 
 - 175 - 
 
ownership structure has also significant positive association with the level of 
voluntary disclosure. 
 
Table 7.3: Bivariate Analysis for Voluntary Disclosure (Combined) 
Total Coefficient T 
Firm Size 0.1006 3.24*** 
ROE 0.0258 3.93*** 
ROA 0.0181 0.36 
Audit Firms 0.2277 7.62*** 
Industry Type 0.1501 5.74*** 
Multi Parent 0.1748 4.17*** 
Current Ratio 0.0031 0.66 
Mkt Category -0.1863 -6.96*** 
Inde Director 0.0665 4.72*** 
Board Size 0.0118 3.84*** 
Dual Leadership 0.2296 10.56*** 
Ownership 0.0437 1.65* 
No Listed Year -0.0017 -1.36 
No Est Year 0.0004 0.27 
 
In the case of voluntary disclosure of non-financial companies (table 7.4), firm 
VL]HSURILWDELOLW\PHDVXUHGE\ERWK52(DQG52$DXGLWILUP¶VLQWHUQDWLRQDOOLQN
multinational parent, independent directors in the board, board size, dual 
leadership structure, and ownership structure have significant positive 
association and market category and leverage have significant negative 
association with the level of disclosure on the internet.   
 
Table 7.4: Bivariate Analysis for Voluntary Disclosure (Non-Financial) 
Total Coefficient T 
Firm Size 0.0518 1.93** 
ROA 0.0251 2.4** 
ROA 0.8596 5.4*** 
Audit Firms 0.1873 4.74*** 
Multi Parent 0.1911 3.96*** 
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Current Ratio 0.0055 0.74 
Mkt Category -0.1428 -5.28*** 
Independent 0.0909 6.22*** 
Board Size 0.0179 2.62** 
Dual Leadership 0.1730 7.22*** 
Ownership 0.0883 3.18*** 
No Listed Year -0.0021 -1.58 
No Est Year 0.0013 1.12 
Leverage -0.0025 -2.69*** 
Quick Ratio 0.0033 0.45 
 
7.3 Multiple Regression Model: 
The result of bivariate analysis is specific, so to generalise the result of this 
study multivariate analysis is applied. Multivariate analysis can statistically 
estimate relationships between different variables, and correlate how important 
each one is to the final outcome and where dependencies exist between them. 
This gives a much richer and realistic picture than looking at a single variable 
and provides a powerful test of significance compared to bivariate analysis. 
 
As the study contains two dependent variables and two or more independent 
YDULDEOHV WKH UHJUHVVLRQ PRGHO LV VDLG WR EH µPXOWLSOH UHJUHVVLRQ¶ ZKLFK LV
considered to be relevant and the basic choice for the relationship form 
between dependent and independents variables, is linear. So the model is 
called "multiple linear regression model".  
 
$FFRUGLQJWR$ILILHWDOS³WKHH[SUHVVLRQ0XOWLYDULDWHDQDO\VLVLVXVHG
to describe analyses of data that are multivariate in the sense that numerous 
REVHUYDWLRQV RU YDULDEOHV DUH REWDLQHG IRU HDFK LQGLYLGXDO RU XQLW VWXGLHG´
Among multivariate analyses, regression analysis is one of the most common 
and widely used techniques in statistical analysis especially in disclosure 
literature (Cooke 1998). It is mainly used in situations where there is one or a 
group of dependent variables that is thought to be a result of one or more 
independent variables; the changes in the values of independents explain most 
of the changes in dependents' values (Abdel-Fattah 2008). 
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According to Hutcheson and Sofroniou (1999), the Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) regression is considered to be a powerful technique especially when the 
model contains continuous and dummy variables. Gujarati (2003) also suggest 
that under certain assumptions, the method of least squares has some very 
attractive statistical properties that have made it one of the most powerful and 
popular methods of regression analysis. The following sections present the 
regression diagnostics that represent the first step in choosing the relevant 
statistical method to analyse the collected data in the current study. 
 
7.4 Regression Diagnostic: 
Cooke (1998) suggested that detailed data screening is important in disclosure 
studies to identify the impact of non linearity problems with the problems of 
outliers before deciding the proper statistical method. There are a number of 
ways to estimate regression coefficients. Linear regression is usually used; the 
OLS method. To justify using OLS, there are four principal assumptions: 
 
1. Linearity: The regression model is linear in the parameters. It means that the 
relationship should be linear between the dependent variable and each 
independent variable. 
 
2. Independence and normality of error: The error terms are independent and 
have a zero population mean. It means that the error terms are not correlated 
DQGQRUPDOO\GLVWULEXWHGZLWKFRQVWDQWPHDQ]HURDQGFRQVWDQWYDULDQFHı2. 
 
3. Homoscedasticity: The variance of the error terms is constant or same for 
each observation. 
 
4. There are no perfect linear relationships among the explanatory variables (no 
multicollinearity). 
 
If one or more of these assumptions do not hold, then the results of the 
regression model will be inefficient or misleading. After running a multiple linear 
regression analysis and estimating the values of the dependent variable (TVDS) 
and therefore residuals (errors), one can check if the OLS linear regression is a 
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good choice or not by performing some model diagnostics that are basically 
based on checking the OLS linear regression assumptions. 
 
7.4.1 Regression Diagnostic for Mandatory Disclosure: 
7.4.1.1 Checking Linearity (Mandatory): 
There needs to be a linear relationship between the dependent and 
independent variables. There are a number of ways to check the type of linear 
relationship that exists between the variables. By using STATA/SPSS, one can 
plot the dependent variable against independent variable, and then visually 
inspect the scatter plot to see how well the fitted regression line represents their 
relationship. Linearity can also be checked by plotting the residuals against the 
independent variable values, and if the relationship is linear, then there will be 
no obvious clustering of positive residuals or a clustering of negative residuals. 
The graphs (for mandatory data) indicate that most of the independent variables 
in the study do not have a linear relationship with the dependent variable. This 
may be because there are some outliers or unusual observations in the data set 
or may be the linear model is not a good fit to describe the relationship between 
the variables. So the linearity assumption is not satisfied and therefore the OLS 
estimators related to the nonlinear relationship variables will not be unbiased. 
However, this result of non-linearity is common in the majority of prior disclosure 
studies (Cooke 1998). The results are given in the appendix C. 
 
7.4.1.2 Checking Normality of Residuals (Mandatory): 
Normality of residuals means that errors (residuals) should be normally 
distributed. It is necessary only for the hypothesis tests to be valid. This study 
applied two methods - graphical methods and numerical methods.  
 
Graphical Methods: 
The most common plots to check the normality assumption are: 
x Q-Q plot 
x P-P plot 
x Histogram 
x Density estimate 
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Figure 7-1: Q-Q plot (Mandatory) 
 
 
Figure 7-2: P-P Plot (Mandatory) 
 
Figure 7-3: Normal curve and Kernel density estimate (Mandatory) 
 
Numerical Method of Normality Test: 
To test the normality there are many numerical methods that can be used. This 
study use Shapiro ±Wilk W statistic as it has been shown to have a good power 
against a wide range of non normal distribution. On the other hand Kolmogorov 
± Smirnov D statistic tends to reject the null hypothesis when the sample size is 
-
1
-
.
5
0
.
5
1
-.5 0 .5
Inverse Normal
0
.
5
1
1
.
5
0 .5 1 1.5
Inverse Normal
0.
00
0.
25
0.
50
0.
75
1.
00
0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00
Empirical P[i] = i/(N+1)
0.
00
0.
25
0.
50
0.
75
1.
00
0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00
Empirical P[i] = i/(N+1)
0
.
5
1
1.
5
2
-1 -.5 0 .5 1
Residual
Kernel density estimate
Normal density
kernel = epanechnikov, bandwidth = 0.0608
Kernel density estimate
0
.
5
1
1.
5
2
2.
5
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Total
Kernel density estimate
Normal density
kernel = epanechnikov, bandwidth = 0.0902
Kernel density estimate
 - 180 - 
 
large and accept when the sample the size is small. According to Shapiro ±Wilk 
W test, if the p value is small then the data may not be considered as normally 
distributed. By using Skewness it is also possible to find out how non symmetric 
the distribution is. Afifi et al. (2004) suggested that if the data are normally 
distributed then the value of skewness will be close to zero. Table 7.5 and 7.6 
presents the results of two common tests: Skewness ± kurtosis and Shapiro ± 
Wilk W for both the residuals and dependent variables for mandatory data. 
 
Table 7.5: Skewness / Kurtosis Test for Normality (Mandatory) 
Variable Obs Pr(Skewness) Pr(Kurtosis)   adj chi2(2) Prob>chi2 
R 234 0.0037 0.5585 8.11 0.0173 
Total 234 0.0000 0.0000 40.78 0 
 
Table 7.6: Shapiro-Wilk W test for Normal data (Mandatory) 
 
 
 
 
 
Both the graphical and numerical method suggests the same result. It can be 
observed that the data set is not normally distributed and this is mainly related 
to the skewness of the distribution. 
 
7.4.1.3 Checking Homoscedasticity of Residuals (Mandatory): 
The assumption of homoscedasticity means that variance of the error terms is 
constant for each observation. To check this homoscedasticity one can use 
both graphical and numerical methods. Graphically, one can look at plots of 
residuals versus predicted values and numerically STATA provides two 
methods for heteroscedasticity test; Cameron &Trivedi's decomposition of IM 
test and Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg and White's tests. This study uses 
both the graphical and numerical methods. 
 
Graphical Method: 
 
Variable Obs W V Z Prob>z 
R 234 0.96301 6.330 4.279 0.00001 
Total 234 0.78659 36.52 8.343 0 
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Figure 7-4: The Relationship between Residuals and Predicted Values 
(Mandatory) 
 
 
Numerical test of Heteroscedasticity: 
Tables 8.7 and 8.8 present the results of numerical tests for mandatory 
disclosure. 
 
Table 7.7: Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg and White tests (Mandatory) 
Test Chi-square Prob>chi2 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg 26.82 0.0000 
:KLWH¶V 156.60 0.0035 
 
Table 7&DPHURQ	7ULYHGL¶V'HFRPSRVLWLRQRI,0WHVW0DQGDWRU\ 
Source Chi-square Df Prob>chi2 
Heteroscedasticity 156.60 112 0.0035 
Skewness 84.51 14 0.0000 
Kurtosis 0.37 1 0.5449 
Total 241.47 127 0.0000 
 
From the table it can be concluded that errors have non-constant variance 
(heteroscedatic), which means that the OLS estimators do not have the 
minimum variance for unbiased estimators. So the data set in this study suffers 
from heteroscedasticity. 
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7.4.1.4 Checking for Multicollinearity: 
Multicollinearity means that there is a linear relationship between two or more 
independent variables. Murray (2006) suggested that it will be very difficult to 
differentiate the individual effects of explanatory variables and Ordinary Least 
Square estimators may be biased when multicollinearity exists. This means that 
there is a linear relationship between two or more independent variables and 
the estimates for a regression model cannot be uniquely computed. There are 
two different ways to check the presence the multicollinearity between 
independent variables: these are correlation coefficient and variance inflation 
factors (VIF) with tolerance values. VIF shows how the variance of an estimator 
is inflated by the presence of multicollinearity (Gujarati 2003 p. 351). In 
disclosure studies these two ways have been widely used.  The present study 
employs both to check the multicollinearity between the variables.  
 
Table 7.9 represents the variance inflation factor (VIF) and the tolerance 
coefficient of each explanatory variable for combined sample. For Variance 
Inflation Factor, it is suggested that data is normally distributed if the VIF is less 
than 10 (Gujarati 2003; Gaur and Gaur 2009). However, others suggested that 
the value of VIF should be 5 as a rule of thumb (Groebner et al. 2005). From the 
table it can be observed that the maximum VIF is 2.549 with mean VIF is 1.479. 
In addition, the lowest tolerance coefficient is 0.392 which is more than 0.20. 
Because according to Hair et al. (2011), the tolerance value more than 0.20 
may be used as a criterion for considering the data being free from the problem 
of multicollinearity. Therefore, considering the rule of thumb, the result of VIF 
and the tolerance coefficient indicates that there is no problem of 
multicollinearity in this data set. 
Table 7.9: VIF and Tolerance for Dependent Variables 
 VIF Tolerance 
Firm Size 1.392 .719 
Return of Equity 1.225 .816 
Return on Assets 1.377 .726 
Audit Firm Int Link 1.224 .817 
Industry Type 2.549 .392 
Multinational Parents 1.126 .888 
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Liquidity(Current ratio) 1.211 .826 
Market Category 1.283 .780 
Independent Director 1.163 .860 
Board Size 2.333 .429 
Dual Leadership Structure 1.309 .764 
Ownership Structure 1.143 .875 
No. of Year-listed 1.655 .604 
No. of year ±establishment 1.723 .580 
Average 1.479  
 
Moreover, it is commonly agreed that the correlation matrix is a powerful tool 
for indicating the relationship between different explanatory variables but there 
is no agreement among researchers regarding the cut off value of correlation 
percentage (Alsaeed 2006). While some researchers use 0.8; e.g. Hair et al. 
(2011); Gujarati (2003); others suggest using 0.7; e.g. Tabachnick and Fidell 
(1996). Table 6.9 and 6.10 represents the correlation coefficient of non 
parametric and parametric tests, Spearman and Pearson correlation 
coefficient respectively for mandatory disclosure. 
 
It can be observed from the tables that correlation coefficients confirm the 
UHVXOWV RI 9,) $FFRUGLQJ WR WKH 6SHDUPDQ¶V WHVW XQGHU WKH PDQGDWRU\
disclosure (table 6.9) model all the correlation coefficients of independent 
variables are less or equal to 0.749. Under the Spearman test, however, there 
are some correlation coefficient of 0.879 (for general disclosure coefficient), 
0.891 (for directors report coefficient), 0.920 (for balance sheet coefficient), 
0.934 (for income statement coefficient), 0.821(for director report with general 
disclosure) and 0.813 (for balance sheet with general disclosure) more than 
0.80. However, all coefficients are the different categories of total mandatory 
disclosure and also these are dependent variables: these variables are not 
examined at the same time. They are examined separately. Therefore, it can 
be concluded that as there is no value more than 0.8 between dependent and 
independent variable, there is no potential multicollinearity problem in the data 
set. 
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/LNH WKH 6SHDUPDQ¶V FRUUHODWLRQ FRHIILFLHQW 3HDUVRQ¶V UDQN correlation for 
mandatory (table 6.10) disclosure also indicates that the highest coefficient for 
independent variables is 0.732 for the combined sample. There are also some 
correlation coefficients of total mandatory disclosure with general disclosure 
(0. GLUHFWRU¶V UHSRUW  EDODQFH VKHHW  LQFRPH VWDWHPHQW
 DQG JHQHUDO GLVFORVXUH ZLWK GLUHFWRU¶V UHSRUW  EDODQFH VKHHW
(0.951) and income statement (0.910); and balance sheet with income 
statement (0.942) which are all exceeding the value of 0.8. As these are all 
GHSHQGHQW YDULDEOHV DQG JHQHUDO GLVFORVXUH GLUHFWRU¶V UHSRUW EDODQFH VKHHW
and income statement are different parts of total mandatory disclosure, it can be 
concluded that there is no potential multicollinearity problem in this study. 
 
7.4.1.5 Regression Diagnostic Summary for Mandatory Disclosure: 
From the results of the above graphical and numerical methods, it can be 
identified that there are some violations of OLS assumptions. The results found 
non-linearity for some independent variables. Also the data is not normally 
distributed and suffers from the problem of heteroscedasticity. However, the 
results of VIF and correlations coefficients under both Spearman and Pearson 
correlation method confirm that there is no multicollinearity. 
 
Therefore, the data analysis needs to be applied using anon parametric test that 
fits with this type of non parametric data which is not normally distributed. The 
OLS is a parametric test, so to fit with the non parametric data it needs to be 
employed using robust standard error. Draper (1988); as cited in Cooke (1998); 
also suggested the robust approach to deal with this type of data where there is 
no necessity to fulfill these assumptions. 
 
7.4.2 Regression Diagnostic for Voluntary disclosure: 
7.4.2.1 Checking Linearity (Voluntary): 
There needs to be a linear relationship between the dependent and 
independent variables. To check the linearity of the voluntary disclosure data 
set, independent variables are plotted against the dependent variable values. 
The graphs for the voluntary disclosure data indicate that most of the 
independent variables in the study do not have a linear relationship with the 
dependent variables. This may be because there are some outliers or unusual 
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observations in the data set or it may be that the linear model is not a good fit to 
describe the relationship between the variables. So the linearity assumption is 
not satisfied. The results are given in the appendix D. 
 
7.4.2.2 Checking Normality of Residuals (Voluntary): 
 
Graphical Method: 
Figure 7-5: Q-Q plot (Voluntary) 
 
 
Figure 7-6: P-P Plot (Voluntary) 
 
Figure 7-7: Normal curve and Kernel density estimate (Voluntary) 
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Numerical Method of Normality Test: 
In order to check the normality of the voluntary data the study again applies 
Shapiro ±Wilk W statistic that has a good power against a wide range of non 
normal distribution. Table 7.10 and 7.11 presents the results of two common 
tests: Skewness ± kurtosis and Shapiro ± Wilk W for both the residuals and 
dependent variables for voluntary data. 
 
Table 7.10: Skewness / Kurtosis test for Normality (Voluntary) 
Variables Obs Pr(skewness) Pr(Kurtosis) Adj chi2 Prob>chi2 
R 234 0.0657 0.5961 3.7 0.1572 
Total 234 0.0018 0.0544 11.74 0.0028 
 
Table 7.11: Shapiro-Wilk W test for Normal data (Voluntary) 
Variable Obs W V Z Prob>z 
R 234 0.98981 1.744 1.29 0.09860 
Total 234 0.96153 6.583 4.37 0.00001 
 
Both the graphical and numerical method suggests the same result. It can be 
observed that the data set is not normally distributed and this is mainly related 
to the skewness of the distribution. 
 
7.4.2.3 Checking Homoscedasticity of Residuals (Voluntary): 
Graphical Method: 
Figure 7-8: The Relationship between Residuals and Predicted Values 
(Voluntary) 
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Numerical Method: 
Table 7.12: Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg and White tests (Voluntary) 
Test Chi-square Prob>chi2 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg 9.88 0.0017 
:KLWH¶V 149.34 0.0106 
 
Table 7&DPHURQ	7ULYHGL¶V'HFRPSRVLWLRQRI,0WHVW9ROXQWDU\ 
Source Chi-square Df Prob>chi2 
Heteroscedasticity 149.34 112 0.0106 
Skewness 86.43 14 0 
Kurtosis 0.05 1 0.8291 
Total 235.82 127 0 
 
The results of both graphical and numerical methods are same. Therefore, it 
can be concluded that errors have non constant variance (heteroscedatic), 
which means that the OLS estimators do not have the minimum variance for 
unbiased estimators. So the data set in this study suffers from 
heteroscedasticity. 
 
7.4.2.4 Checking for Multicollinearity (Voluntary): 
As all the independent variables are the same for both the mandatory disclosure 
model and voluntary disclosure model so VIF and Tolerance values are same 
for both models. Therefore it can be concluded that there is no problem of 
multicollinearity in the voluntary disclosure data set. 
 
Again this study considers the correlation matrix for indicating the relationship 
between different explanatory variables. Table 6.15 and 6.16 represents the 
correlation coefficient of non parametric and parametric tests, Spearman and 
Pearson correlation coefficient respectively for voluntary disclosure for the 
combined sample.  
 
It can be observed from the tables that correlation coefficients confirm the 
UHVXOWV RI 9,) $FFRUGLQJ WR WKH 6SHDUPDQ¶V WHVW XQGHU WKH YROXQWDU\
disclosure (table 6.15) model all the correlation coefficients of independent 
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variables are less or equal to 0.749. Under the Spearman test, however, there 
are some correlation coefficients of total voluntary disclosure with  general 
disclosure coefficient (0.864), strategic information coefficient (0.870), 
corporate governance coefficient (0.800), financial information coefficient 
(0.914), sustainability disclosure coefficient (0.871), and 0.828 (for general 
disclosure with strategic information disclosure coefficient), and 0.826 (for 
corporate governance disclosure with financial disclosure coefficient) are 
more than 0.80. However, all the coefficients are the separate categories of 
total voluntary disclosure and also these are dependent variables and all 
these variables are not examined at the same time. They are examined 
separately. Therefore, it can be concluded that as there is no value more than 
0.8 between dependent and independent variables, there is no potential 
multicollinearity problem in the current study. 
 
/LNH WKH 6SHDUPDQ¶V FRUUHODWLRQ FRHIILFLHQW 3HDUVRQ¶V UDQN FRUUHODWLRQ IRU
voluntary disclosure model (table 6.16) also indicates that the highest coefficient 
for independent variables is 0.732 for the combined sample. There are also 
some correlation coefficients of total voluntary disclosure with general 
disclosure (0.813), strategic information disclosure (0.844), corporate 
governance disclosure (0.847), financial information (0.882), CSR (0.830), 
sustainability disclosure (0.884); and corporate governance disclosure with 
financial information disclosure (0.859), and sustainability disclosure with CSR 
(0.839) that are all exceed the value of 0.8. As they are all dependent variables 
and general disclosure, strategic information disclosure, corporate governance 
disclosure, financial information, sustainability disclosure, and CSR are different 
parts of the total voluntary disclosure, it can be concluded that there is no 
potential multicollinearity problem in this study. 
 
7.4.2.5 Regression Diagnostic Summary for Voluntary Disclosure Model: 
From the results of the above graphical and numerical methods, it can be 
identified that there are some violations of OLS assumptions. The results found 
non-linearity for some independent variables. Also the data is not normally 
distributed and suffers from the problem of heteroscedasticity. However, the 
results of VIF and correlations coefficients under both Spearman and Pearson 
confirm that there is no multicollinearity. 
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Therefore, the data analysis needs to be applied using a non-parametric test 
that fits with this type of non-parametric data which is not normally distributed. 
The OLS is a parametric test, and to fit with the non-parametric data it needs to 
be employed using robust standard error.  
 
7.5 Regression Analysis and Hypothesis Testing:  
According to Hair et al. (1998) although transformation can be used to deal with 
the violation of classical linear regression assumptions, researchers may face a 
number of problems when transforming their data and therefore some general 
guidelines should be followed. Furthermore, the existence of outliers may affect 
the results even with transformed data. Therefore it is recommended to employ 
statistical techniques that put less emphasis on such outliers (Abdel-Fattah 
2008). In the light of this, OLS regression with robust standard error analysis is 
used in disclosure literature such as Iskander (2008). 
 
Based on the above discussion, the OLS regression with robust standard error 
analysis has been used in this study. The following section represents the 
results of regression analysis for both the mandatory and voluntary disclosure 
model. 
 
7.5.1 Mandatory Disclosure Model: 
7.5.1.1 Regression Analysis for Combined Mandatory Disclosure Model: 
Table 7.14 represents the results of OLS regression with robust standard error 
for the mandatory disclosure model. From the table it can be observed that the 
WRWDO PDQGDWRU\ GLVFORVXUH KDV VLJQLILFDQW SRVLWLYH DVVRFLDWLRQ S   ZLWK
DXGLWILUP¶VLQWHUQDWLRQDOOLQNLQGHSHQGHQWGLUHFWRUVLQWKHERDUGGXDOOHDGHUship 
VWUXFWXUH LW KDV VLJQLILFDQW QHJDWLYH DVVRFLDWLRQ S   ZLWK SURILWDELOLW\
measured by ROE. In addition, profitability measure by ROA has significant 
SRVLWLYH DVVRFLDWLRQ S   DQG PDUNHW FDWHJRU\ KDV VLJQLILFDQW QHJDWLYH
DVVRFLDWLRQ S  .10) with the level of mandatory disclosure. The positive 
association means that the total mandatory disclosure increases with the 
LQFUHDVHLQILUP¶VSURILWDELOLW\PHDVXUHGE\52$ LI WKHILUPLVDXGLWHGE\%LJ
audit firm, has a high number of independent directors in the board and there is 
dual leadership in the board. On the other hand, negative association means 
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that companies that are in the Z category and whose profitability (measured by 
ROE) increases, disclose less mandatory information on the web. 
 
In addition, firm size, industry type, multinational parents, liquidity and 
ownership structure have positive non significant association: board size, 
FRPSDQ\DJHPHDVXUHGE\QXPEHURIOLVWHG\HDUDQGFRPSDQ\¶VHVWDEOLVKPHQW
year have non significant negative association with the level of mandatory 
disclosure on the internet. The adjusted R square of the model explains how 
much of the changes in the dependent variable are explained by the changes in 
the independent variables. The value of adjusted R square is 0.308 i.e. 30.8% 
and the R2 is 34.98% means that 30.8% of the changes of total mandatory 
disclosure is explained by the changes in its examined determinants. Some 
prior studies have reported better as well as poorer explanatory power using 
different sets of independent variables. For example, Hassan et al. (2008) 
reported 53.80%, Akhtaruddin (2005) reported 57.7% and Al Akra et al. 
reported (2010) 6.3% for the full model and 12.6% for the reduced model in 
1996, 14.7% for full and 20.7% for reduced model in 2004 and 66.7% for pooled 
full model and 68% for pooled reduced model. 
 
Referred to the different categories of mandatory disclosure, there is a 
VLJQLILFDQW SRVLWLYH DVVRFLDWLRQ RI WKH DXGLW ILUP¶V LQWHUQDWLRQDO OLQN S 
LQGHSHQGHQW GLUHFWRUV LQ WKH ERDUG S DQG S and dual leadership 
VWUXFWXUH S ZLWK DOO FDWHJRULHV RI PDQGDWRU\ GLVFORVXUH RQ WKH LQWHUQHW
On the other hand, profitability measured by ROE has significant negative 
DVVRFLDWLRQDWSZLWKEDODQFHVKHHWDQGDWSZLWKLQFRPHVWDWHPHQW
and DW S  ZLWK JHQHUDO GLVFORVXUH ZLWK DOO WKH SDUWV RI PDQGDWRU\
GLVFORVXUHH[FHSWWKHGLUHFWRU¶VUHSRUW 
 
Firm size and industry type have non-significant positive association with all the 
parts of mandatory disclosure, while board size and number of years listed are 
negatively non-significant with the mandatory disclosure level. Profitability 
measured by ROA is significantly positively associated with the disclosure of 
balance sheet and income statement. Multinational parent have only significant 
positLYHDVVRFLDWLRQZLWKWKHGLVFORVXUHRIWKHGLUHFWRU¶VUHSRUW/LTXLGLW\UDWLRLV
positively non-significant with general disclosure and income statement but 
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negatively non-VLJQLILFDQW ZLWK GLUHFWRU¶V UHSRUW DQG GLVFORVXUH RI EDODQFH
sheets. Market category has significant negative association with all the parts of 
mandatory disclosure except disclosure of balance sheet. Ownership structure 
has positive non significant association with all the categories of mandatory 
disclosure except general disclosure on the web. Company age measured by 
the establishment year of the company is only significantly negatively 
associated with the directors report. 
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Table 7.14: OLS Regression with Robust Standard Error for Combined Mandatory Disclosure 
 Mandatory General Director Balance Sheet Income Statement 
 Coefficient t Coefficient T Coefficient T Coefficient t Coefficient t 
Firm Size 0.0269 0.84 0.0322 1.07 0.026 0.57 0.0440 1.26 0.0068 0.24 
Return of Equity -0.0468 -2.71*** -0.0355* -1.96 -0.030 -1.13 -0.0762*** -4 -0.0284** -1.97 
Return on Assets 0.1634 2.47** 0.1326 1.64 0.004 0.03 0.2502*** 3.43 0.1319* 1.92 
Audit Firm Size 0.1388 3.93*** 0.1287*** 3.66 0.230*** 4.15 0.1209*** 3.2 0.1428*** 3.96 
Industry type 0.0465 0.91 0.0171 0.34 0.000 0 0.0442 0.81 0.0780 1.54 
Multinational Parents 0.0738 1.36 0.0684 1.39 0.134** 2.04 0.0511 0.87 0.0866 1.52 
Liquidity(Current ratio) 0.0002 0.04 0.0009 0.13 -0.001 -0.12 -0.0012 -0.17 0.0015 0.21 
Market Category -0.1114 -1.82* -0.1056* -1.72 -0.186*** -2.77 -0.1014 -1.47 -0.1087* -1.87 
Independent Director 0.0500 2.64*** 0.0516*** 2.85 0.072*** 2.76 0.0485** 2.43 0.0457** 2.38 
Board Size -0.0059 -1.07 -0.0053 -0.98 -0.002 -0.3 -0.0062 -1.06 -0.0068 -1.17 
Role Duality 0.2843 4.44*** 0.2805*** 4.52 0.282*** 4.1 0.2978*** 4.28 0.2738*** 4.3 
Ownership Structure 0.0035 0.1 -0.0098 -0.28 0.020 0.44 0.0053 0.14 0.0067 0.18 
No. of Year-listed -0.0009 -0.42 -0.0011 -0.49 -0.001 -0.2 -0.0004 -0.16 -0.0014 -0.64 
Year ±establishment -0.0011 -0.89 -0.0015 -1.14 -0.003* -1.8 -0.0013 -0.94 -0.0005 -0.38 
Constant 0.1401 0.46 0.2206 0.76 -0.021 -0.05 -0.0331 -0.1 0.2977 1.07 
R 0.591 0.584 .577 .578 .570 
R Square 0.3498 0.341 .333 .335 .325 
Adjusted R square 0.308 0.299 .291 .292 .282 
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7.5.1.2 Test of Hypothesis for Combined Mandatory Disclosure Model: 
The result of the regression analysis agree with research hypotheses 
concerning the existence of positive significant relationship between the total 
mandatory disclosure and profitability measured by ROA (hypothesis H2b), 
DXGLWILUP¶VLQWHUQDWLRQDOOLQNK\SRWKHVLV+LQGHSHQGHQWGLUHFWRULQWKHERDUG
(hypothesis H9) and dual leadership structure (hypothesis H10). On the other 
hand, the regression result found significant negative association of total 
mandatory disclosure with the firms profitability measured by ROE (hypothesis 
H2a) and market category (hypothesis H8). 
 
The regression result of profitability measured by ROA is consistently in line 
with Wallace (1987), Wallace et al. (1994), Karim (1996), Owusu ± Ansah 
(1998), Hossain (2000). This implies that more profitable companies disclose 
more mandatory information on their website. It is also supported by signaling 
theory which indicates that companies with high profit or good news have the 
incentive to distinguish themselves from those with less profit or bad news: this 
helps to raise capital at the lowest possible price and it can be achieved through 
corporate internet reporting. 
 
7KH SRVLWLYH VLJQLILFDQW DVVRFLDWLRQ RI DQ DXGLW ILUP¶V LQWHUQDWLRQDO OLQN LV DOVR
consistent with Singhvi and Desai (1971), Ahmed and Nichols (1994), Street 
and Gray (2001), Naser et al. (2002), Karim and Jamal (2005), Nurunnabi and 
Monirul (2012). This means that the company, whose auditor has an 
international link with Big 4 companies, discloses more mandatory information 
on the internet to retain their reputation and differentiate themselves from other 
companies in Bangladesh. 
 
Moreover, the result of the independent directors in the board hypothesis is also 
consistent with Chen and Jaggi (2000), Abdelsalam and Donna (2007), Ezat 
and Ahmed (2008) and Xiao et al. (2004) who suggest that the ratio of 
independent directors to the total number of directors on corporate boards is 
positively associated with the comprehensiveness of financial disclosures. This 
indicates that a higher proportion of independent directors encourage the 
companies to disclose more mandatory information: this leads to better 
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monitoring and control of the action of executive directors and safeguards the 
interest of different investors, who need accurate information. 
 
In addition, dual leadership structure is also consistent with the result of Forker 
(1992), Gao and Kling (2012), Nandi and Ghosh (2013). The positive 
association implies that the existence of the role duality in the leadership 
VWUXFWXUHZRXOGLPSURYHWKHERDUG¶VHIIHFWLYHQHVVDOORZLQJLWJRRGFRQWURORYHU
the board and encourage the disclosure of more information on the internet. 
Forker (1992) also argued that role duality increases the monitoring quality and 
improves the level of disclosure. 
 
The result of profitability measured by ROE has significant negative association, 
which is different from profitability measured by ROA. This means that 
companies, whose profitability in terms of ROE are higher; disclose less 
information on the internet. This result is also consistent with Bujaki and Mc 
Conomy (2002), Belkaoui and Kahl (1978) who measured profitability by ROE. 
The negative significant association of market category is consistent with Karim 
and Jamal (2005). This implies that the disclosure level was lower for a 
company whose security is categorised as Z category. The reason may be the 
FRPSDQ\¶VLQWHQWLRQWRKLGHLQIormation as they failed to provide a dividend or to 
hold a general meeting or if they fail to run their business continuously or incur 
loss continuously. 
 
On the other hand, inconsistent with hypothesis H1, this study found non-
significant association of firm size with the level of disclosing mandatory 
information on the internet and does not accept the hypothesis. The result is 
consistent with Stanga (1976), Malone et al. (1993), Ahmed and Nicholls 
(1994), Ahmed (1996). This means that firm size has no impact on the level of 
mandatory disclosure. The possible reason is that the corporate internet 
reporting is still voluntary in Bangladesh and is not regulated. 
 
Regarding the hypothesis H4, this study found non association of industry type 
with the level of mandatory disclosure on the internet and also reject the 
hypothesis. This implies that the disclosure of mandatory information on the 
internet is not affected by whether the company is financial or non-financial. The 
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result is consistent with Wallace et al. (1994), Naser et al. (2002), Raffournier 
(1995), Inchausti (1997), Patton and Zelenka (1997), Owusu-Ansah (1998), 
Naser and Al-Khatib (2000). 
 
Moreover this study found non-significant association of multinational parent 
(hypothesis H5) with the level of disclosing mandatory information on the 
internet and does not accept the hypothesis. This means that the level of 
disclosure does not depend on whether the company is a MNC or local. The 
result is consistent with Oyelere et al. (2003). 
 
Inconsistent with hypothesis H7, the present study found non-significant 
association of company liquidity with the level of disclosure on the internet. The 
result is consistent with Wallace and Naser (1995), Owusu and Ansah (1998) 
Belkaoui and Kahl (1978). This implies that FRPSDQ\¶V OLTXLGLW\ SRVLWLRQ GRHV
not affect the level of disclosure on the internet. 
 
This study also found non significant association of board size (hypothesis 
H11), ownership structure (hypothesis H12), and company age (hypothesis 
H13) and does not accept those hypotheses. The result of board size is 
consistent with Holthausen and Larcker (1993) and non association of 
ownership structure is consistent with Wallace and Naser (1995), Craswell and 
Taylor (1992); Naser and Al-Khatib (2000), Naser et al. (2002) and finally non 
association of company age is consistent with Akhtaruddin (2005), Alsaeed 
(2006), Curtis (1979). 
 
7.5.1.3 Regression Analysis for Non-Financial Mandatory Disclosure 
Model:  
Table 7.15 represents the results of OLS regression with robust standard error 
for the mandatory disclosure model. From the table it can be observed that the 
WRWDOPDQGDWRU\GLVFORVXUHKDYHVLJQLILFDQWSRVLWLYHDVVRFLDWLRQSZLWK
audit firm and multinational parents while it has significant negative association 
S   ZLWK ILUPV SURILWDELOLW\ PHDVXUHG E\ 52( ,Q DGGLWLRQ LQGHSHQGHQW
directors in the board and dual leadership structure have significant positive 
DVVRFLDWLRQ S   DQG OHYHUDJH KDV VLJQLILFDQW QHJDWLYH DVVRFLDWLRQ S 
0.10) with the level of mandatory disclosure. The positive association means 
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that the total mandatory disclosure increases if the firm is audited by a Big four 
audit firm, have multinational parent, high number of independent directors in 
the board and the existence of dual leadership in the board. On the other hand, 
negative association means that highly levered firms and highly profitable 
(measured by ROE) firms disclose less mandatory information on the web. 
 
In addition, firm size, profitability measured by ROA, liquidity measured by 
current ratio, and ownership structure has positive non significant association: 
TXLFNUDWLRPDUNHWFDWHJRU\ERDUGVL]HQXPEHURI OLVWHG\HDUDQGFRPSDQ\¶V
establishment year have non significant negative association with the level of 
mandatory disclosure on the internet. The adjusted R square of the model 
explains how much of the changes in the dependent variable are explained by 
the changes in the independent variables. The value of the adjusted R square is 
0.323 i.e. 32.3% and the R2 is 62.9% which means that 32.3% of the changes 
of total mandatory disclosure are explained by the changes in its examined 
determinants for non-financial companies. 
 
Referred to the different categories of mandatory disclosure, there is a 
VLJQLILFDQW SRVLWLYH DVVRFLDWLRQ RI DXGLW ILUP S   DQG S  
PXOWLQDWLRQDO SDUHQW S   DQG S   DQG QXPEHU RI LQGHSHQGHQW
GLUHFWRU S DQG S DQG GXDO OHDGHUVKLS VWUXFWXUH S ZLWK DOO
categories of mandatory disclosure on the internet. On the other hand, 
3URILWDELOLW\ PHDVXUHG E\ 52( KDV VLJQLILFDQW QHJDWLYH DVVRFLDWLRQ S 
DQG S   ZLWK DOO WKH SDUWV RI PDQGDWRU\ GLVFORVXUH H[FHSW LQFRPH
statement. 
 
Moreover, Firm size and firms liquidity measured by current ratio have non 
significant positive association with all the parts of mandatory disclosure while 
firms liquidity measured by quick ratio and company age measured by both 
number of yeas listed and number of years established are negatively non 
significant with all the categories of mandatory disclosure.  
 
)LUP¶VSURILWDELOLW\PHDVXUHGE\52$ LV VLJQLILFDQWO\SRVLWLYHO\DVVRFLDWHGZLWK
WKH GLVFORVXUH RI GLUHFWRU¶V UHSRUW DQG EDODQFH VKHHW )LUP OHYHUDJH KDV
significant negaWLYH DVVRFLDWLRQ ZLWK JHQHUDO GLVFORVXUH DQG GLUHFWRU¶V UHSRUW
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0DUNHWFDWHJRU\KDVVLJQLILFDQWQHJDWLYHDVVRFLDWLRQRQO\ZLWKGLUHFWRU¶VUHSRUW
and board size has significant negative association only with general disclosure. 
Ownership structure has positive non-significant association with all the 
categories of mandatory disclosure except income statement where it has non-
significant negative association.  
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 Table 7.15: OLS Regression with Robust Standard Error for Non-financial Mandatory Disclosure 
 Mandatory General Director Balance Sheet Income Statement 
 Coeff. T Coeff. T Coeff. T Coeff. T Coeff. T 
Firm Size 0.018 0.56 0.034 1.12 0.022 0.57 0.027 0.79 -0.002 -0.05 
Return of Equity -0.147 -2.26** -0.162 -2.06** -0.242 -2.75*** -0.169 -2.35** -0.095 -1.44 
Return on Assets 0.411 1.61 0.397 1.55 0.567 1.73* 0.496 1.75* 0.300 1.18 
Audit Firm Size 0.119 2.39** 0.124 2.49** 0.179 2.47** 0.089 1.69* 0.132 2.36** 
Multinational Parents 0.144 2.49** 0.129 2.44** 0.175 2.18** 0.125 2.06** 0.165 2.76*** 
Leverage -0.013 -1.77* -0.017 -1.85* -0.028 -2.62*** -0.012 -1.52 -0.008 -1.1 
Liquidity-Current ratio 0.040 0.79 0.046 0.93 0.045 0.82 0.044 0.83 0.032 0.61 
Quick ratio -0.039 -0.77 -0.048 -0.96 -0.058 -1.08 -0.041 -0.79 -0.027 -0.52 
Market Category -0.086 -1.24 -0.076 -1.14 -0.149 -2.11** -0.078 -1.01 -0.086 -1.25 
Independent Director 0.096 3.01*** 0.092 3.2*** 0.133 3.45*** 0.100 2.93*** 0.087 2.59** 
Board Size -0.013 -1.13 -0.017 -1.68* -0.018 -1.25 -0.013 -1.08 -0.008 -0.71 
Role Duality 0.250 3.51*** 0.253 3.74*** 0.246 3.2*** 0.252 3.33*** 0.246 3.39*** 
Ownership Structure 0.007 0.14 0.001 0.02 0.045 0.7 0.012 0.22 -0.001 -0.01 
No. of Year-listed -0.002 -0.84 -0.002 -0.67 -0.002 -0.52 -0.002 -0.8 -0.003 -0.98 
Year ±establishment -0.001 -0.51 -0.001 -0.89 -0.002 -1.54 0.000 -0.41 0.000 -0.06 
Constant 0.231 0.74 0.251 0.86 0.081 0.21 0.131 0.4 0.352 1.1 
R .629 .637 .666 .609 .602 
R Square .395 .406 .444 .371 .362 
Adjusted R square .323 .334 .377 .296 .286 
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7.5.1.4 Test of the Hypothesis for Non-Financial Mandatory Disclosure 
Model: 
The result of the regression analysis agrees with research hypotheses 
concerning the existence of positive significant relationship between the total 
PDQGDWRU\ GLVFORVXUH DQG DXGLW ILUP¶V LQWHUQDWLRQDO OLQN K\SRWKHVLV +
multinational parent (hypothesis H3), number of independent director in the 
board (hypothesis H9) and dual leadership structure (hypothesis H10). On the 
other hand, the regression result found significant negative association of total 
mandatory disclosure with the firms profitability measured by ROE (hypothesis 
H2a) and firms leverage (hypothesis H6). This result is quite similar with the 
result of mandatory disclosure of the combined model. 
 
However, the study found non-significant association of firm size (hypothesis 
H1), profitability (hypothesis H2b), multinational parent (hypothesis H5), liquidity 
(hypothesis H7), market category (hypothesis H8), board size (hypothesis H11), 
ownership structure (hypothesis H12), and company age (hypothesis H13) with 
the level of disclosing mandatory information on the internet. 
 
7.5.2 Voluntary Disclosure Model: 
7.5.2.1 Regression Analysis for Combined Voluntary Disclosure Model: 
The result of the OLS regression with robust standard error for the voluntary 
disclosure model is presented in table 7.16. From the table it can be observed 
WKDWWKHWRWDOYROXQWDU\GLVFORVXUHKDVVLJQLILFDQWSRVLWLYHDVVRFLDWLRQS
with audit firm, industry category, multinational parent, and dual leadership 
structure. Firm size and industry category have also significant association 
SZLWK WKH OHYHORIGLVFORVLQJYROXQWDU\ LQIRUPDWLRQRQ WKH LQWHUQHWZKLOH
they have significant negative assRFLDWLRQ S   ZLWK ILUPV SURILWDELOLW\
measured by ROE. The positive association means that the total voluntary 
GLVFORVXUH LQFUHDVHVZLWK WKH LQFUHDVH LQILUP¶VVL]HDILUPEHLQJDXGLWHGE\D
big four audit firm, for financial companies, having multinational parents, having 
a high number of independent directors in the board and the existence of dual 
leadership in the board structure. On the other hand, negative association 
means that voluntary disclosure increases for non profitable companies 
(measured by ROE) on the web. 
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,Q DGGLWLRQ ILUP¶V SURILWDELOLW\ PHDVXUHG E\ 52$ ILUP¶V OLTXLGLW\ PDUNHW
category, board size, ownership structure and company age measured by 
number of listed year have negative non-significant association: company age 
measured E\ FRPSDQ\¶V HVWDEOLVKPHQW \HDU KDV QRQ VLJQLILFDQW SRVLWLYH
association with the level of voluntary disclosure on the internet. The adjusted R 
square of the model explains how much of the changes in the dependent 
variable are explained by the changes in the independent variables. The value 
of the adjusted R square is 0.501 i.e. 50.10% which means that 50.10% of the 
changes of total voluntary disclosure are explained by the changes its examined 
determinants. Some prior studies have reported stronger as well as weaker 
explanatory power using different sets of independent variables. For example, 
Depoers (2000) reported 65%, Barako et al. (2006) reported 53.4% and 
Iskander (2008) reported 45%, Haniffa and Cooke (2002) reported 47.9%. 
 
Referred to the different categories of voluntary disclosure, there is a significant 
positive association of firm size with all categories of voluntary disclosure on the 
internet. Audit firm size has significant positive association with all the 
categories of voluntary disclosure except investor information and presentation 
format on the website. In the same way, multinational parent has significant 
positive association with all categories except financial information and dual 
leadership structure also has significant positive association with all categories 
except environmental information.  
 
,Q DGGLWLRQ ILUP¶V SURILWDELOLW\ PHDVXUHG E\ 52( LV VLJQLILFDQWO\ QHJDWLYHO\
associated with corporate governance information, investor information and 
presentation format of voluntary disclosure on the website. ROA has also 
significant negative association with corporate social responsibility disclosure 
and environmental disclosure. Like profitability, market category is negatively 
associated with general disclosure, strategic information disclosure, corporate 
governance and financial disclosure. Board size has only significant negative 
association with sustainability disclosure and ownership structure has only 
significant negative association with presentation format. On the other hand, 
industry category has significant positive association with financial information, 
corporate social responsibility disclosure, environmental disclosure and 
sustainability disclosure; the number of independent directors has significant 
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positive association with general disclosure, strategic information disclosure, 
corporate governance disclosure, financial information disclosure and 
presentation format and company age measured by number of establishment 
years has significant positive association only with presentation format. 
 
0RUHRYHU FRPSDQ\¶V OLTXLGLW\ DQG FRPSDQ\ DJH PHDVXUHG E\ WKH QXPEHU RI
listed years has non significant association with all the categories of voluntary 
disclosure.   
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Table 7.16: OLS Regression with Robust Standard Error for Combined Voluntary Disclosure 
 Voluntary General Strategy Goverance Financial 
 Coeff. T Coeff. T Coeff. t Coeff. T Coeff. t 
Firm Size 0.060 2.57** 0.039 1.81* 0.063 2.37** 0.069 2.44** 0.056 1.8* 
Return of Equity -0.018 -2.34** -0.011 -1.04 -0.019 -1.38 -0.053 -3.97*** -0.019 -1.37 
Return on Assets -0.045 -0.87 -0.021 -0.33 0.006 0.07 0.061 0.54 0.021 0.28 
Audit Firm Int 0.129 4.42*** 0.077 2.88*** 0.178 3.49*** 0.202 4.97*** 0.197 5.8*** 
Industry type 0.089 2.6*** 0.028 0.81 0.084 1.55 0.092 1.6 0.105 2.15** 
Multinational Parents 0.116 3.53*** 0.055 1.84* 0.105 1.89* 0.140 2.73*** 0.074 1.63 
Liquidity(Current ratio) 0.000 -0.05 0.000 -0.02 0.003 0.46 -0.001 -0.14 -0.003 -0.57 
Market Category -0.030 -1.06 -0.087 -1.98** -0.078 -1.75* -0.108 -2.19** -0.096 -1.99** 
Independent Director 0.023 2.18** 0.036 3.13*** 0.038 1.99** 0.053 2.64*** 0.033 1.96* 
Board Size -0.004 -1.2 -0.004 -1.13 -0.007 -1.31 -0.010 -1.6 -0.005 -0.91 
Role Duality 0.127 4.69*** 0.172 4.03*** 0.154 3.44*** 0.314 5.85*** 0.201 4*** 
Ownership Structure -0.003 -0.14 0.011 0.46 0.024 0.63 0.005 0.14 -0.011 -0.34 
Year-listed 0.000 -0.33 -0.001 -1 0.001 0.2 0.000 -0.04 0.000 0.17 
Year establishment 0.000 0.04 0.000 -0.29 -0.001 -0.44 -0.003 -1.51 -0.001 -0.6 
Constant -0.377 -1.72 0.171 0.82 -0.473 -1.86 -0.377 -1.38 -0.259 -0.87 
R .728 .616 .573 .686 .658 
R Square .531 .379 .328 .471 .433 
Adjusted R square .501 .340 .286 .437 .397 
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 CSR Environmental Sustainability Investor Presentation 
 Coeff. T Coeff. T Coeff. T Coeff. T Coeff. t 
Firm Size 0.102 2.77** 0.069 2.62*** 0.057 3.06*** 0.032 1.99** 0.051 2.44** 
Return of Equity -0.012 -1.12 -0.006 -0.74 -0.011 -1.6 -0.017 -3.02*** -0.023 -3.43*** 
Return on Assets -0.177 -2.6*** -0.172 -2.92*** -0.080 -1.52 0.028 0.38 -0.017 -0.23 
Audit Firm Int 0.159 2.74*** 0.101 1.84* 0.136 4.12*** 0.043 1.31 0.044 1.47 
Industry type 0.134 2.33** 0.117 2.14** 0.167 4.53*** -0.034 -0.86 0.008 0.21 
Multinational Parents 0.197 3.08*** 0.188 2.95*** 0.112 3.34*** 0.097 2.5** 0.079 2.55** 
Liquidity(Curr. ratio) -0.001 -0.32 0.002 0.53 -0.001 -0.43 0.001 0.16 0.002 0.56 
Market Category 0.035 0.91 0.064 1.47 0.021 1.15 -0.056 -1.45 -0.029 -0.81 
Independent Director 0.018 1.14 0.012 0.82 0.004 0.41 0.019 1.54 0.022 1.76* 
Board Size -0.004 -0.81 -0.005 -1.01 -0.006 -1.71* 0.004 0.92 0.003 0.69 
Role Duality 0.077 2.56** 0.048 1.56 0.063 3.1*** 0.119 3.55*** 0.055 1.66* 
Ownership Structure 0.035 1.1 -0.012 -0.38 -0.026 -1.27 0.019 0.75 -0.040 -1.87* 
Year-listed 0.001 0.53 0.000 0.05 -0.001 -0.41 -0.002 -1.36 -0.002 -1.43 
Year ±establishment 0.000 -0.03 0.001 0.87 0.001 1.23 0.000 -0.07 0.002 2.61*** 
Constant -0.957 -2.79 -0.661 -2.62 -0.466 -2.64 -0.041 -0.26 -0.210 -1.05 
R .673 .557 .722 .493 .541 
R Square .452 .311 .522 .243 .292 
Adjusted R square .417 .267 .491 .194 .247 
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7.5.2.2 Test of Hypothesis for Combined Voluntary Disclosure Model: 
The result of the regression analysis agree with research hypotheses 
concerning the existence of positive significant relationship between the total 
YROXQWDU\GLVFORVXUHDQGILUPVL]HK\SRWKHVLV+DXGLWILUP¶VLQWHUQDWLRQDOOLQN
(hypothesis H3), industry type (hypothesis H4), multinational parent (hypothesis 
H5), number of independent director (hypothesis H9) and dual leadership 
structure (hypothesis H10). On the other hand, the regression result found 
VLJQLILFDQW QHJDWLYH DVVRFLDWLRQ RI WRWDO YROXQWDU\ GLVFORVXUH ZLWK WKH ILUP¶V
profitability measured by ROE (hypothesis H2a). 
 
The positive association of firm size indicates that larger firms tend to disclose 
more voluntary information on the internet. This result is also supported by 
agency and capital need theory: companies may think that greater disclosure 
will reduce investor uncertainty as well as information asymmetry. The result is 
consistent with some prior studies (Ahmed and Courtis 1999, Abd-El Salam 
1999, Oyelere et al. 2003, Marston and Annika 2004, Barako et al. 2006, 
Bonson and Thomas 2006, Sriram and Laksmana 2006, Alsaeed 2006, Uyar 
2011, Alves et al. 2012, Hajji and Ghazali 2013. For example, Marston and 
Annika (2004) proved that firm size is a significant explanatory variable for the 
amount of financial and other investor-related information presented on 
FRPSDQLHV¶ZHEVLWHV2QHRIWKHFRQFOXVLRQVRIWKHVWXG\FRQGXFWHGE\6ULUDP
and Laksmana (2006) was that larger firms, on average, report more financial 
and non-financial data on the corporate web sites than is reported by smaller 
firms. Lastly, Oyelere et al. (2003) also showed that firm size has a significant 
and positive impact on internet financial reporting practice, and therefore, larger 
firms are more likely to engage in internet financial reporting.  
 
7KH UHVXOW RI DXGLW ILUP¶V LQWHUQDWLRQDO OLQN is consistent with Al-Shammari 
(2007), Bonson and Thomas (2006), Nurunnabi and Monirul (2012). It is also 
supported by signalling theory as the audit firm may benefit from the higher 
level of disclosure of its clients as a signal of its own quality and reputation and 
so differentiate themselves from other audit firms. The client company may 
attempt to improve the appearance of its financial position and results of 
operations, errors and inadequate disclosure, which support such motives, may 
be considered to be purposely caused by the management of the company. 
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Therefore, auditing firms may support and encourage their clients to disclose 
more voluntary information which also helps to reduce cost of capital by 
UHGXFLQJLQYHVWRU¶VXQFHUWDLQW\WKLVORJLFLV supported by capital need theory. 
 
The positive significant relation of Industry type is consistent with Bonson and 
Thomas (2006), Oyelere et al. (2003) and Xiao et al. (2004), Aly et al. (2010), 
Garg and Divya (2010). Signalling theory also suggests industry differences in 
disclosure. Companies within the same industry tend to adopt the same level of 
disclosure. If a company within an industry fails to follow the same disclosure 
practices, including internet disclosures, as others in the same industry, then it 
may be interpreted as a signal that the company is hiding bad news (Craven 
and Marston 1999). 
 
Consistent with hypothesis H5, multinational parent has significant positive 
association with the level of voluntary disclosure on the internet. This result is 
consistent with Raffournier (1995), Bollen et al (2006). This means that the 
companies, who have a multinational parent, disclose more information on their 
website. The reason may be they have to comply with the regulation of the host 
country as well as the parent company. Owusu-Ansah (1998) also indicated that 
multinational corporations are expected to demand more information because of 
various issues associated with emerging economies. 
 
Regarding the hypothesis H9, the number of independent directors in the board 
affects the level of internet corporate reporting. The result is consistent with 
Fama and Jensen (1983), Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990), Klein (1998), Chen 
and Jaggi (2000), Ho and Wong (2001), Cheng and Courtenay (2006), 
Abdelsalam and Donna (2007), Ezat and Ahmed (2008), Chau and Gray 
(2010), Samah and Dahawy (2010), Duchin et al. (2010). This indicates that a 
higher proportion of independent directors encourage the companies to disclose 
more voluntary information on their web sites. Therefore, a large proportion of 
independent directors lead to better monitoring and control over the action of 
executive directors: it safeguards the interests of different investors, who need 
accurate information. 
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The positive significant association of dual leadership structure is consistent 
with Eisenhardt (1989), Dahya et al.1996; Rechner and Dalton 1991; Donaldson 
and Davies (1991), Nandi and Ghosh (2013), Gao and Kling (2012). This result 
indicates that the existence of role duality encourage the management to 
disclose more voluntary information. Moreover, a significant negative 
association of firms profitability measured by ROE is consistent with 
Camfferman and Cooke (2002), Wallace and Naser (1995), which implies that 
more profitable companies disclose less voluntary information. 
 
On the other hand, the current study found a non-significant association of 
profitability measured by ROA (hypothesis H2b) with the level of voluntary 
disclosure on the internet and so does not accept the hypothesis. The result is 
consistent with Oyelere et al. (2003), Marston and Annika (2004), Uyar (2011). 
This implies that profitability has no significant impact on the level of disclosure 
of voluntary information. 
 
Inconsistent with company liquidity (hypothesis H7) the result does not accept 
the hypothesis and found a non-significant association with the level of 
disclosure. This means that the liquidity position of a company has no impact on 
the corporate internet reporting. The result is consistent with Alsaeed (2006), 
Belkaoui and Kahl (1978), Ahmed and Courtis (1999), Aly et al. (2010), 
Puspitaningrum and Sari (2012). 
 
Regarding the board size (hypothesis H11), this study does not find any 
significant association with the level of disclosing voluntary information on the 
internet which means the level of voluntary disclosure does not affect  internet 
reporting. The result is consistent with Arcay and Vazquez (2005), Cheng and 
Courtenay (2006), and Gandia (2008).  
 
Inconsistent with ownership structure (hypothesis H12) the study does not 
accept the hypothesis as it found non-significant association with the internet 
disclosure level. This means that the structure of ownership of a company has 
no impact on internet disclosure. The result is consistent with Craswell and 
Taylor (1992), Naser and Al-Khatib (2000), Raffournier (1995), Abdel-Salam 
and Donna (2007), Trabelsi and Labelle (2006).  
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Moreover, the present study found non-significant association of company age 
(hypothesis H13) with the level of corporate internet reporting. The result is 
consistent with Alsaeed (2006), Hossain et al. (2008), Nandi and Ghosh (2013), 
Al-Shammari et al. (2007), Al-Shayeb (2003), Nurunnabi and Monirul (2012). 
The possible reason is that corporate internet reporting is voluntary in 
Bangladesh and there is no regulatory pressure to disclose information on the 
internet.  
 
Regarding hypothesis H8 (market category), this study found non-significant 
association with the level of voluntary disclosure on the internet. This implies 
that the level of disclosing voluntary information on the internet does not depend 
RQWKHFRPSDQ\¶VPDUNHWFDWHJRU\ 
 
7.5.2.3 Regression Analysis for Non-Financial Voluntary Disclosure: 
The result of OLS regression with robust standard error for voluntary disclosure 
model is presented in table 7.17. From the table it can be observed that the total 
voluntary disclosure has significant positiYHDVVRFLDWLRQZLWKILUPVL]HS
FRPSDQ\¶V SURILWDELOLW\ PHDVXUHGE\ 52$ S   DXGLW ILUP¶V LQWHUQDWLRQDO
OLQNSPXOWLQDWLRQDOSDUHQWSLQGHSHQGHQWGLUHFWRULQWKHERDUG
S   DQG GXDO OHDGHUVKLS VWUXFWXUH S   while it has significant 
QHJDWLYH DVVRFLDWLRQ ZLWK ILUPV SURILWDELOLW\ PHDVXUHG E\ 52( S   DQG
ILUP OHYHUDJH S   7KH SRVLWLYH DVVRFLDWLRQ PHDQV WKDW WRWDO YROXQWDU\
GLVFORVXUHLQFUHDVHVZLWKWKHLQFUHDVHLQILUP¶VVL]HILUP¶VSURILWDELOLW\measured 
by ROA, audited by big four audit firm, having multinational parents, high 
number of independent directors in the board and the existence of dual 
leadership in the board structure. On the other hand, negative association 
means that voluntary disclosure on the internet decreases for profitable 
companies (measured by ROE) and highly levered firm. 
 
,QDGGLWLRQILUP¶VOLTXLGLW\PHDVXUHGE\TXLFNUDWLRPDUNHWFDWHJRU\ERDUGVL]H
ownership structure and company age measured by number of listed years 
have a negative non-significant association. A FRPSDQ\¶VOLTXLGLW\PHDVXUHGE\
current ratio and company age measured by established year have non-
Significant positive association with the level of voluntary disclosure on the 
internet. The value of adjusted R square is 46.5% which means that 46.5% of 
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the changes of total voluntary disclosure are explained by the changes in its 
examined determinants. Some prior studies have reported stronger as well as 
weaker explanatory power using different sets of independent variables. For 
example, Depoers (2000) reported 65%, Barako et al. (2006) reported 53.4% 
and Iskander (2008) reported 45%, Haniffa and Cooke (2002) reported 47.9%. 
 
Referred to the different categories of voluntary disclosure, there is a significant 
positive association of multinational parent with all categories of voluntary 
disclosure on the internet except general disclosure. Firm size has significant 
positive association with strategic information, corporate governance, corporate 
sustainability, anG SUHVHQWDWLRQ IRUPDW &RPSDQ\¶V SURILWDELOLW\ PHDVXUHG E\
ROE has significant negative association with all the categories of voluntary 
disclosure except environmental information, investor information and 
SUHVHQWDWLRQ IRUPDW RQ WKH ZHEVLWH $OVR FRPSDQ\¶s profitability measured by 
ROA has significant positive association with all the categories except investor 
LQIRUPDWLRQDQGSUHVHQWDWLRQIRUPDW$XGLWILUP¶VLQWHUQDWLRQDOOLQNKDVVLJQLILFDQW
positive association with strategic information, corporate governance disclosure, 
financial disclosure and sustainability disclosure. 
 
 In the same way, leverage is significantly and negatively associated with 
strategic information, corporate governance disclosure, financial disclosure, 
CSR disclosure and sustainability disclosure. Although investor relation is 
positively and significantly associated with current ratio, it is negatively and 
significantly associated with quick ratio. Market category is negatively and 
significantly associated with general and corporate governance disclosure. 
Independent director in the board has significant positive association with 
general, strategic, corporate governance, financial, investor and presentation 
format. Moreover, role duality has significant positive association with general, 
strategic, corporate governance, financial, sustainability and investor 
information. Ownership structure has significant positive association only with 
&65GLVFORVXUH&RPSDQ\¶VOLVWHG\HDUKDVVLJQLILFDQWQHJDWLYHDVVRFLDWLRQZLWK
environmental, sustaLQDELOLW\LQYHVWRUDQGSUHVHQWDWLRQIRUPDWZKLOHFRPSDQ\¶V
established year has significant positive association with environmental, 
sustainability and presentation format. Moreover, board size has non-significant 
association with all the categories of voluntary disclosure.  
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Voluntary General Strategy Governance Financial 
 Coeff. T Coeff. T Coeff. T Coeff. T Coeff. t 
Firm Size 0.026 1.77* 0.027 1.26 0.039 2.1** 0.038 1.76* 0.038 1.42 
Return of Equity -0.076 -2.7*** -0.062 -1.7* -0.117 -2.94*** -0.155 -2.35*** -0.122 -2.34** 
Return on Assets 0.409 3.45*** 0.256 1.72* 0.436 1.77* 0.625 2.16** 0.415 2.19** 
Audit Firm Size 0.088 2.67*** 0.051 1.4 0.119 1.76* 0.197 3.12*** 0.191 4.34*** 
Multinational Parents 0.113 3.08*** 0.043 1.11 0.137 1.97* 0.148 2.41** 0.095 1.8* 
Leverage -0.008 -2.25** -0.007 -1.5 -0.013 -2.65*** -0.013 -1.76* -0.014 -2.17** 
Current ratio 0.013 0.69 0.033 1.14 0.028 0.77 0.0001 0 0.012 0.31 
Quick Ratio -0.020 -1.04 -0.041 -1.37 -0.036 -0.97 -0.014 -0.38 -0.018 -0.48 
Market Category -0.033 -1.07 -0.090 -1.88* -0.066 -1.34 -0.108 -1.98** -0.070 -1.39 
Independent Director 0.048 3.94*** 0.063 3.79*** 0.071 2.82*** 0.116 4.13*** 0.079 3.22** 
Board Size -0.004 -0.92 -0.013 -1.56 -0.010 -1.1 -0.014 -1.3 -0.010 -1.15 
Role Duality 0.100 3.35*** 0.159 3.34*** 0.131 2.69*** 0.271 4.32*** 0.165 2.94*** 
Ownership Structure -0.0002 -0.01 0.024 0.67 0.011 0.23 -0.0003 -0.01 -0.019 -0.43 
No. of Year-listed -0.002 -1.58 -0.002 -1.28 -0.002 -0.55 -0.001 -0.41 -0.001 -0.34 
Year ±establishment 0.001 1.4 0.0003 0.49 0.0002 0.12 -0.002 -1.46 0.0001 0.08 
Constant -0.066 -0.47 0.318 1.58 -0.231 -1.25 -0.089 -0.4 -0.083 -0.32 
R .723 .631 .580 .707 .644 
R Square .522 .399 .337 .500 .414 
Adjusted R square .465 .327 .257 .440 .344 
Table 7.17: OLS Regression with Robust Standard Error for Non-financial Voluntary Disclosure 
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CSR Environmental Sustainability Investor Presentation 
 Coeff. t Coeff. T Coeff. T Coeff. T Coeff. t 
Firm Size 0.024 1.2 0.006 0.3 0.014 1.66* 0.019 1.01 0.039 2** 
Return of Equity -0.083 -2.77*** -0.036 -1.37 -0.050 -2.69*** -0.020 -0.49 -0.058 -1.37 
Return on Assets 0.737 3.06*** 0.478 1.94* 0.420 2.98*** 0.307 1.42 -0.008 -0.07 
Audit Firm Size 0.083 1.33 0.022 0.36 0.062 1.95* 0.036 0.77 0.033 0.87 
Multinational Parents 0.196 2.77*** 0.188 2.5** 0.083 2.61*** 0.079 1.68* 0.069 1.82* 
Leverage -0.010 -2.65*** -0.004 -1.2 -0.006 -2.61*** 0.0003 0.07 -0.005 -0.87 
Current ratio 0.005 0.15 0.018 0.77 -0.006 -0.41 0.050 1.87* 0.013 0.52 
Quick Ratio -0.012 -0.38 -0.025 -1.01 0.002 0.12 -0.052 -1.98** -0.020 -0.79 
Market Category 0.026 0.74 0.044 0.92 0.011 0.51 -0.051 -1.18 -0.044 -1.02 
Independent Director 0.004 0.27 0.017 0.89 0.005 0.55 0.061 3.35*** 0.059 3.18*** 
Board Size 0.007 0.76 -0.001 -0.15 -0.002 -0.58 -0.003 -0.38 0.000 -0.04 
Role Duality 0.036 1.36 0.021 0.66 0.039 2.26** 0.098 2.68*** 0.041 1.14 
Ownership Structure 0.058 2.03** -0.018 -0.54 -0.006 -0.32 0.008 0.23 -0.037 -1.31 
Year-listed -0.002 -1.15 -0.003 -1.74* -0.003 -2.58** -0.003 -1.72* -0.003 -1.77* 
Year ±establishment 0.002 1.46 0.003 3.14*** 0.002 3.36*** 0.001 0.85 0.002 3.73*** 
Constant -0.277 -1.49 -0.089 -0.49 -0.076 -0.96 0.063 0.35 -0.085 -0.47 
R .646 .528 .677 .581 .566 
R Square .417 .279 .459 .337 .320 
Adjusted R square .348 .192 .394 .258 .238 
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7.5.2.4 Test of Hypothesis for Non-Financial Voluntary Disclosure Model: 
The result of the regression analysis agree with the research hypotheses 
concerning the existence of positive significant relationship between the total 
voluntary disclosure on the internet with firm size (hypothesis H1), profitability 
PHDVXUHGE\52$ K\SRWKHVLV+EDXGLW ILUP¶V LQWHUQDWLRQDO OLQN K\SRWKHVLV
H3), multinational parent (hypothesis H5), independent director in the board 
(hypothesis H9) and dual leadership structure (hypothesis H10). On the other 
hand, the regression result found significant negative association of total 
voluntary disclosure on the internet with the profitability measured by ROE 
(hypothesis H2a) and leverage (hypothesis H6). 
 
However, the study found non-significant association of liquidity (hypothesis 
H7), market category (hypothesis H8), board size (hypothesis H11), ownership 
structure (hypothesis H12), and company age (hypothesis H13) with the level of 
disclosing voluntary information on the internet. 
 
7.6 Conclusion: 
This chapter identified the factors affecting corporate internet reporting practices 
in Bangladesh. It examines whether the firm size, profLWDELOLW\ DXGLW ILUP¶V
international link, industry type, multinational parent, leverage, liquidity, market 
category, independent director in the board, dual leadership structure, board 
size, ownership structure, and company age affect the disclosure of information 
on the internet. This chapter includes two phases of analysis. Firstly, it 
examines the association of each independent variable separately with the 
dependent variable through bivariate analysis. Finally, it examines the 
association of all independent variables with the dependent variable through 
multivariate analysis to identify the combined effect of applying all independent 
variables at the same time. 
 
The findings of the bivariate analysis indicate that most of the independent 
variables are related to the dependent variables. In the case of the mandatory 
GLVFORVXUH PRGHO FRPELQHG ILUP VL]H SURILWDELOLW\ DXGLW ILUP¶V LQWHUQDWLRQDO
link, industry type, multinational parent, liquidity, independent directors in the 
board, board size, dual leadership structure are significantly and positively 
related with the disclosure of mandatory information on the internet. Only 
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market category and company age measured by the number of listed years 
have significant negative association with mandatory reporting on the internet. 
 
This result of combined sample is slightly different in the case of the non-
financial sample companies. The study found significant positive association of 
SURILWDELOLW\ DXGLW ILUP¶V LQWHUQDWLRQDO OLQN PXOWLQDWLRQDO SDUHQW LQGHSHQGent 
director in the board, dual leadership structure, ownership structure, liquidity 
measured by quick ratio and significant negative association of market 
category, company age measured by number of listed year, leverage with the 
disclosure of mandatory information. Although firm size and board size are 
significant in case of combined sample, they are non-significant association in 
case of non-ILQDQFLDOVDPSOH2QO\WKHFRPSDQ\¶VHVWDEOLVKPHQW\HDUKDVQRQ-
significant association with the mandatory disclosure in both samples. 
 
Regarding voluntary disclosure (combined), firm size, profitability measured by 
52( DXGLW ILUP¶V LQWHUQDWLRQDO OLQN LQGXVWU\ W\SH PXOWLQDWLRQDO SDUHQW
independent director in the board, board size, dual leadership structure, 
ownership structure have significant positive association and market category 
has significant negative association with the disclosure of voluntary information 
on the internet. In the case of non-financial sample companies, the disclosure of 
voluntary information has significant positive association with firm size, 
SURILWDELOLW\ DXGLW ILUP¶V LQWHUQDWLRQDO OLQN PXOWLQDWLRQDO SDUHQW LQGHSHQGHQW
director in the board, board size, dual leadership structure, ownership structure 
and significant negative association with market category and leverage. In both 
cases liquidity and company age have non-significant association. 
 
Although most of the variables are significant in bivariate analysis, the result is 
quite different in multivariate analysis where all variables are examined together 
to identify the combined effect. Based on the findings of the mandatory 
disclosure model, the study found significant positive association between 
PDQGDWRU\ GLVFORVXUH RQ WKH LQWHUQHW DQG DXGLW ILUP¶V LQWHUQDWLRQDO OLQN
independent directors in the board and dual leadership structure and significant 
negative association with profitability measured by ROE. In the combined 
sample profitability measured by ROA have significant positive association with 
the mandatory disclosure but it is non-significant in the non-financial sample. 
 - 213 - 
 
While market category has significant negative association with mandatory 
disclosure in non-financial sample, it is non-significant in combined sample. 
Again, multinational parent has significant positive association with the 
mandatory disclosure in non-financial sample companies, but it has a non-
significant association in the combined sample. Although leverage has 
significant negative association with mandatory disclosure in the non-financial 
sample, it has non-significant association in the combined sample. Market 
category is also significantly and negatively associated in the combined sample. 
However, in both cases, firm size, industry type, board size, ownership structure 
and company age have no association with mandatory disclosure on the 
internet.  
 
5HJDUGLQJ WKH YROXQWDU\ GLVFORVXUH PRGHO ILUP VL]H DXGLW ILUP¶V LQWHUQDWLRQDO
link, multinational parent, independent directors in the board and dual 
leadership structure has significant positive association: profitability measured 
by ROE has significant negative association with the voluntary disclosure on the 
internet. On the other hand, profitability measured by ROA, liquidity, market 
category, board size, ownership structure and company age have non-
significant association with the voluntary disclosure. Although profitability 
measured by ROA has significant positive association and leverage has 
significant negative association with voluntary disclosure in the non-financial 
sample, they are non-significant in the combined sample. Moreover, industry 
type has significant positive association with voluntary disclosure in combined 
sample. 
 
This chapter concludes that the determinants of mandatory and voluntary 
disclosure vary among the different categories. This result will help to identify 
the characteristics of companies disclosing more mandatory or more voluntary 
information on the internet. Moreover, the explanatory power of the model 
varies among the different categories. 
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Chapter: 8 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
8.1 Introduction: 
There has been tremendous growth in corporate sector and market activities in 
transitional and emerging economies in recent times. As the capital 
requirements of companies in these economies grow to support their increased 
business activities, so does the requirement for greater financial disclosure. 
Corporate internet reporting provides an additional cost-effective channel for 
companies in these economies to voluntarily deposit financial information in the 
market place. This research has examined the extent to which companies listed 
in the Dhaka Stock Exchange are taking advantage of the opportunity afforded 
by the Internet to communicate their financial information.  
 
The current chapter summarises the results and conclusions from chapter six 
and chapter seven. It starts with section 8.2 that outlines the objective, research 
questions and methodology. The findings of the study are summarised in 
section 8.3. Section 8.4 outlines the contributions made to the knowledge, 
followed by the recommendation for improving corporate internet reporting in 
section 8.5. Limitations and the scope of further research are discussed in 
section 8.6. The chapter ends with section 8.7 that presents the conclusion of 
this study. 
 
8.2 Research Objectives, Questions and Methodology 
The main objective of the present study is to identify the extent of corporate 
internet reporting practices in an emerging economy through the extent of 
disclosing mandatory and voluntary information on the internet. It also 
addresses the determinants of such reporting practices. It uses a sample from 
Bangladesh as an emerging capital market that lacks enough number of 
disclosure studies regarding corporate internet reporting. 
 
The first two research questions mentioned in chapter one have been answered 
by applying a descriptive analysis of mandatory reporting and voluntary 
reporting and its different categories on the internet by the Bangladeshi 
companies. The results of the disclosure checklist, the research instrument, 
have been analysed in different categories and in total. In order to find out the 
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answer of third research question, the study formulated a number of research 
hypotheses. These hypotheses are developed on the basis of a theoretical 
framework and evidence from the prior literature review on corporate reporting 
and they are tested empirically by applying different statistical techniques. The 
following section summarises the results of the study. 
 
8.3 Findings of the Study:  
In general the current study highlighted the corporate internet reporting 
practices in an emerging economy like Bangladesh. The data were collected by 
visiting the website of 234 listed companies in Bangladesh. The study revealed 
that 90.70% companies have website and all of them discloses some sort of 
information on their website whereas Nurunnabi and Monirul (2012) found only 
83 companies (29.12 percent) that have websites in 2009. So it can be 
concluded that the use of internet for business reporting is increasing in 
Bangladesh which justified the necessity of this study. 
 
By developing two separate disclosure checklist, firstly it examines the extent of 
mandatory disclosure on the internet by the Bangladeshi companies and 
secondly it examines the extent of voluntary disclosure on the internet. From the 
findings, it is revealed that the level of total mandatory disclosure on the internet 
by the listed companies in Bangladesh is low: the figure stands at 66.24%. 
Among the categories of mandatory disclosure, companies disclose the most 
information regarding general corporate information and the least regarding the 
GLUHFWRU¶V UHSRUW 7KHUH LV KXJH GLVFUHSDQF\ LQ WKH GLVFORVXUH RI PDQGDWRU\
information on corporate websites. In the case of non-financial companies the 
mean of total mandatory disclosure score is about 60.57% with a standard 
deviation of 32.04%. Here also the general information disclosure represents 
the highest disclosure level of 71.94% on the internet while disclosure of 
GLUHFWRU¶VUHSRUWSUHVHQWVWKHORZHVWGLVFORVXUHOHYHOof 45.30%. 
 
The study revealed that many company do not meet the disclosure 
requirements of the regulatory bodies in Bangladesh. The reason may be the 
disclosure of information on the internet is still voluntary. The low level of overall 
compliance with mandatory disclosure by Bangladeshi firms can be attributed to 
organizational culture, poor monitoring, and lapse in enforcement by the 
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regulatory body. Disclosure decisions are culture-driven (El-Gazzar et al. 1999). 
Ho and Wong (2001) also argued that in countries where the culture supports a 
high level of secrecy, managements become less transparent and are less likely 
to favor a high level of disclosure.  
 
Regarding voluntary disclosure, the result revealed that the level of disclosing 
voluntary information on the internet is only 35.46% which is also very low in 
comparison to mandatory disclosure. General corporate information represents 
the highest disclosure level of 70%, while the corporate environmental 
information disclosure presents the lowest disclosure level of 11.97%. 
Disclosure of social responsibility reporting and sustainability information on the 
internet is also low, 19.20% and 18.58%respectively. However, in case of non-
financial companies; the average disclosure rate is 29.50% which is lower than 
the combined sample. It is also identified that the disclosure of general 
information on the website is the highest disclosing category with the value of 
about 66.10% and the lowest disclosing category is corporate environmental 
information which is only about 6.93%.These results clearly suggest that the 
listed companies in Bangladesh are not using the full potential of the Internet for 
communicating corporate information to stakeholders. 
 
In order to gain a clear overview of corporate internet reporting practices by the 
listed companies in Bangladesh, sector wise analysis is performed which 
helped to identify the highest and lowest disclosing sector. It is observed that 
among the fifteen sectors, the telecommunication sector discloses highest 
mandatory information at 85.44% and the tannery sector discloses the lowest 
with only 37.86%.Inthe case of voluntary disclosure, the banking sector 
discloses the highest amount of information (62.23%) and the Tannery sector 
discloses the lowest amount of information (22.40%). So it can be concluded 
that Tannery sector of Bangladesh discloses the lowest amount of mandatory 
and voluntary information on the internet. 
 
Finally the study identified the determinants of mandatory and voluntary 
reporting on the internet through correlation, bivariate and multivariate analysis. 
The correlation coefficient of both the Spearman test and the Pearson test, 
showed that the level of mandatory disclosure has significant positive 
 - 217 - 
 
UHODWLRQVKLS ZLWK ILUP VL]H DXGLW ILUP¶V LQWHUQDWLRQDO OLQN LQGXVWU\ FDWHJRU\
multinational parent, independent director in the board, board size, role duality 
and significant negative association with market category and company age 
measured by listed year. But in case of non-financial companies, while 
profitability measured by ROA, audit firm, multinational parent, independent 
director, role duality and ownership structure are all positively and significantly 
associated with the level of mandatory disclosure, market category is 
significantly negatively associated with the disclosure level. 
 
Regarding voluntary disclosure, the correlation coefficient of both the Spearman 
test and the Pearson test, represented that the level of voluntary disclosure has 
VLJQLILFDQW SRVLWLYH UHODWLRQVKLS ZLWK ILUP VL]H DXGLW ILUP¶V LQWHUQDWLRQDO OLQN
industry category, multinational parent, liquidity, independent director in the 
board, board size, role duality and significant negative association with market 
category. But in case of non-financial companies, ZKLOH ILUP¶VVL]HSURILWDELOLW\
PHDVXUHGE\52$DXGLWILUP¶VLQWHUQDWLRQDOOLQNOHYHUDJHLQGHSHQGHQWGLUHFWRU
in the board, role duality and ownership structure are all positively and 
significantly associated with the level of voluntary disclosure, market category is 
significantly negatively associated with the disclosure level. 
 
The result of bivariate analysis showed that firm size, profitability measured by 
ROE, audit ILUP¶V LQWHUQDWLRQDO OLQN LQGXVWU\ W\SH PXOWLQDWLRQDO SDUHQW
independent directors in the board, board size, dual leadership structure, and 
market category have significant association with both mandatory and voluntary 
disclosure. But these results are very specific. So, to generalize the result of this 
study multivariate analysis was applied.  
 
The result of multivariate analysis differed slightly from bivariate analysis which 
revealed that the level of mandatory disclosure on the internet has significant 
SRVLWLYH DVVRFLDWLRQ ZLWK ILUP¶V SURILWDELOLW\ PHDVXUHG E\ 52$ DXGLW ILUP¶V
international link, independent director in the board, dual leadership structure 
DQG VLJQLILFDQW QHJDWLYH DVVRFLDWLRQ ZLWK ILUP¶ SURILWDELOLW\ PHDVXUHG E\ 52(
and market category. But in case of non-ILQDQFLDO FRPSDQLHV DXGLW ILUP¶V
international link, multinational parent, independent director in the board, dual 
leadership structure have significant positive association and profitability (ROE) 
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and leverage have significant negative association with the level of mandatory 
disclosure.  
 
The study also indentified the determinants of voluntary disclosure on the 
LQWHUQHW7KHOHYHORIYROXQWDU\GLVFORVXUHGHSHQGVRQWKHILUPVL]HDXGLWILUP¶V
international link, industry type, multinational parent, independent director in the 
board, dual leadership structure and profitability (ROE) whereas in non-financial 
companies, the disclosure level depends on firm size, profitability (both ROE 
DQG 52$ DXGLW ILUP¶V LQWHUQDWLRQDO OLQN PXOWLQational parent, independent 
director in the board, dual leadership structure and leverage. 
 
)URP WKH ILQGLQJV LW FDQ EH FRQFOXGHG WKDW DXGLW ILUP¶V LQWHUQDWLRQDO OLQN
independent director in the board, dual leadership structure have significant 
positive association and profitability measured by ROE has significant negative 
association with the level of disclosure of mandatory and voluntary information 
by the Bangladeshi companies. However, firm size, multinational parent, and 
industry type have significant positive association with the level of disclosing 
voluntary information: they are non-significant in mandatory disclosure. In 
addition, board size, ownership structure and company age has a non- 
significant association with the level of disclosure (both mandatory and 
voluntary). Nurunnabi and Monirul (2012) also found the significant relationships 
RIDXGLWILUP¶VZLWKWKHOHYHORILQWHUQHWUHSRUWLQJ7KHUHDVRQPD\EHODUJHUDXGLW
firms may have more influence over their clients to disclose more information 
than the minimum, which is adequate in order to maintain their reputation in the 
market. 
 
8.4 Contribution to Knowledge: 
5HJDUGLQJ WKH LVVXH RI ³FRUSRUDWH LQWHUQHW UHSRUWLQJ´ WKH PRVW LPSRUWDQW
decisions made by corporations is whether to disclose information about their 
organisation and to what extent they should do soon the internet. The decision 
to disclose information on the internet has some relevant advantages, such as 
DQLQFUHDVHLQWKHLQYHVWRUV¶WUXVWLQWKHILUPZKLFKXVXDOO\KHOSVWRUDLVHFDSital 
at the lowest cost. It ensures transparency in disclosing information which is 
very important in an emerging capital market. The users of financial reporting, 
including investors, need confidence in financial markets and information 
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disclosure is a vital element to build this confidence. Given this, this thesis 
focused on determining the extent of mandatory and voluntary reporting 
practices on the internet and the determinants that affects the level of 
disclosure: as the use of the internet to disseminate corporate information is 
increasing, this empirical study provides a communication bridge to the various 
stakeholders in the society. This research aims to expand the understanding 
about internet financial reporting and increasing the overall disclosure level, 
which will be an incentive to encourage investment in Bangladeshi companies 
as well as other emerging countries. 
 
The thesis is expected to contribute to corporate reporting literature both in 
macro and micro level. The study classifies the information as mandatory and 
voluntary information and developed two separate sets of disclosure checklists 
to identify the current status of internet reporting in an emerging economy. 
These indexes were modified to be suitable for companies working in the 
Bangladeshi environment context and could be used by other researchers to 
investigate internet financial reporting and disclosure for companies working in 
other emerging countries that are experiencing similar economic changes. 
 
These checklists were then classified into different categories: there are four 
categories of information in the mandatory and nine categories of information in 
the voluntary checklist which helped to identify the highest and lowest 
disclosure categories of information. Moreover, both the mandatory and 
voluntary data set is classified into two categories: the total data set named as 
combined data and non-financial data to examine the effects of the 
determinants in non-financial sector separately. 
 
The thesis provides a comprehensive view of the previous studies that have 
discussed corporate internet reporting in developed and emerging economies 
and especially in Bangladesh. By providing the current status of disclosing 
mandatory and voluntary information on the internet, this study reduces the 
existing gap in the literature relating to emerging economy. 
 
The study conveyed the importance of employing a wider theoretical framework 
by encompassing several disclosure theories to obtain a full explanation of 
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mandatory and voluntary reporting practices on the internet. The results signify 
that disclosure theories that originating from developed countries are also 
applicable in emerging capital markets. 
 
The study provides the evidence that at present 90.70% companies have 
websites and all of them disclose some sort of mandatory and voluntary 
information on the internet. While some sectors are disclosing the most 
information like the Telecommunication sector, others sectors are disclosing 
little information, Tannery sector. This study will help to identify those lower 
disclosing sectors. 
 
The result of the study will provide beneficial insights and recommendations for 
legislators, accounting professionals and researchers to assess the current 
status of corporate internet reporting in Bangladesh and the characteristics of 
the companies that are, and that are not, satisfying national and international 
LQYHVWRUV¶GHPDQGIRURQOLQHLQIRUPDWLRQ,QPDFUROHYHOLWDOVRKHOSVUHJXODWRUV
to assess the necessity of developing a framework and guidelines for corporate 
internet reporting which will reduce the information asymmetry and increase 
LQYHVWRUV¶FRQILGHQFH$VDQLQFUHDVLQJQXPEHURIFRPSDQLHVDOORYHUWKHZRUOG
are using the internet for financial disclosure, it is high time to think about an 
International Internet Accounting Standards (IIASs) for harmonisation of 
financial reporting practices. Though regulations alone can do little to ensure 
disclosure because companies view that disclosure excellence lies in the hands 
of regulatory bodies who work for VDIHJXDUGLQJ WKH FRPSDQ\¶V YDOXH IRU
shareholders (Ho and Wong (2001).So the regulatory bodies need to create an 
environment that helps become aware of the companies consequences of 
nondisclosure of adequate information. 
 
This study provides an update result after the Directive Circular (which was 
issued by the order of the Securities and Exchange Commission 
SEC/CMRRCD/ 2009-193/09, Mrs. Ruksana Chowdhury, Executive Director on 
January 17, 2010) regarding the disclosure of quarterly financial statements in   
company web-sites. It is believed that the result of this study will contribute to 
develop further rules or guidelines regarding internet reporting. 
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It is expected that this research will be beneficial to companies, investor 
relations, financial analysts, auditors, investors and other users. Companies 
need to attract investors by disclosing timely, relevant information. Financial 
analysts will save time and effort in collecting and analysing the information 
their clients need. International investors can easily access and obtain 
information required for their investment decisions. This study will help to 
identify the importance of corporate internet reporting. 
 
8.5 Recommendations for Improving Corporate Internet Reporting: 
In the near future, corporate reporting on the internet will not be just about 
providing traditional information, it is expected that future internet disclosures 
are more likely to provide certain advantages over the traditional annual 
reporting by extending the amount of information, improving timeliness, allowing 
a degree of interactivity, and also likely to provide annual financial data on an 
updated monthly basis or on a rolling basis. As the findings revealed that most 
of the companies have a web page, so it can be said that having a corporate 
web site is a common practice in Bangladesh. The regulators like BSEC and 
ICAB can play an important role in promoting corporate websites as a 
communication tool for investors by issuing guidelines for corporate internet 
reporting which can be considered as a motivating factor for companies. They 
should update the standards and guidelines of corporate reporting. 
 
The study offers certain implications for corporations, regulators and market 
participants. First, corporations need to take investor relations more seriously. 
They can do this by setting up separate investor relations departments and can 
use corporate web sites for investor relations more effectively by disclosing 
relevant information on a timely basis. The findings indicate that the information 
level disclosed on corporate web sites varies among firms. While some firms 
disclose comprehensive information that stakeholders may benefit from, others 
disclose very little information. The gap in information disclosure level among 
different sectors shows this succinctly and this can be closed by implementing 
the guidelines. 
 
Furthermore, there are differences among subcategories of disclosure items. 
While the disclosure percentage of some items is high, others are quite low. 
 - 222 - 
 
This does not mean that every item deserves equal disclosure. Nevertheless, 
attention ought to be paid to the percentage of items or categories. For 
example, corporate environmental disclosure is the least among subcategories, 
and hence needs improvement. It is the appropriate time to make it mandatory 
for all companies to publish corporate social responsibility reporting, 
environmental reporting and sustainability reporting on the internet. It is also 
important for companies to disclose the audited financial statements and 
differentiate these from un-audited financial statements. 
 
Secondly, the study has some implications for regulators as well. The current 
³FRPSO\ RUH[SODLQ´DSSURDFKUHJDUGLQJ corporate governance guidelines seems 
to be insufficient to motivating companies to disclose information. In addition 
there is only a directive circular regarding corporate internet reporting which is 
also insufficient. There is a need to enforce disclosure of at least some minimal 
level of information. Policies incorporating rewards and sanctions may be 
helpful in improving the situation. A new company act is supposed to be drafted 
and passed into laws regarding internet reporting. 
 
Finally, some responsibilities fall on the shoulders of stakeholders as well. They 
can contact the investor relations departments of firms, and demand more 
information disclosure. Present or potential investors may send messages to 
the management. Shareholders may express the hardships they face in finding 
QHFHVVDU\LQIRUPDWLRQLQWKHILUP¶VZHESDJH Users can sign up for copies of all 
company announcements and press releases to be emailed to them after they 
hit the stock exchange screen. 
 
To increase the transparency of these companies, and consequently that of the 
financial markets, it is necessary tKDW WKH FRPSDQ\¶V DQDO\VHG VKRXOG GHYRWH
much more effort to the use of the internet as a medium for the disclosure of 
corporate information. It is necessary to protect the investors. In a developed 
economy, like the European economy, companies have accepted the 
importance of the internet as a corporate reporting medium and they are very 
interested in digital reporting (Bonson and Thomas 2002). Like the developed 
economy, corporate reporting in the emerging economy should be digitalised in 
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order to attract potential investors world-wide and to improve relations with 
stakeholders. 
 
It is recommended that members of the accounting profession should consider 
and encourage the improvement of increased content, improved accessibility, 
improved verification and more sophisticated use of the website as a 
mechanism for feedback. Companies can enhance their ability to have two-way 
communications with a broader range of potential stakeholders. 
 
8.6 Limitation and Scope of Further Research: 
There is no perfect study and this study is no exception. It has some limitations 
that need to be acknowledged and addressed when assessing the findings of 
the study. This section summarises these limitations. 
 
This study presents a snapshot of internet financial reporting of Bangladeshi 
companies from December 2013 to March 2014. As internet reporting is a new 
phenomenon in Bangladesh, this study could not examine the longitudinal data 
of internet reporting, and so is limited to a cross-sectional study. However, this 
study provides a base for future longitudinal studies of internet reporting in 
Bangladesh. 
 
The explanatory power in the multiple regression analysis ranged between 30% 
and 50%; although this percentage is considerable, it might indicate that other 
variables that were not included in the model affect the level of disclosure. 
Some variables are excluded in this study because of their unavailability, for 
example, the qualification of accountants, the attitude of management to IT, 
audit committee, and the technological infrastructure. Therefore, future studies 
might usefully employ other variables, which could affect internet financial 
reporting and disclosure in Bangladesh. Moreover, the study could not consider 
the endogeneity / causality issues in the empirical models. 
 
In this study, all items included in the disclosure index are equally weighted, 
which means that all information items are assumed to be of the same degree 
of importance for investors. However, assigning different weights for different 
items in the list might mislead because the relative importance of each item 
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varies from company to company. Future studies could use a weighted 
disclosure index but would need to ensure that the internet reporting standards 
are harmonized. 
 
The current study developed a self constructed checklist to measure the extent 
of disclosure using the disclosure index technique. While a number of steps 
have been followed to lessen subjectivity in selecting information items to be 
included in the checklist (see section 5.6), it cannot be argued that the study is 
free from subjectivity. Moreover, measuring the extent of disclosure may be a 
problem but the use of disclosure index methodology seems reasonable as it 
satisfies the requirements of reliability and validity and has been extensively 
used in previous disclosure studies (Marston and Shrives 1991). Furthermore, 
Cooke and Wallace (1989), suggest that it is a suitable proxy to gain insight into 
the level of information disclosed by companies. 
 
This study investigated the extent of internet reporting and characteristics of 
companies adopting internet financial reporting and as such it focused on 
supply rather than demand. Therefore, a better understanding of the different 
needs of users and the potential for effective reporting activity could be 
achieved by measuring demand side factors such as the frequency of visits to 
corporate web sites to download or view financial information. 
 
8.7 Conclusion: 
The previous discussion explained in a comprehensive fashion the overview of 
the whole thesis. This thesis is considered to be unique for the following 
reasons. First, it is examining the corporate internet reporting practices with one 
of the most detailed checklists in this area of research. Second, the checklists 
categorized the mandatory disclosure into four categories and voluntary 
disclosure into nine categories of disclosure and examined the determinants of 
internet disclosure not just for the total mandatory and voluntary disclosure, but 
for every single category over the examined period of time.Third, the thesis is 
introducing a recent area of corporate reporting, corporate internet reporting, 
which acts as an effective method in reducing information gap compared to the 
other traditional methods. 
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While it is recognised that this research has some limitations, it is believed that 
the findings of this research provide a useful insight into the corporate internet 
disclosure practices of Bangladeshi companies with regard to two disclosure 
categories i.e. corporate mandatory disclosure and voluntary disclosure: areas 
which have been neglected by previous studies. This adds a new dimension to 
the studies on corporate internet disclosure and the study has achieved its 
aims, has made policy recommendations and also provides a starting point for 
many future research possibilities in the area of financial reporting as discussed 
above. 
 
This study will help to realize the importance and determinants of corporate 
internet reporting in any emerging economy. It can be concluded that while 
numerous variations exist, the pressures on companies, worldwide to become 
widely accessisable, more transparent, accountable, responsible and ultimately 
to help supply chains and economies to become more sustainable. From the 
findings companies as well as regulators will be able to identify the gap between 
existing rules and the reporting practices by the companies and also help to 
develop rules and guidelines both in national and international level to 
harmonize the corporate internet reporting practices. 
 
The result of this study indicates that the existence of low level of voluntary 
disclosure is considered to be a sign of the existence of the information gap 
which contributes to the information asymmetry. It is believed that increasing 
the level of internet disclosure will reduce this information asymmetry and 
reduces the cost of external financing. Accordingly, this type of disclosure is 
considered to be an effective solution for the reduction of the information gap.  
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Appendix-A 
Mandatory Disclosure Checklist 
S. N. A. General disclosures Sources 
1 $XGLWRU¶VUHSRUW CA-1994, Sec-183(3) 
2 5HYLHZRIWKHFRPSDQ\¶VILQDQFLDOVWDWHPHQWV IAS ± 1.27(a) 
3 A significant acquisition or disposal of fixed assets  IAS ± 1.28 
4 Gains and losses on the disposal of non-current assets IAS ± 1.34 
5 Audited financial statements (BS and P & L a/c) CA ± 1994, Sec ± 183(3) 
6 The period covered by the financial statements CA ± 1994, Sec- 183(4); IAS ± 1.49 
7 Balance sheet and Profit and Loss account CA ± 1994, Sec ± 183(1) 
8 Performance at a glance- 3 years CA ± 1994 
9 Cash flow statement CA ± 1994, Sec ± 183(a) 
10 All sales and purchase of goods by the company CA ± 1994, Sec ± 183(b) 
11 Comparative information shall be disclosed in respect of the previous period IAS ± 1.36 
12 %RDUGRI'LUHFWRU¶VUHSRUW CA ± 1994, Sec ± 183 
13 Legal form of the entity, its country of incorporation and the address of its 
registered office 
IAS ± 1.126 (a) 
14 1DWXUHRIWKHHQWLW\¶VRSHUDWLRQDQGLWVSULQFLSDODFWLYLWLHV IAS ± 1.126 (b) 
15 Summary of significant accounting policies IAS ± 1.105 
16 The date of financial statements authorisation of issue IAS ± 10.17 
17 The nature and quantity of changes in accounting policy CA ± 1994,Schedule ± XI, Part - I; IAS 8.28(c)  
18 Notes to the accounts CA ± 1994, Sec ± 185(6); SEC rules ± 1987, 
 -267- 
 
Sec ± 12(1) 
19 Disclosure of all significant accounting policies CA ± 1994,Schedule ± XI, Part ± I 
20 Statement of changes in financial position CA ± 1994, Schedule ± XI, Part ± I 
21 Nature of the activities of the enterprise CA ± 1994, Schedule ± XI, Part ± I 
22 All material information should be disclosed CA ± 1994, Schedule ± XI, Part ± I 
23 Any restriction on the title to assets should be clearly stated CA ± 1994, Schedule ± XI, Part ± I 
 %'LUHFWRU¶V5HSRUW  
24 6WDWHPHQWRIFRPSDQ\¶VDIIDLUV CA ± 1994, Sec ± 184(1)(a) 
25 The amount proposed by the board to carry to any reserve CA ± 1994, Sec ± 184(1)(b) 
26 The amount of dividend recommended by the board CA ± 1994, Sec ± 184(1)(c) 
27 Material changes and commitments affecting the financial position of the 
company 
CA ± 1994, Sec ± 184(1)(d) 
28 Changes in the nature of business during the year CA ± 1994, Sec ± 184(2) (a) 
29 &KDQJHVLQWKHQDWXUHRIFRPSDQ\¶VVXEVLGLDULHVEXVLQHVVGXULQJWKH\HDU CA ± 1994, Sec ± 184(2) (b) 
30 Changes in the classes of busiQHVVRIFRPSDQ\¶VLQWHUHVW CA ± 1994, Sec ± 184(2) (c) 
31 Fullest information of every reservation, qualification or adverse remark 
contained in the audit report 
CA ± 1994, Sec ± 184(3) 
 C. Contents of Balance Sheet  
32 Total fixed assets and its composition CA ± 1994, Sec ± 185, Schedule ± XI, Part ± I 
33 Fundamental accounting assumptions CA ± 1994, Sec ± 185, Schedule ± XI, Part ± I 
34 Method of depreciation CA ± 1994, Sec ± 185, Schedule ± XI, Part ± I 
35 Original cost of each fixed assets CA ± 1994, Sec ± 185, Schedule ± XI, Part ± I 
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36 Addition to the fixed assets during the year CA ± 1994, Sec ± 185, Schedule ± XI, Part ± I 
37 Amount of depreciation / deductions during the year CA ± 1994, Sec ± 185, Schedule ± XI, Part ± I 
38 Total amount of accumulated depreciation during the year CA ± 1994, Sec ± 185, Schedule ± XI, Part ± I 
39 $JJUHJDWH ERRN YDOXH RI FRPSDQ\¶V TXRWHG LQYHVWPHQWV DQG DOVR PDUNHW
value 
CA ± 1994, Sec ± 185, Schedule ± XI, Part ± I 
40 $JJUHJDWHERRNYDOXHRIFRPSDQ\¶V unquoted investments and also market 
value 
CA ± 1994, Sec ± 185, Schedule ± XI, Part ± I 
41 Nature of investment and its classification (Govt. securities, shares, 
debentures or bonds)  
CA ± 1994, Sec ± 185, Schedule ± XI, Part ± I 
42 Mode of valuation of investments (cost or market) CA ± 1994, Sec ± 185, Schedule ± XI, Part ± I 
43 Inventory valuation method CA ± 1994, Sec ± 185, Schedule ± XI, Part ± I 
44 Current assets and its composition CA ± 1994, Sec ± 185, Schedule ± XI, Part ± I 
45 Net realizable value of inventories CA ± 1994, Sec ± 185, Schedule ± XI, Part ± I 
46 Debt classification  CA ± 1994, Sec ± 185, Schedule ± XI, Part ± I 
47 Amount of debt due by directors CA ± 1994, Sec ± 185, Schedule ± XI, Part ± I 
48 The maximum amount of debt due by directors CA ± 1994, Sec ± 185, Schedule ± XI, Part ± I 
49 Cash in hand and bank CA ± 1994, Sec ± 185, Schedule ± XI, Part ± I 
50 Amount of leasehold property and expenditure on property development BAS 16,17 
51 Cash which is not immediately available for use CA ± 1994, Sec ± 185, Schedule ± XI, Part ± I 
52 Classification of loan and advances CA ± 1994, Sec ± 185, Schedule ± XI, Part ± I 
53 Trade and other receivables CA ± 1994, Sec ± 185, Schedule ± XI, Part ± I 
54 Advances recoverable in cash or in kind CA ± 1994, Sec ± 185, Schedule ± XI, Part ± I 
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55 Current liabilities and its composition CA ± 1994, Sec ± 185, Schedule ± XI, Part ± I 
56 The amount of contingent liabilities CA ± 1994, Sec ± 185, Schedule ± XI, Part ± I 
57 Classification of long term secured and unsecured loans CA ± 1994, Sec ± 185, Schedule ± XI, Part ± I 
58 Current posting of long term liabilities CA ± 1994, Sec ± 185, Schedule ± XI, Part ± I 
59 Accrued interest on loan CA ± 1994, Sec ± 185, Schedule ± XI, Part ± I 
60 Provision for taxation CA ± 1994, Sec ± 185, Schedule ± XI, Part ± I 
61 Proposed dividends CA ± 1994, Sec ± 185, Schedule ± XI, Part ± I 
62 Provision for contingencies CA ± 1994, Sec ± 185, Schedule ± XI, Part ± I 
63 Provision for provident fund schemes CA ± 1994, Sec ± 185, Schedule ± XI, Part ± I 
64 Provision for insurance, pension and similar staff benefit schemes CA ± 1994, Sec ± 185, Schedule ± XI, Part ± I 
65 Other provisions CA ± 1994, Sec ± 185, Schedule ± XI, Part ± I 
66 Classification of share capital  CA ± 1994, Sec ± 185, Schedule ± XI, Part ± I 
67 Specify the sources from which bonus shares are issued CA ± 1994, Sec ± 185, Schedule ± XI, Part ± I 
 D. Profit & Loss Account  
68 The working result of the company during the year CA ± 1994, Sec ± 185, Schedule ± XI, Part ± I 
69 The aggregate amount of sales CA ± 1994, Sec ± 185, Schedule ± XI, Part ± I 
70 The amount of sales in respect of each class of goods CA ± 1994, Sec ± 185, Schedule ± XI, Part ± I 
71 Quantity of sales for each class of goods CA ± 1994, Sec ± 185, Schedule ± XI, Part ± I 
72 Commission paid to selling agent CA ± 1994, Sec ± 185, Schedule ± XI, Part ± I 
73 Brokerage /discount on sales (other than trade discount) CA ± 1994, Sec ± 185, Schedule ± XI, Part ± I 
74 The gross income derived from different heads CA ± 1994, Sec ± 185, Schedule ± XI, Part ± I 
75 Classification of payments made to the managing director or managing CA ± 1994, Sec ± 185, Schedule ± XI, Part ± I 
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agents during the year 
76 Net profit & loss according to Sec- 119 of Company Act 1994  CA ± 1994, Sec ± 185, Schedule ± XI, Part ± I 
77 Amount to paid to the auditors as fees or others CA ± 1994, Sec ± 185, Schedule ± XI, Part ± I 
78 Amount paid to the advisor CA ± 1994, Sec ± 185, Schedule ± XI, Part ± I 
79 Value of imports calculated on CIF basis during the year CA ± 1994, Sec ± 185, Schedule ± XI, Part ± I 
80 Expenditure in foreign currency CA ± 1994, Sec ± 185, Schedule ± XI, Part ± I 
81 Value of all imported raw materials consumed and their % to the total 
consumption 
CA ± 1994, Sec ± 185, Schedule ± XI, Part ± I 
82 The amount remitted during the year in foreign currencies on account of  
dividend 
CA ± 1994, Sec ± 185, Schedule ± XI, Part ± I 
83 Classification of earnings in foreign exchange CA ± 1994, Sec ± 185, Schedule ± XI, Part ± I 
84 The amount provided for depreciation, renewals in value of fixed assets CA ± 1994, Sec ± 185, Schedule ± XI, Part ± I 
85 7KH DPRXQW RI LQWHUHVW RQ WKH FR¶V GHEHQWXUHV DQG RWKHU ORDQV SDLd to 
directors / managers 
CA ± 1994, Sec ± 185, Schedule ± XI, Part ± I 
86 The amount reserved for repayment of share capital CA ± 1994, Sec ± 185, Schedule ± XI, Part ± I 
87 Reserved amount for repayment of loans CA ± 1994, Sec ± 185, Schedule ± XI, Part ± I 
88 Provisions made for meeting liabilities, contingencies of commitments CA ± 1994, Sec ± 185, Schedule ± XI, Part ± I 
89 Expenditures on consumption of stores and spare parts CA ± 1994, Sec ± 185, Schedule ± XI, Part ± I 
90 Expenditure on power and fuel CA ± 1994, Sec ± 185, Schedule ± XI, Part ± I 
91 Expenditure on rent CA ± 1994, Sec ± 185, Schedule ± XI, Part ± I 
92 Expenditure on repair to buildings CA ± 1994, Sec ± 185, Schedule ± XI, Part ± I 
93 Repairs to machinery expenses CA ± 1994, Sec ± 185, Schedule ± XI, Part ± I 
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94 Expenses on salaries, wages and bonus CA ± 1994, Sec ± 185, Schedule ± XI, Part ± I 
95 Contribution to provident and other funds CA ± 1994, Sec ± 185, Schedule ± XI, Part ± I 
96 Workmen and staff welfare expenses CA ± 1994, Sec ± 185, Schedule ± XI, Part ± I 
97 Breakup of income from investment CA ± 1994, Sec ± 185, Schedule ± XI, Part ± I 
98 Profits and losses on investments CA ± 1994, Sec ± 185, Schedule ± XI, Part ± I 
99 Staff remuneration more than tk 36000 per year CA ± 1994, Sec ± 185, Schedule ± XI, Part ± I 
100 The amount of income tax CA ± 1994, Sec ± 185, Schedule ± XI, Part ± I 
101 Dividends from subsidiary companies CA ± 1994, Sec ± 185, Schedule ± XI, Part ± I 
102 Provisions for losses of subsidiary companies CA ± 1994, Sec ± 185, Schedule ± XI, Part ± I 
103 The aggregate amount of dividend paid CA ± 1994, Sec ± 185, Schedule ± XI, Part ± I 
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Appendix B  
Voluntary Disclosure Index 
S.N. A. General Corporate Information Sources 
1. Objectives, mission and company philosophy Sobhani et al. 2012; Bhuiyan et al. 2007 
2. Company History and Background Bhuiyan et al. 2007 
3. Product & Services Bhuiyan et al. 2007 
4. Organogram Dutta and Bose, 2007 
5. Stock exchanges on which shares are held Akhtaruddin and Rouf (2011) 
6. &RPSDQ\¶VFRQWULEXWLRQRQQDWLRQDOHFRQRP\ GRI 2006; Sobhani et al. 2012 
7. Discussion of major factors underlying performance GRI (2006) 
8. Information about company listing (date) Rouf (2011) 
9. Web address or e-mail address Bhuiyan et al. (2007) 
10. Annual report in PDF and/or HTML format Dutta and Bose (2007) 
 B. Corporate Strategic Information  
11.  Statement of corporate strategy and objectives ±
general. 
Chow and Wong - Boren (1987), Ferguson et al.(2002), Chau and Gray 
(2002), Haniffa and Cooke (2002), Eng and Mak (2003), Leventis and 
Wetman (2004), Ghazali and Weetman (2006), Barako et al. (2006), 
Abdel- Fatah  (2008). 
12. Statement of corporate strategy and objectives ±
financial. 
Akhtaruddin and Rouf (2011) 
13. Statement of corporate strategy and objectives ±
marketing. 
Akhtaruddin and Rouf (2011) 
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14. Impact of strategy on current performance. Gray et al. (1995), Hossain et al. (2008). 
15. Statement of corporate strategy and objectives ± 
social 
Akhtaruddin and Rouf (2011) 
16. Market share analysis Haniffa and Cooke (2002), Leventis and Weetman (2004), Barako et 
al.(2006), Abdel-Fatah (2008) 
17. Managing risk and uncertainties UNEP-FI (2006); GRI 2006; Sobhani et al. 2012 
 C. Corporate Governance/Directors Information  
18. Name of principal shareholders Leventis and Weetman (2004), ACCA (2005), Hassan et al. (2006), 
Abdel-Fatah (2008). 
19. List of directors. Hossain et al. (1994), Barako et al. (2006), Hassan et al. (2006), GRI 
(2006), UNEP-FI (2006),  Tsamenyi et  al. (2007), Abdel Fatah(2008). 
20. Outside affiliations of the directors Hossain et al. (2008). 
21. Meeting held and Attendance. Resolutions of 
VKDUHKROGHUV¶PHHWLQJV 
Dutta and Bose, 2007 
22. Educational qualifications of the directors. Hossain et al. (1994), Haniffa and Cooke (2002), Barako et al. (2006), 
Tsamenyi et al. (2007), Abdel Fatah (2008). 
23. Experience of the directors. Hossain et al. (1994), Haniffa and Cooke (2002), Barako et al. (2006), 
Tsamenyi et al. (2007), Abdel Fatah (2008). 
24. ([HFXWLYH2IILFHUV¶LQIRUPDWLRQ Dutta and Bose, 2007 
25. Other directorship held by executive directors. Gray et al. (1995). 
26. Articles of association Full text Dutta and Bose, 2007 
27. Number of shares Dutta and Bose, 2007 
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28. Classes of shares Dutta and Bose, 2007 
29. Members of the audit committee Dutta and Bose, 2007 
30. Remuneration of the members of the management 
board and directors Individualized 
Dutta and Bose, 2007 
31. Disclosure of risks Dutta and Bose, 2007 
 D. Financial Information  
32. Financial ratios Dutta and Bose, 2007 
33. Financial reports of the subsidiaries Dutta and Bose, 2007 
34. Segment reporting Dutta and Bose, 2007 
35. Current share price Current trading day (internal or 
external link) 
Dutta and Bose, 2007 
36. Share price history Internal or external link Dutta and Bose, 2007 
37. Current dividend Dutta and Bose, 2007 
38. Dividend of past year Internal or external link Dutta and Bose, 2007 
39. Press releases or news Dutta and Bose, 2007 
40. Reports of analysts Dutta and Bose, 2007 
41. $QDO\VWV¶OLVW$QDO\VW¶VQDPHDQGFRQWDFWGHWDLOV Dutta and Bose, 2007 
42. Graphs on Financial Performance Leventis and Weetman (2004), Abdel- Fatah (2008), Rouf (2011). 
42. Dividend payout policy Leventis and Weetman (2004), Abdel- Fatah (2008), Sobhani et al. 2012 
43. Sources of their revenue and amount GRI (2006); Rouf (2011) 
44. Foreign currency information Rouf (2011) 
45. Interim report Bhuiyan et al. (2007); Dutta and Bose (2007); Nurunnabi and Monirul 
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(2012) 
46. Comparative financial growth with previous years Hossain et al. (1994), Chau and Gray (2002), Haniffa and Cooke (2002), 
Eng and Mak (2003), Leventis and Weetman (2004), Ghazali and 
Weetman (2006), Tsamenyi et al (2007), Abdel- Fatah  (2008). 
47. Infrastructural and institutional development GRI (2006), Sobhani et al.(2012). 
 E. Corporate Social Responsibility Information  
48. Special CSR page Dutta and Bose, 2007 
49. Stand-alone CSR report Dutta and Bose, 2007 
50. Donations to charitable bodies information Dutta and Bose, 2007 
51. Product quality and safety Dutta and Bose, 2007 
52. Sponsoring public health, sponsoring of recreational 
projects 
Meek et al. (1995), Gray et al. (1995), Ferguson et al. (2002), SAI (2002), 
Chau and Gray (2002), Haniffa and Cooke (2002), Leventis and 
Weetman (2004), Ghazali and Weetman (2006), Abdel-Fatah(2008), 
Azim et al.(2011), Sobhani et al.(2012). 
53. Patronizing religious functions and activities Sobhani et al. (2012) 
54. Commitment for HR development Sobhani et al. 2012 
55. Information about employee appreciation Sobhani et al. 2012 
56. Amount spent on CSR activities Sobhani et al. 2012 
57. Commitment to societal development Sobhani et al. 2012 
58. Poverty alleviation programmes Sobhani et al. 2012 
59. Rural development programmes Sobhani et al. 2012 
60. Social awareness programmes Sobhani et al. 2012 
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61. Financial assistance for poor women and children Sobhani et al. 2012 
 F. Corporate Environmental Information  
63. Information on energy savings Dutta and Bose, 2007 
64. Environmental policies or company concern for the 
environment. 
Dutta and Bose, 2007 
65. Recycling plant of waste products Dutta and Bose, 2008 
66. Financing for pollution control equipment or facilities Dutta and Bose, 2008 
67. Land reclamation and forestation programmes. Dutta and Bose, 2008; Sobhani et al. 2012 
68. Pollution control of industrial process Dutta and Bose, 2008 
69. Research on new methods of production to reduce 
environmental pollution 
Dutta and Bose, 2008 
70. Support for public or private action designed to protect 
the environment 
Dutta and Bose, 2008 
71. Conservation of energy in the conduct of business 
Operations 
Dutta and Bose, 2008 
72. 'LVFXVVLRQRIWKHFRPSDQ\¶VHIIRUWVWRUHGXFHHQHUJ\
consumption 
Dutta and Bose, 2008 
73. Issues concerning climate change Sobhani et al. 2012 
74. Amount spent for environmental activities Dutta and Bose, 2008 
75. Conservation of natural resources Dutta and Bose, 2008 
 G. Sustainability Information  
76. Creating job opportunities for unemployed youth Sobhani et al. 2012 
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77. Anti-corruption measures Sobhani et al. 2012 
78. HRD plans and policies Sobhani et al. 2012 
79. Employee compensation, welfare or donation Sobhani et al. 2012 
80. Male  female ratio in employment Sobhani et al. 2012 
81. Training employees through in-house Programmes Dutta and Bose, 2007; Sobhani et al. 2012 
82. Healthy and safe workplace for staff Sobhani et al. 2012 
83. Healthcare facilities for the employees Sobhani et al. 2012 
84. Other loan facilities to the employees Sobhani et al. 2012 
85. Provisions for maternity and paternity leaves Sobhani et al. 2012 
86. Disclosure on child labour or free from child labour Sobhani et al. 2012 
87. Appreciating customers for their support Sobhani et al. 2012 
88. Customer service and facilities Sobhani et al. 2012 
89. Information related to new products Sobhani et al. 2012; Sobhani et al. 2012 
90. Information on the ground of the products & service Dutta and Bose, 2007; Sobhani et al. 2012 
91. µ5HVHDUFK	GHYHORSPHQW¶IRUSURGXFWV	VHUYLFHV Sobhani et al. 2012 
92. Complaints received and resolution Information GRI 2006; Sobhani et al. 2012 
93. Arrangement for receiving complaints GRI 2006; Sobhani et al. 2012 
94. Corporate policy and strategy for sustainable 
development 
ACCA 2005; Sobhani et al. 2012 
95. Future cash flow forecast SAI (2002), Gul and Leung (2004), Lim et al. (2007), Abdel-Fatah (2008), 
Rouf (2011). 
96. Market share forecast Gul and Leung (2004), Lim et al. (2007), Abdel-Fatah (2008), Rouf 
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(2011). 
97. Competitor analysis- quantitative and qualitative Hossain et al. (1994), Haniffa and Cooke (2002), Barako et al. (2006), 
GRI (2006), Lim et al. (2007), Abdel-Fatah (2008). 
98. Factors that may affect future performance Barako et al. (2006), 
99. Planned advertising and publicity expenditure  Rouf (2011). 
100. Amount spent for sustainability activities GRI (2006), Sobhani et al. (2012). 
 H. Investor Related Information  
101. Name of investor relations officer Dutta and Bose, 2007 
102. E-mail to investor relations Dutta and Bose, 2007 
103. Phone number to investor relations Dutta and Bose, 2007 
104. Postal address to investor relations Dutta and Bose, 2007 
105. Frequently asked questions Bhuyan et al. 2007; Dutta and Bose, 2007 
106. Financial Calendar Dutta and Bose, 2007 
107. One click Current news Bhuyan et al. 2007; Dutta and Bose, 2007  
108. One click Investor relation Bhuyan et al. 2007; Dutta and Bose, 2007 
109. Future plan Bhuyan et al. 2007 
110. Proxy form Bhuyan et al. 2007 
111. Financial statement signed Bhuyan et al. 2007 
112. Webmail Bhuyan et al. 2007 
113. Online investor information order service Dutta and Bose, 2007 
 I. Presentation Format  
114. Financial data in Processable format: Spread sheet Bhuyan et al. 2007 
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compatible (xls), or ASCII(txt)  
115. Format of annual report (current) PDF or http Bhuyan et al. 2007; Dutta and Bose, 2007 
116. Audio/ video files Bhuyan et al. 2007; Dutta and Bose, 2007 
117. English version of annual report Bhuyan et al. 2007; Dutta and Bose, 2007 
118. Web-site (English version) Bhuyan et al. 2007; Dutta and Bose, 2007 
119. Search engine Bhuyan et al. 2007; Dutta and Bose, 2007 
120. Site map Bhuyan et al. 2007 
121. Links to related sites Bhuyan et al. 2007 
122. Feedback Bhuyan et al. 2007 
123. The use of graphics Dutta and Bose, 2007 
124. Hyperlinks to accounting data Dutta and Bose, 2007 
125. Trend data and analysis Dutta and Bose, 2007 
126. Date last modified Dutta and Bose, 2007 
127. Mailing list/ e-mail news alert Dutta and Bose, 2007 
128. Availability of help section Dutta and Bose, 2007 
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Appendix C: Mandatory Disclosure Scatter Plots 
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Appendix D: Voluntary Disclosure Scatter Plots 
